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The sun came up with no conclusion
Flowers sleeping in their beds
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I’m wide-awake, it’s morning
Road to Joy
Bright Eyes
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Thesis Overview
“So, what should I do?” is the big question this thesis is concerned with. Indeed,
this is the query each player asks himself when in the middle of a game he has to make
his move, as in Part I. And then, again, this is the question that one needs to answer
in Part II when considering a stochastic optimal control problem in the framework of
stochastic volatility modeling.
Part I. A class of mean field games with state dynamics governed by jump-
diffusion processes with controlled jumps
In a nutshell, game theory studies the behaviour of a bunch of decision makers,
called players or agents, when interacting in strategic situations. This means that the
outcome of this interaction, which may be different for every participant, depends not
only on one’s individual choices but also on the decisions taken by the other players.
This connection ties together all the players, meaning that each agent cannot choose the
strategy which maximises its preferences without considering the choices made by the
others. Initially formalized by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in [VNM], over the past
seven decades game theory results have been deeply and widely applied and extended
to represent different situations in countless contexts. And the reason is straightforward
since, as social animals, human beings are required to confront themselves into strategic
decisions on a daily basis.
The distinctive trait of the class of non-cooperative, symmetric games with mean-
field interactions we focus on is the fact that the state evolution of any player is given
by a jump-diffusion process, where the size of the jumps is controlled by the player
itself. Mean-field interaction refers to the fact that, by construction, both the dynamics
of the private state and the possible outcomes of each player depend on the opposing
players only through their overall distribution. This class of games is presented in
Chapter 1. Considering non-cooperative games, the aim is to discuss the existence of
a Nash equilibrium for them, and possibly to compute it. A Nash equilibrium, firstly
introduced by Nash in [Nas+50; Nas51], is a set of strategies, one for each player, that
are optimal for each of them when they are simultaneously played. In other words, none
of the players has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from it, since no other strategy can
improve his outcome if the strategies of the others remain unchanged. Unfortunately, this
is easier said than done, being the computation of Nash equilibria a quite hard problem
vin general. However, since the games studied here are symmetric and charachterised by
an interaction of mean-field type, it is possible to overcome (some of) these issues by
considering their limiting game, that is the game arising when the number of players
grows to infinity, which is in general easier to study. This is the main subject of the
mean-field game theory, introduced by Lasry and Lions in [LL06a; LL06b; LL07] and,
independently, by Huang, Malhame´, and Caines in [HMC06] combining ideas from the
interacting particle system theory and results from the game theory. The key idea is that
when the number of the intervening (homogeneous) players is large enough, the impact
of one particular individual becomes morally negligible compared to the impact due to
the overall population, and therefore it is possible to develop an efficient decision-rule by
paying particular attention on the aggregate behaviour rather than on each individual
player’s choice. Chapter 2 studies the existence of a mean-field game solution for the
class of games introduced in the previous chapter by means of relaxed controls, introduced
by Lacker in [Lac15a] and, independently, by Fischer in [Fis+17]. A mean-field game
solution of the limiting game provides useful information also regarding the finite-player
games and indeed it can be exploited to compute an approximate Nash equilibrium for
them, at least when the number of agents is big enough, as examined in Chapter 3.
Lastly, Chapter 4 presents a possible economic application of the class of games
previously introduced: financial institutions, that are the players of this game, interact on
an interbank lending market, aiming at controlling their level of reserves to balance their
investment portfolio and, at the same time, to meet regulatory requirements. Assuming
that this market is illiquid, each bank can access to it and therefore adjust its reserve
level by borrowing or lending money only at some exogenously given instants, modeled
as jump times of a Poisson process with constant intensity, which in turn represents a
health indicator of the whole system.
Part II. An optimal control approach to stochastic volatility models
Stochastic control theory concerns dynamical systems whose evolution is modeled
by stochastic differential equations depending on a control input which is chosen to
reach the best possible outcome. Chapter 5 presents a (very short) introduction to
stochastic optimal control theory in the case of continuous-time Markov diffusion pro-
cesses, collecting well-known results which are used in the subsequent chapter. If the
deterministic case has been a classical topic since the 1600s, optimal control in stochas-
tic systems is a more recent theory: introduced by Bellman in the mid ‘50s in [Bel58],
it has been widely applied in finance since the late ‘60s, when Merton formulated his
portfolio-consumption model in [Mer69; Mer75] and then Black and Scholes presented
their mathematical model, which bears their names, representing a financial market con-
taining derivative instruments and leading to determine the fair price of a European call
option. Starting from this single query, the results in stochastic optimal control were
used to solve several problems and to answer to disparate questions in different economic
fields.
Chapter 6 formulates and discusses the stochastic optimization problem that is
vi
the main scope of Part II characterised by a system whose state evolves accordingly to
a diffusion process with (partially) controlled stochastic volatility. Stochastic volatility
models were introduced in the late ‘80s to overcome some biases of the most used models
at that time, inter alia, the Black and Scholes pricing equation which nonetheless is still
daily used, and therefore to better describe financial data series. The model considered
here is a modification of the Heston model, presented in [Hes93]. Indeed, the state is
described by a Heston process, except that a multiplicative control is added into its
volatility component. The main objective is to consider the possible role of an external
actor, whose exogenous contribution is summarised in the control itself.
Part I
A class of mean field games with
state dynamics governed by
jump-diffusion processes with
controlled jumps
Chapter 1
A class of mean field games with
controlled jumps in the state
dynamics
Every human being faces the surrounding world everyday by taking decisions and
making choices based on their personal preferences and values. Being in a social environ-
ment, their behaviuors and their choices cannot ignore the social and cultural structure
where they take place. Reservations in fancy hotels depend on the feedback read on
review sites, the car one decides to buy is conditioned by advertising and by the car
models driven by their neighbours, political preferences depend on the education one
receives, on the discussions with the coworkers, on the opinion polls reported in the
media and much more. We all are affected by the choices made by our families, by our
friends and by our colleagues.
But at the same time, we write reviews about the hotels where we have stayed
overnight, we zip around the city on our brand-new cars and we try to convince our office
mates that our political opinion is, quite obviously, the right one. So, even if affected,
we influence the choices made by our families, by our friends and by our colleagues as
well.
Furthermore, one’s own behaviour and the one of other people influence not only
the choices that every person makes, but also the outcomes of different situations one is
in: which party will run the country after the next round of election? How much will
the new Audi cost? Since, in principle, different people may have different wishes and
preferences, the desired outcome may converge towards a same result or may diverge
leading to a conflicting situation.
It would seem that as members of a economical, political and social life, each of us
is actively playing a game whenever making a choice.
Consider, as an example, a number of firms producing a similar good and therefore
competing in the same market (as in [GLL11],[CS15]). Each producer chooses its level of
3production knowing that the resulting aggregate supply, and therefore the resulting price,
depends not only on his choice but also on the strategies adopted by its competitors. If
the aim is to maximise one’s own gain, which is the proper level each producer has to
choose?
Or, consider the consensus problem (as in [OSFM07], [Nou+13]). A group of people
is required to agree on a final decision concerning a certain subject. Clearly, regarding
one’s own preferences, each person would prefer an outcome rather than another ending
and may try to convince the others of the goodness of its own beliefs. Then, the final
agreement depends upon the preferences and the persuasive skills of all the people.
Decision-makers’ interaction is the main subject of game theory, and in particular
mean field game theory studies a class of differential decision problems characterised by
a large (say huge, or better infinite) number of small and similar (say identical) players
which are coupled together through their empirical average. Models with too many
agents who mutually interact may be inefficient from a mathematical point of view,
since it is not possible to consider simultaneously the dynamics of all the players, all
their possible choices and all the ways these choices reflect on the other participants.
Indeed, it would mean considering too many coupled equations and too many constraints
at the same time, which may be not feasible. Actually, such a model would describe
every detail of the reality, but it would be humanly and, even worse, computationally
impossible to be solved. Therefore, the aim of mean field game theory is to simplify
a (specific) class of large population games to make them more tractable, but without
losing their meaning. Somehow, mean field games look at the big picture.
Mean Field Games (MFGs, henceforth) were introduced by Lasry and Lions in
[LL06a; LL06b; LL07] and, independently, by Huang, Malhame´, and Caines in [HMC06]
combining ideas from the interacting particle system theory and results from the game
theory. Interacting particles become here interacting decision makers, i.e. rational play-
ers provided with preferences and goals who interact in a strategic situation, meaning
that the outcome of the game for each of them depends on its own actions as well as
on the strategies chosen by all the other players. Therefore, the behaviour of the peers
becomes a crucial variable in computing one’s own optimal strategy. Then, considering
again the analogy with an interacting particle system, the outcome of a game is not the
sum of the forces as in a physics model, but it is the sum of rational choices made by the
players. In [GLL11], the authors strongly support that the primary purpose of MFGs is
not (or not only) to compute and describe the inevitable result of a strategic game but it
is to explain why the inevitable emergent phenomenon is a natural response of coherent
behaviours.
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the class of MFGs we will study in the
following. Section 1.1 presents Gn: a non cooperative, symmetric, n-player game with
mean-field interaction. Here we define how the state of each player evolves in time, what
is his own personal objective and how the other participants may influence both his
dynamics and his outcome. Particular attention will be paid to the characteristics of
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these games which guarantee the possibility of introducing the corresponding theoretical
limiting game. This is the mean field game G∞ arising when the number of players n
grows to infinity, which is introduced in Section 1.2 along with the concept of mean field
game solution.
1.1 The n-player game Gn
We present here the n-player game Gn, a non cooperative, symmetric game with
mean-field coupling that is the main interest of the Part I of this Thesis.
Let T > 0 be a fixed and finite time horizon and let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) be a filtered
probability space, supporting n independent Brownian motions W i, for i = 1, . . . , n,
and n independent Poisson processes N i, for i = 1, . . . , n with the same time-dependent
intensity function ν(t).The filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is assumed to satisfy the usual conditions,
meaning that it is complete, i.e. F0 contains all the P -null sets, and it is right-continuous,
i.e.
Ft =
⋂
s>t
Fs for all t ∈ [0, T ] .
The state of each player i in the game, denoted by Xi,nt and belonging to the real
space, evolves in time accordingly to the following stochastic differential equation
dXi,nt = b(t,X
i,n
t , µ
n
t ) dt+ σ(t,X
i,n
t ) dW
i
t + β(t,X
i,n
t− , µ
n
t−, γ
i
t) dN˜
i
t , (1.1)
subjected to a given initial condition
Xi,n0 = ξ
i.
Here, N˜ it denotes the compensated Poisson process N˜
i
t = N˜
i
t −
∫ t
0 ν(s) ds and µ
n stands
for the empirical measure of the system Xn = (X1,n, . . . , Xn,n), which is defined for any
time t ∈ [0, T ] as
µnt =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ
Xi,nt
, (1.2)
where δx denotes the Dirac delta measure at the point x. In addition we assume that
the initial conditions ξi, i = 1, . . . , n, are mutually independent real-valued random
variables, all distributed according to the same distribution χ and that they are also
independent from the noises W i, N i introduced before.
Observe that the functions b, σ and β appearing in the SDEs (1.1) do not depend on
the specific player i, meaning that they are equal for any agent even if computed relative
to the different players’ positions/strategies.
Each player i has the chance to control his position, or better the dynamics defining
his state, by choosing at any time t ∈ [0, T ] a control input γit . Each control process
γi = (γit)t∈[0,T ], also called the strategy chosen by player i, takes values in the action
space A ⊂ R and it is assumed to be predictable and regular enough to assure the well
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definition of the SDE (1.1). This class of strategies is called the set of the admissible
control processes and it is termed Ai. We assume that the admissibility of a control does
not depend on which specific agent is going to play it, i.e. Ai = A for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Then, an admissible strategy profile γ for the game Gn, also called simply an admissible
strategy, is an n-tuple (γ1, . . . , γn) of admissible controls γi ∈ A for all i = 1, . . . , n,
collecting the control processes chosen by each player.
Observe that strategies can be distinguished between open-loop strategies, if they
depend only on the time variable, i.e. γi = γi(t), and feedback strategies, if the decision
rule selects an action as a function also of the current state of the system x, i.e. γi =
γi(t, x). The more appropriate type depends on the context and in particular it is due to
the information each player has: if any player has knowledge only of the initial state of
the system and he cannot observe either the state of the system or the strategies chosen
by the other players, it is natural to consider open-loop strategies, whereas, it is more
suitable to consider feedback strategies if the players can observe the state of the system
at any time.
Remark 1.1.1. In the following, we will require precise regularity conditions, both on the
dynamics (1.1) and on the admissible strategies A, so as to guarantee the existence of a
unique strong solution to the SDEs (1.1).
Compared to the setting introduced in [Lac15a], which is a key reference for this
Part I, the dynamics of all players in this game are given by jump-diffusion processes
rather than continuous-time diffusion processes. This provides greater flexibility in the
modeling of the players’ dynamics.
In equation (1.1), the control of each player γi appears in the function β which
multiplies the corresponding compensated Poisson Process N˜ i, meaning that player i can
affect the magnitude of the jumps appearing in his dynamics whereas, as formulated, no
control is set on when these jumps occur. Indeed, the intensity function of the Poisson
processes, ν(t), which is the same for all players, is not influenced by any control.
Remark 1.1.2. It should be pointed out that a control component could be also applied
to the drift term b and to the diffusive component σ. This problem is already faced,
and solved, in [Lac15a] and this is the main reason we skip it here. However, a more
complete study is presented in [BCDP17a].
The dynamics of the n players are explicitly coupled together through the empirical
distribution of their positions, µn. Although no strategy appears in the dynamics of
player i but its own, the whole strategy profile (γ1, . . . , γn) has an implicit impact on
the dynamics Xi,n, i.e. Xi,n = Xi,n(γ). Indeed, Xi,n depends on the measure flow
µn = (µnt )t∈[0,T ], whose evolution is in turn affected by the choices made by all the
players in the game, since it depends on the state of all the agents. It will be relevant in
the following observing that the empirical distribution is the only source of interaction
among the evolution of the players’ states, since this is the only way Xj,n and γj may
influence Xi,n if i 6= j.
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Each player takes part in the game in the hope of optimizing his outcome. The result
of Gn relative to player i is given by the expected cost J
i,n, defined as
J i,n = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xi,nt , µ
n
t , γ
i
t) dt+ g(X
i,n
T , µ
n
T )
]
, (1.3)
and therefore player i aims to minimise it. As for the dynamics, also in the cost criterion,
both the running cost function f and the terminal cost function g, which depend on the
state and the strategy of the player and on the empirical distribution, are equal for each
player, but then computed with respect to the different players’ positions/strategies.
Furthermore, by its definition, the expected cost faced by player i, J i,n, depends on the
opponents’ choices, i.e. J i,n = J i,n(γ1, . . . , γn), due to (and only through) the empirical
measure µn.
As pointed out before, by construction, both the dynamics of the private state, given
in equation (1.1), and the cost functions, in equation (1.3), of each player depend on
the opposing players only through the distribution of all the participants, µn. This kind
of coupling is said to be of mean-field type. Inter alia, mean field interaction implies
that the dependence on the opponents is anonymous: for each agent it is irrelevant
which other particular player chooses which specific control but he cares only about the
resulting aggregate state position. In other words, considering player i, a permutation
of the other players’ identities would lead unchanged the population distribution µn and
therefore would not modify the game from his point of view since both his dynamics and
his cost functions are invariant under such a permutation.
As defined, Gn is a non cooperative game, meaning that each agent pursues his own
interest which in principle may conflict with the goals of the other players. In multi-
person decision making problem, the meaning of optimality is not univocal, and in the
following we will always consider Nash optimality.
Notation. Given an admissible strategy profile γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ An and any admissible
control η ∈ A, (η, γ−i) denotes a further admissible strategy where player i deviates from
γ by playing η, wheres all the other players continue playing γj , j 6= i, i.e.
(η, γ−i) = (γ1, . . . , γi−1, η, γi+1, . . . , γn) .
Then,
Definition 1.1.1. An admissible strategy profile γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ An is a Nash equi-
librium of the n-player game Gn if for each i = 1, . . . , n and for any admissible strategy
η ∈ A
J i,n(η, γ−i) ≥ J i,n(γ) . (1.4)
This definition states that a strategy profile γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) is a Nash equilibrium for
the game Gn if no player has the incentive to unilaterally deviate from it by playing any
1.1 The n-player game Gn 7
different admissible strategy. Indeed, considering any i, γi is a best response of player i
if his opponents play accordingly to γ, i.e.
γi = arg min
η∈A
J i,n(η, γ−i)
and a unilateral change would lead to a higher (or at least not lower) expected cost.
Sometimes, explicitly computing a Nash equilibrium of a game, or even proving its
existence, is a too difficult task and therefore a slightly weaker equilibrium concept is
introduced. Namely,
Definition 1.1.2. For a given ε ≥ 0, an admissible strategy profile γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈
An is an ε-Nash equilibrium of the n-player game Gn if for each i = 1, . . . , n and for
any admissible strategy η ∈ A
J i,n(η, γ−i) ≥ J i,n(γ)− ε . (1.5)
Naturally, a Nash equilibrium of the game Gn is a 0-Nash equilibrium.
In other words, a strategy profile (γ1, . . . , γn) is an ε-Nash equilibrium if for each player
in the game an unilateral change of his strategy when the others remain unchanged may
lower the expected cost, but providing a maximum saving of ε.
Remark 1.1.3. In the two previous definitions, both Nash and ε-Nash equilibrium are
defined with respect to open loop strategies. Analogously, these definitions can also be
rewritten considering feedback strategies, but a clarification is necessary. Let γi(t, x)
be the feedback rule of player i 6= 1 and consider what happen when player 1 deviates:
since the state processes depend on the mean measure of the system, they depend on the
control of the deviating player and then, even if the feedback function γi is kept fixed,
the resulting strategy γi(t,Xi,nt ) differs form the one in the initial scenario, violating
the Definitions 1.1.1 and 1.1.2. In this case a different notion of equilibrium may be
consider, the so called feedback Nash equilibrium.
By its definition, searching for a Nash equilibrium means solving, simultaneously, n
optimization problems which are coupled together and, in turn, rely on n dynamic state
processes that are also coupled together. Then, the difficulty of such a task is clear.
Moreover, the complexity of this problem becomes larger and larger as the number of
players increases. However MFG theory is a powerful tool to investigate the existence
of a (approximate) Nash equilibrium at least for particular symmetric games when the
number of the intervening agents is pretty large and the impact of one particular indi-
vidual may be negligible compared to the influence of the overall population. We briefly
present the fundamental underlying idea of this theory in the following section.
A crucial characteristic of these games Gn, which will allow tractability for the cor-
responding limiting game and it is a common requirement in MFG theory, is their
symmetry. First, the population in the game is required to be of homogeneous players,
meaning that the dynamics and the objectives of all the agents are provided by the same
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functions. This is our case since the functions b, σ and β appearing in the dynamics (1.1)
and the cost functions f and g in equation (1.3) do not depend on the specific player,
although then they are evaluated at the state of the related player. Second, as pointed
out before, the interaction between the players is of mean-field type and therefore the
opponents are anonymous since, for each player, a permutation of the other agents’
identity does not modify the game.
1.2 The limiting game G∞
In a game with a small number of players the position, and thus the strategy, of
one single agent can significantly affect the distribution of the state across the players,
µn, and therefore the outcome of the game. On the contrary, when the number of in-
tervening agents in a homogeneous population grows to infinity, the behaviour of just
one single player becomes morally negligible in the aggregate. In this case, large popu-
lation condition can be exploited to develop efficient decision-rules by paying particular
attention on the population behaviour rather than on each individual player’s choice.
See [HMC06]. Indeed, assuming that the population is distributed according to a given
distribution, if the number of players is big enough, when a singular player deviates
from his position in favor to a different one the population distribution does not move
significantly. Therefore the deviation of just one player is not substantially felt by the
other participants. This is the so called decoupling effect. Clearly, what has been said
strongly depends on the fact that the interaction among the agents is of mean field type,
otherwise this would not be true.
Therefore, in a symmetric game with a large homogeneous population and mean
field interaction, it is possible to focus on just one representative player, say player p,
and summarize the contribution of all his opponents through the population distribution,
that is a measure flow µ = (µt)t∈[0,T ], where µt is a probability distribution over the state
space, in our case µt ∈ P(R). The crucial point is that, since (at least theoretically) the
impact of the choice of player p does not influence the population distribution, he can
consider µ as a fixed deterministic function µ : [0, T ] → P(R) when he searches for his
optimal control among all the possible admissible strategies.
In the following we consider the naive, theoretical generalization of the previous game
Gn to the the case when the number of players is infinite. We refer to this game as G∞.
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions,
supporting a Brownian motion W and a Poisson process N with intensity ν(t). The
state of the representative player p, X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ], moves accordingly to
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt) dt+ σ(t,Xt) dWt + β(t,Xt−, µt−, γt) dN˜t , (1.6)
subjected to the initial condition
X0 = ξ ∼ χ .
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As before, assumptions granting the existence of a unique strong solution to the SDE (1.6)
will be given in the following and for now we denote by A the admissible strategies that
player p can choose from. Since different choices for the control process γ leads to dif-
ferent controlled dynamics, we will sometime stress this dependence by writing X(γ) or
Xγ to denote the solution to the SDE (1.6) under γ ∈ A.
The effectiveness of an admissible strategy γ is evaluated accordingly to the expected
cost of the game J = J(γ), which is defined by
J = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xγt , µt, γt) dt+ g(X
γ
T , µT )
]
. (1.7)
The definition of the expected cost J is equal to the one in the game Gn. However, since
at this point the impact of the choice of player p no longer influences the population
distribution being µ considered as fixed, then the outcome J depends directly only on
the strategy γ chosen by the representative player p. Therefore, player p now faces a
single-agent optimization problem and thus an admissible strategy γˆ ∈ A is optimal if
it attains the minimum of the expected cost, i.e.
J(γˆ) = inf
γ∈A
J(γ) .
Clearly, an optimal strategy γˆ depends by definition on the population distribution µ
which is selected at the beginning. Therefore, it still depends on the choices of all the
opponents that are summarised in this measure flow µ, but nevertheless, contrary to the
previous case, they are kept fixed in this optimization step.
The subsequent step regards consistency for the choice of the measure flow µ that
player p considers when optimizing. In a nutshell, due to the symmetry of the pre-limit
game Gn the statistical properties of the representative player should approximate the
empirical distribution generated by all the participants. Indeed, since all the infinite
players in the game are identical (their dynamics solve the same SDE (1.6), their objec-
tives matches and they interact symmetrically), being in the same situation, they would
all act in the same way, meaning that they would all choose the same strategy. This
means that an optimal strategy γˆ for player p is optimal also for all the other players
when they are in place of p. Consequently, also the statistical distribution of the opti-
mally controlled state X γˆ would be the same for all the players, and therefore it must
coincide with the population distribution, i.e.
L(X γˆ) = µ . (1.8)
In other words, a fixed measure flow µ is consistent if the optimal behaviour of the
representative player computed with respect to it, i.e. γˆ(µ), generates this exactly
measure flow µ. In economics, this is called the rational expectation hypothesis, here,
in this game framework, we refer to condition (1.8) as the MFG consistency condition.
Therefore,
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Definition 1.2.1. A mean field game solution for the game G∞ is an admissible process
γˆ ∈ A that is optimal, meaning that γˆ ∈ arg minγ∈A J(γ), and, at the same time, it is
such that the related controlled dynamics X γˆ satisfies the MFG consistency condition
µt = L(X γˆt ) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
A mean field game solution γˆ of G∞ is said to be Markovian if there exists a mea-
surable function γˆ : [0, T ]× R→ A such that γˆt = γˆ(t,Xt−).
So, a MFG solution represents an equilibrium relationship between the individual strate-
gies, required to be best responses to the infinite population behaviour, and the overall
population distribution, required to be collectively determined by the players’ strategies.
The existence of a mean field game solution for this game G∞ is the main subject of
Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3 we look for an approximate Nash equilibrium for the n-player game Gn,
for any n large enough. The construction of these equilibria will strongly depend on the
existence of a (regular enough) MFG solution of the limiting game G∞. Indeed, there
are two different ways to justify why G∞ may be intended as the limit of the games
Gn and therefore why we refer to G∞ as limiting game: convergence or approximation
results. The latter refers to the fact that a Markovian MFG solution for G∞ may
allow to construct approximate Nash equilibria for the corresponding n-player games,
at least if the number of players n is large enough. In particular, we will show that
if there exists a Markovian MFG solution γˆ = γˆ(t,Xt−) for G∞, then the strategy
profile (γˆ(t,X1,nt− (γˆ)), . . . , γˆ(t,X
n,n
t− (γˆ))) is a εn-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding
game Gn, with the sequence εn satisfying εn → 0 as n → ∞. This approximation
result is also practically relevant since a direct verification of the existence of Nash
equilibria for n-player games when n is very large is usually not feasible. Furthermore,
the computation of these possible equilibria is not even numerically feasible, due to the
curse of dimensionality. See, e.g., [HMC06], [KLY11], [CD13a], [CD13b], [CL15] as well
as the recent book [Car16] for further details.
On the other hand, the key question in the convergence approach is if and in which
sense a sequence of Nash equilibria for the n-player games Gn converges towards a MFG
solution of a limiting game. Assuming that for each n the game Gn admits a Nash
equilibrium γˆ = (γˆ1, . . . , γˆn) then we expect that, at least heuristically, the empirical
measure µn computed with respect to the optimally controlled processes Xi,n(γˆ) con-
verges to a deterministic measure flow µ and that, in the light of the above observations,
this measure µ coincides with the distribution of the optimally controlled state X γˆ . In
other words, a mean field game solution γˆ for the game G∞ should minimise
J = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X γˆt ,L(X γˆt ), γˆt) dt+ g(X γˆT ,L(X γˆT ))
]
,
subjected to X γˆ solving the McKean-Vlasov SDE{
dX γˆt = b(t,X
γˆ
t ,L(X γˆt )) + σ(t,X γˆt ) dWt + β(t−, X γˆt−,L(X γˆt−, γˆt−)) dN˜t ,
X0 = ξ .
1.2 The limiting game G∞ 11
These results are collected under the name propagation of chaos, see, e.g., [Szn91]. While
the uncontrolled counter-part of MFG, that is particle systems and propagation of chaos
for jump processes, has been thoroughly studied in the probabilistic literature (see, e.g.,
[Gra92; JMW08; ADPF]), MFGs with jumps have not attracted much attention so far.
Indeed, most of the existing literature focuses on non-linear dynamics with continuous
paths, with the exception of few papers such as [HAA14], [KLY11] and the more recent
[CF17]. We do not address this problem for games Gn in the present work.
Chapter 2
Existence of a solution for the
mean field game G∞
In this chapter we study the stochastic differential game G∞ introduced in the pre-
vious Chapter 1. Section 2.1 briefly recalls the mean field game G∞, highlighting its
main characteristics and the main difficulties involved in its study. To overcome these
issues, the previous game is modified and re-written from the perspective of the relaxed
controls. Section 2.2 contains the main result of this chapter, that is the existence of
a relaxed mean field game solution for G∞ whereas Section 2.3 investigates conditions
guaranteeing that a relaxed Markovian mean field game solution can be built.
The novel contributions of what presented here are contained in [BCDP17a]. The
main reference for this chapter is [Lac15a].
2.1 The relaxed MFG problem G∞
As introduced in Chapter 1, the MFG G∞ we are interest in is the following. Fixed a
finite time horizon T > 0, let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) be a filtered probability space, which
satisfies the usual conditions and supports a standard Brownian motion W and a Poisson
process N with intensity function ν(t). These two processes W and N are assumed to be
independent. The real-valued state variable X, which is controlled through the process
γ, i.e. X = Xγ , follows the dynamics
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt) dt+ σ(t,Xt) dWt + β(t,Xt−, µt−, γt) dN˜t, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.1)
with initial condition X0 = ξ distributed according to a real-valued probability distribu-
tion χ ∈ P(R). Here, µ represents a measure flow, meaning that µ : [0, T ]→ µt ∈ P(R) is
a given deterministic function, whose precise meaning will be explained in what follows.
An admissible control process, called also an admissible strategy, is any predictable
control process γ = (γt)t∈[0,T ] taking values in a fixed action space A ⊂ R and guaran-
teeing that the SDE (2.1) admits a unique strong solution. The set of all the admissible
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controls is denoted by A. Then, a control process is chosen in order to minimise the
expected cost
J(γ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, µt, γt)dt+ g(XT , µT )
]
,
and therefore γˆ ∈ A is said to be optimal if
J(γˆ) = inf
γ∈A
J(γ) . (2.2)
According to Definition 1.2.1, an optimal strategy γˆ is a MFG solution for the game G∞
if the related controlled state Xˆ = X(γˆ) satisfies the MFG consistency condition (1.8),
that is L(Xˆt) = µt for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Our aim is to prove the existence of such a solution.
The own definition of mean field game solution, Definition 1.2.1, provides a (possible)
constructive algorithm to build a solution for the MFG G∞. Indeed, this problem can
be solved by splitting it into two parts:
1. Optimization problem. Consider a fixed measure flow µ and solve the stochastic
minimisation problem infγ∈A J(γ) finding the set of all the optimal strategies γˆ =
γˆ(µ), say Aˆ(µ), which attain the minimum expected cost. Since µ is treated as an
exogenous parameter, it is non affected by the choice of the control strategy γˆ.
Clearly, the existence of an optimal control is not granted for free and existence
analysis has to be developed;
2. Fixed point problem. Find, if there exists, a fixed point of the correspondence
Φ: µ 7→ {L(X γˆt )t∈[0,T ] : γˆ ∈ Aˆ(µ)} . (2.3)
If it exists, then the optimal control process γ∗ ∈ Aˆ(µ) which provides the fixed
point condition L(Xγ∗) = µ is a MFG solution of the game G∞.
Observe that, at least theoretically, the optimization problem in the previous step
should be solved for any measure flow µ.
The main difficulty in the present approach is to show the existence of a fixed point
for the mapping Φ. Indeed, classical results require the continuity of Φ, which is hard
to prove. Lacker in [Lac15a] and, independently, Fischer in [Fis+17] introduce a new
powerful approach, the martingale approach, to avoid the direct study of the regularity
of the correspondence Φ by means of the so called relaxed controls. The basic idea is to
re-define the state variable and the controls on a suitable canonical space supporting all
the randomness sources involved in the SDE (2.1), and identify the solution to the MFG
G∞ no longer with a stochastic process γ but with a probability measure P that can be
seen as the joint law of the control-state pair. Therefore, finding a relaxed solution to
the MFG above will boil down to finding a fixed point for a different suitably defined
set-valued map, easier to study.
The rest of this section introduces the notation used throughout the chapter and
sets up the main assumptions on the state variable and the cost functions as well as the
precise definition of the relaxed mean field game G∞.
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2.1.1 Notation
A real-valued function defined on the time interval [0, T ], x : [0, T ]→ R, is said to be
ca`dla`g if it is continuous from the right at all t ∈ [0, T ) and with finite left limit for all
t ∈ (0, T ]. The set of all real-valued ca`dla`g functions defined on [0, T ] will be denoted
by D = D([0, T ];R). Then, it is well known that
Theorem 2.1.1. Each x ∈ D is a bounded, Borel measurable function with either finite
or countably infinite discontinuities.
Proof. See, e.g., [Whi07].
This space D can be endowed with the Skorohod topology J1. Let Λ be the set of
strictly increasing functions ι : [0, T ] → [0, T ] such that ι, along with its inverse ι−1, is
continuous. Then for any x, y ∈ D, J1-metric on D is defined by
dJ1(x, y) = inf
ι∈Λ
{‖x ◦ ι− y‖∞ ∨ ‖ι− I‖∞} ,
where I denotes the identity map. J1 denotes the topology induced by this metric. A
peculiar property of the Skorohod J1 topology is that whenever xn → x with respect
to J1 then both the magnitudes and the locations of the jumps of xn converge to those
of x. Moreover, the space (D,J1) is Polish. See [Whi07, Chapter 3-11-12] for further
details on the ca`dla`g space and the Skorohod topology J1.
Given any metric space (S, d), B(S) denotes the Borel σ-field of S induced by d.
Then P(S) stands for the set of all probability measures defined on the measurable space
(S,B(S)). Furthermore, for any p ≥ 1, Pp(S) ⊂ P(S) denotes the set all probabilities
on S such that
∫
S d(x, x0)
pP (dx) <∞ for some (hence for all) x0 ∈ S. The space Pp(S)
will be endowed with the Wasserstein metric dW,p that is defined for any µ, η ∈ Pp(S)
by
dW,p(µ, η) = inf
pi∈Π(µ,η)
(∫
S×S
|x− y|p pi(dx, dy)
) 1
p
, (2.4)
where
Π(µ, η) = {pi ∈ P(S × S) : pi has marginals µ, η} .
More details on the Wasserstein metric can be found in [Vil08, Chapter 6].
For any measure µ ∈ Pp(S) for S being either R or D we will use the notation
|µ|p =
∫
R
|x|pµ(dx),
‖µ‖pt =
∫
D
(|x|∗t )pµ(dx), |x|∗t := sup
s∈[0,t]
|x(s)| .
Moreover, unless otherwise stated, given two measurable spaces (S1,Σ1) and (S2,Σ2),
the product space S1 × S2 will always be endowed with the product σ-fields Σ1 × Σ2 =
σ({B1 ×B2 : B1 ∈ Σ1 , B2 ∈ Σ2}).
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2.1.2 Assumptions
In order to prove the existence of a solution for the MFG G∞ the coefficient functions
b, σ, β, the costs f, g, the initial distribution χ of the state process X and the intensity
measure ν are required to be regular enough, that is to satisfy the following assumptions.
Assumption A. Let p′ > p ≥ 1 be given real numbers.
(A.1) The initial distribution χ belongs to Pp′(R).
(A.2) The intensity measure of the Poisson process ν : [0, T ]→ R+ is bounded, meaning
that there exists a positive constant cν such that for all t ∈ [0, T ]
|ν(t)| ≤ cν .
(A.3) The coefficient functions b : [0, T ] × R × Pp(R) → R, σ : [0, T ] × R → R and
β : [0, T ]×R×Pp(R)×A→ R, as well as the costs f : [0, T ]×R×Pp(R)×A→ R
and g : R× Pp(R)→ R are (jointly) continuous functions in all their variables.
(A.4) The functions b, σ and β are Lipschitz continuous with respect to the state variable
and the mean measure, meaning that there exists a constant c1 > 0 such that for
all t ∈ [0, T ], x, y ∈ R, µ, η ∈ Pp(R) and α ∈ A
|b(t, x, µ)− b(t, y, η)|+ |σ(t, x)− σ(t, y)|+ |β(t, x, µ, α)− β(t, y, η, α)|
≤ c1 (|x− y|+ dW,p(µ, η))
and in their whole domain satisfy the growth condition
|b(t, x, µ)|+ ∣∣σ2(t, x)∣∣+ |β(t, x, µ, α)| ≤ c1(1 + |x|+ (∫
R
|z|p µ(dz)
) 1
p
+ |α|
)
.
(A.5) The cost functions f and g satisfy the following growth conditions
−c2 (1 + |x|p + |µ|p) + c3 |α|p
′ ≤ f(t, x, µ, α) ≤ c2
(
1 + |x|p + |µ|p + |α|p′
)
,
|g(x, µ)| ≤ c2 (1 + |x|p + |µ|p) ,
for each t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ R, µ ∈ Pp(R) and α ∈ A for some positive constant c2 > 0.
Without loss of generality we can assume c1 = c2 = cν .
(A.6) The control space A is a closed subset of R.
The reason why Assumption A is required will be more clear in the proofs. How-
ever it is worth noting that conditions (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) ensure the existence of
a unique strong solution of the SDE (2.1) governing the evolution of the state vari-
able. Furthermore, the (Lipschitz) continuity and the growth conditions are widely used
in Lemma 2.2.1 and Lemma 2.2.2, which establish good compactness and continuity
properties needed in the fixed point argument when the action space A is compact. Fur-
thermore, along with Assumption (A.6), they are needed when extending the existence
of a MFG solution to the unbounded case.
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2.1.3 Relaxed controls and admissible laws
Let Γ be a measure on the set [0, T ]×A equipped with the product σ-field B([0, T ]×A)
such that its first marginal is given by the Lebesgue measure, meaning that Γ([s, t]×A) =
t− s for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , and its second marginal is a probability distribution over A.
The set of all measures of this type and satisfying∫ T
0
∫
A
|α|p Γ(dt, dα) <∞
will be denoted by V, which is endowed with the normalized Wasserstein metric dV
defined by
dV(Γ,Γ′) = dW,p
(
Γ
T
,
Γ′
T
)
.
Observe that, as soon as the action space A is compact, then also the complete separable
metric space V is compact.
Let ΩD denote the ca`dla`g space D([0, T ];R) and FD the Borel σ-algebra induced on
D by the Skorohod norm dJ1 . Then, the canonical map from this space (Ω
D,FD) into
itself, which is given by
X : ΩD → D
ω → X(ω) = ω ,
generates the canonical filtration FXt = σ (Xs, 0 ≤ s ≤ t). In the same way, the canonical
map on (ΩV ,B([0, T ]×A)) = (V,B([0, T ]×A)), defined as
Γ: ΩV → V
ω → Γ(ω) = Γ ,
provides the canonical filtration FΓt = σ(Γ(F ) : F ∈ B([0, T ] × A)). From now on, we
refer to the product space V × D endowed with the product σ-field FXt ⊗ FΓt as the
canonical filtered measurable space (Ωˆ, Fˆ , (Fˆt)t∈[0,T ]). Then, a generic element of Ωˆ is
a couple (Γ, X), and, with a slight abuse of notation, its projections onto V and D will
still be denoted respectively by Γ and X.
Let L be the linear integro-differential operator defined on C∞0 (R), i.e. the set of all
infinitely differentiable functions φ : R→ R having compact support, by
Lφ(t, x, µ,Γ) = b(t, x, µ)φ′(x) +
1
2
σ2(t, x)φ′′(x)
+
∫
A
[φ(x+ β(t, x, µ, α))− φ(x)− β(t, x, µ, α)φ′(x)]ν(t)Γ(dα) (2.5)
for each (t, x, µ,Γ) ∈ [0, T ]× R× Pp(R)× P(A). Moreover, for any φ ∈ C∞0 (R) and for
any measure µ ∈ Pp(D), let the operator Mµ,φt : Ωˆ→ R be defined by
Mµ,φt (Γ, X) = φ(Xt)−
∫ t
0
Lφ(s,Xs−, µs−,Γs) ds , t ∈ [0, T ] . (2.6)
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Here µt− = µ ◦ pi−1t− with pit− : D → Rd defined as pit−(x) = xt− for x ∈ D. Notice that
a.e. under the Lebesgue measure we have µt− = µt, where µt is defined similarly as the
image of µ via the mapping pit : D → Rd given by pit(x) = xt, x ∈ D.
Definition 2.1.1. Let µ be a measure in (Pp(D), dW,p) and P be a probability measure
in Pp(Ωˆ) over the canonical filtered space (Ωˆ, Fˆ , Fˆt). P is an admissible law with respect
to µ if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. P ◦X−10 = χ;
2. EP [
∫ T
0 |Γt|p dt] <∞;
3. Mµ,φ = (Mµ,φt )t∈[0,T ] is a P -martingale for each φ ∈ C∞0 (R).
The set of all the admissible laws computed with respect to µ will be denoted by R(µ).
Notation. Being X any random variable on the probability space (Ω,F , P ) with values
in a measurable space (S,B(S)), P ◦ X−1 represents the measure on (S,B(S)) defined
by
P ◦X−1(B) = P (X ∈ B) ∀B ∈ B(S) .
Remark 2.1.1. According to Definition 2.1.1, R represents a correspondence which maps
each probability measure µ ∈ Pp(D) into the admissible probability measures P over Ωˆ
which are consistent with it, i.e.
R : Pp(D) Pp(Ωˆ)
µ R(µ) = {P : P is an admissible law with respect to µ} . (2.7)
Given any measure flow µ, R(µ) is nonempty if the martingale problem (2.6) admits at
least one solution. The latter is guaranteed by the fact that the SDE (2.1) has one strong
solution due to the regularity Assumption A. Moreover, R(µ) is a convex set. In fact, if
Q is any convex combination of probability measures inR(µ), that is Q = aP1+(1−a)P2
with a ∈ [0, 1] and P1, P2 ∈ R(µ), then Q is still an element of R(µ). Indeed,
Q ◦X−10 = (aP1 + (1− a)P2) ◦X−10
= aP1 ◦X−10 + (1− a)P2 ◦X−10
= aχ+ (1− a)χ = χ ,
and by linearity of the expectation, for any 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T
EQ
[
Mµ,φt |Fs
]
= aEP1
[
Mµ,φt |Fs
]
+ (1− a)EP2
[
Mµ,φt |Fs
]
= aMµ,φs + (1− a)Mµ,φs =Mµ,φs .
Since the elements of R(µ) are defined as solutions of the martingale problem as-
sociated to the operator L, an application of [EKM90, Theorem III-10] and [EKL77,
The´ore`me 13] provides the following equivalent characterisation of P being an element
of R(µ).
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Lemma 2.1.1. Given a measure µ ∈ Pp(D), the space of the admissible laws R(µ) is
the set of all probability measures Q on some filtered measurable space (Ω′,F ′, (F ′t)t∈[0,T ])
satisfying the usual conditions and supporting an F ′t-adapted process X, an F ′t-adapted
Brownian motion B and a Poisson random measure N on [0, T ]×A with mean measure
ν(t) dt× Γt(dα), such that
Q ◦X−10 = χ
and the state process X satisfies the following equation
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
b(s,Xs, µs)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs)dBs +
∫ t
0
∫
A
β(s,Xs−, µs−, α)N˜(ds, dα),
(2.8)
where, as usual, N˜ denotes the compensated Poisson random measure, i.e. N˜(dt, dα) =
N(dt, dα)− ν(t)Γt(dα) dt.
Remark 2.1.2. In Lemma 2.1.1, the measurable space (Ω′,F ′) and the filtration (F ′t)t∈[0,T ]
are not specified in advance. However, by definition, Γ is an element in V and the solution
process X to equation (2.8) has ca`dla`g paths. Therefore, by considering the measurable
map
Ω′ 3 ω 7→ (Γ(ω), X(ω)) ∈ Ωˆ = V ×D
we can induce a measure P ′ on the canonical space such that (Γ, X) has the same law
under P ′ as it does under P . Thus, in the following, when we consider a P ∈ R(µ), we
may always assume that P is defined on the canonical space (Ωˆ, Fˆ).
Any element Γ ∈ V is called a relaxed control. Indeed, in view of the previous lemma,
choosing a probability P ∈ R(µ) means choosing an intensity measure Γ for the Poisson
random measure N . So, roughly speaking, the control is no longer a process γ in the
function multiplying the Poisson Process in the state dynamics as in the classical game
G∞, see equation (2.1), but it is directly the intensity measure Γ of a Poisson measure,
see equation (2.8). Hence the name relaxed control. Furthermore, a control Γ ∈ V is
said to be strict if Γt = δγ(t) for some A-valued measurable stochastic process γt for
t ∈ [0, T ], where δx denotes the Dirac delta function at the point x.
2.1.4 Relaxed mean-field game solutions
The next step is to generalize the optimization problem (2.2) to the new relaxed
framework. For any measure µ ∈ Pp(D), the corresponding cost function Cµ : Ωˆ→ R is
re-defined as
Cµ(Γ, X) =
∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µt, α)Γ(dt, dα) + g(XT , µT ) . (2.9)
2.1 The relaxed MFG problem G∞ 19
Since at this point the measure µ is considered as fixed, the relaxed optimization problem
consists in finding, for any µ ∈ Pp(D), all the consistent admissible law P ∗ ∈ R(µ) so
that the expected cost under P ∗ is minimal, i.e.∫
Ωˆ
Cµ dP ∗ = inf
P∈R(µ)
∫
Ωˆ
Cµ dP .
Then, in view of the previous discussion, an optimal measure P ∗ ∈ R(µ) is a MFG
relaxed solution if it guarantees that the corresponding state process X is distributed
according to µ, that is the MFG consistency condition P ∗ ◦X−1 = µ.
As for the classical setting, any relaxed MFG solution can be defined by a fixed point
argument. Given a probability distribution µ ∈ Pp(D), let the expected cost related to
µ under P ∈ P(Ωˆ), J(µ, P ), be defined by
J : P p(D)× P(Ωˆ)→ R ∪ {∞}
(µ, P ) 7→ J(µ, P ) = EP [Cµ] =
∫
Ωˆ
Cµ dP , (2.10)
and let R∗ be the correspondence which maps a measure flow µ into the set of the
minimising probabilities consisted with it, i.e.
R∗ : P p(D) P(Ωˆ)
µ R∗(µ) = arg min
P∈R(µ)
J(µ, P ) . (2.11)
Remark 2.1.3. Observe that R∗(µ) ⊂ Pp(Ωˆ) whenever µ ∈ Pp(D). Indeed, by definition
of the set R, any P ∈ R satisfies E[∫ T0 |Γt|p dt] <∞, hence EP [(|X|∗T )p] <∞ in view of
Lemma 2.2.3. Therefore P ∈ Pp(Ω[A]) and being R∗ ⊂ R the conclusion holds.
Therefore,
Definition 2.1.2. A relaxed mean field game solution is a probability distribution P ∈
P(Ωˆ) providing a fixed point for the set-valued map
E : Pp(D) P(D)
µ E(µ) = {P ◦X−1 : P ∈ R∗(µ) } . (2.12)
Or, in a more compact form, a relaxed MFG solution is any P ∈ Pp(Ωˆ) which satisfies
P ∈ R∗(P ◦X−1) .
A relaxed MFG solution is said to be Markovian if the V-marginal of P , i.e. Γ, sat-
isfies P (Γ(dt, dα) = dtΓˆ(t,Xt−)(dα)) = 1 for a measurable function Γˆ : [0, T ] × R →
P(A), whereas a relaxed MFG solution is said to be strict Markovian if P (Γ(dt, dα) =
dtδγˆ(t,Xt−)(dα)) = 1 for a measurable process γˆ : [0, T ]× R→ A.
Remark 2.1.4. The previous game can be generalized to the multidimensional case,
meaning that the state X, the Brownian motion W and the Poisson N can be modeled
as multidimensional processes. We present here the one dimensional case for simplicity.
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2.2 Existence of a relaxed MFG solution
2.2.1 The bounded case
After introducing the relaxed setting, we are ready to prove the existence of such a
relaxed solution for the limiting MFG G∞ under the additional assumption of bound-
edness of the coefficients and compactness of the action space A. Namely,
Assumption B. The coefficients b, σ, β are bounded and the space of actions A is
compact.
Then,
Theorem 2.2.1. Under Assumptions A and B, there exists a relaxed solution for the
relaxed mean field game G∞.
Due to Definition 2.1.2, proving the existence of a relaxed MFG solution to the relaxed
MFG G∞ means exhibiting a fixed point for the correspondence
E : Pp(D) Pp(D)
µ E(µ) = {P ◦X−1 : P ∈ R∗(µ) } . (2.13)
To this end, we will make use of the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem.
Theorem 2.2.2 (Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem). Let K be a nonempty compact
convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff space, and let the correspondence ϕ : K  K
have closed graph and nonempty convex values. Then the set of fixed points of ϕ is
compact and nonempty.
Proof. See, e.g., [AB06, Theorem 17.55].
In order to make the proof of Theorem 2.2.1 more readable, we break it into several
parts. Some more technical results are collect in Subsection 2.2.3 at the end of this
section.
As first step, we prove that
Lemma 2.2.1. Under Assumption A and B, the set-valued correspondence R given in
Definition 2.1.1 is continuous with relatively compact image R(P(D)) = ⋃µ∈P(D)R(µ)
in P(Ωˆ).
Recall that
Definition 2.2.1. A correspondence ϕ : X  Y between topological spaces is
• upper hemicontinuous at x if for every neighborhood U of ϕ(x), there is a neigh-
borhood V of x such that for each z ∈ V , ϕ(z) ⊂ U ;
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• lower hemicontinuous at x if for every open set U such that ϕ(x) ∩ U 6= ∅ there is
a neighborhood V of x such that if z ∈ V , then ϕ(z) ∩ U 6= ∅;
• continuous at x if it is both upper and lower hemicontinuous at x. ϕ is continuous
if it is continuous at each point x ∈ X.
For further details see, e.g., [AB06, Chapter 17].
Before proving Lemma 2.2.1, we first show the relative compactness of a suitable
set of probability measures which in turn will guarantee the relative compactness of the
pushforward measures {P ◦X−1 : P ∈ R(µ)}, for any µ ∈ P(D).
Proposition 2.2.1. Let c > 0 be a given positive constant, p′ > p ≥ 1 and χ a probability
law. Qc ⊂ Pp(Ωˆ) is defined as the set of laws Q = P ◦ (X,Γ)−1 of Ωˆ-valued random
variables defined on some filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈[0,T ], P ) such that:
1. dXt = b(t,Xt)dt+ σ(t,Xt)dWt +
∫
A β(t,Xt−, α)N˜(dt, dα), for a Brownian motion
W and a random measure N with intensity Γt(dα)ν(t)dt, where ν is measurable
and bounded by a constant c;
2. P ◦X−10 ∼ χ;
3. b : [0, T ] × R → R, σ : [0, T ] × R → R and β : [0, T ] × R × A → R are measurable
functions such that
|b(t, x)|+ ∣∣σ2(t, x)∣∣+ |β(t, x, α)| ≤ c(1 + |x|+ |α|) , (2.14)
for all (t, x, α) ∈ [0, T ]× R×A;
4. E
[
|X0|p
′
+
∫ T
0 |Γt|p
′
dt
]
≤ c.
Then Qc is relatively compact in Pp(Ωˆ).
Proof. Since D is a Polish space under J1 metric, Prokhorov’s theorem (cf. [Bil13, The-
orem 5.1, Theorem 5.2]) ensures that a family of probability measures on D is relatively
compact if and only if it is tight. In order to prove the tightness, we will use the Aldous’s
criterion provided in [Bil13, Theorem 16.10]. By proceeding as in Lemma 2.2.3, there
exists a constant C = C(T, c, χ) such that
EQ
[
(|X|∗T )2
]
≤ CEQ
[
1 + |X0|p
′
+
∫ T
0
|Γt|p′dt
]
,
which means that EQ
[
(|X|∗T )2
]
is bounded by a constant which depends upon Q only
through the initial distribution χ, which is the same for all Q ∈ Qc. Therefore
sup
Q∈Qc
EQ[(|X|∗T )p] <∞ . (2.15)
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Then we are left with proving that
lim
δ↓0
sup
Q∈Qc
sup
τ∈TT
EP
[∣∣X(τ+δ)∧T −Xτ ∣∣p] = 0 , (2.16)
where TT denotes the family of all stopping times with values in [0, T ] almost surely. For
each Q ∈ Qc and each stopping time τ ∈ TT , there exists a constant C˜ such that
EQ
[∣∣X(τ+δ)∧T −Xτ ∣∣p] ≤ C˜EQ
[∣∣∣∣∣
∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
b(t,Xt) dt
∣∣∣∣∣
p]
+ C˜EQ
[∣∣∣∣∣
∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
σ(t,Xt) dWt
∣∣∣∣∣
p]
+ C˜EQ
[∣∣∣∣∣
∫ τ+δ)∧T
τ
∫
A
β(t,Xt−, α)N˜(dt, dα)
∣∣∣∣∣
p]
.
(2.17)
By applying Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality as in the proof of Lemma 2.2.3, there
exists a constant C¯ such that for any Q ∈ Qc and τ ∈ TT
EQ
[∣∣X(τ+δ)∧T −Xτ ∣∣p] ≤ C¯EQ
[(∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
(1 + |X|∗T )dt
)p]
+ C¯EQ
(∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
(1 + |X|∗T )dt
) p
2

+ C¯EQ
(∫
A
∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
(1 + |X|∗T + |α|)ν(t)Γt(dα)dt
) p
2
 .
(2.18)
From this point onwards one can proceed as in the proof of [Lac15a, Proposition B.4],
and exploiting the boundeded of the intensity ν and of supQ∈Qc E
Q[(|X|∗T )p], see equa-
tion (2.15), and the regularity of Γ as assumed by condition (4) one has
lim
δ↓0
sup
Q∈Qc
sup
τ∈TT
EQ
[∣∣X(τ+δ)∧T −Xτ ∣∣p] = 0 .
Hence Aldous’ criterion applies and the proof is completed.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.1. This proof is divided into three parts.
The image of R is relatively compact. Using [Lac15a, Lemma A.2], we prove that
the range of the correspondence R, i.e. R(Pp(D)), is relatively compact in Pp(Ωˆ) by
proving that both {P ◦ Γ−1 : P ∈ R(Pp(Ωˆ))} and {P ◦ X−1 : P ∈ R(Pp(Ωˆ))} are
relatively compact sets in Pp(V) and Pp(D) respectively. The compactness of {P ◦Γ−1 :
P ∈ R(Pp(Ωˆ))} in Pp(V) equipped with the p-Wasserstein metric dW,p follows from
the compactness of A, and therefore of V. On the other hand, the compactness of
{P ◦X−1 : P ∈ Pp(Ωˆ)} is due to Proposition 2.2.1 and the boundedness of b, σ and β.
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R is upper hemicontinuous. In order to show that R is upper hemicontinuous, we
prove that R is closed, i.e. its graph
GrR = {(µ,R(µ)) : µ ∈ Pp(D)}
is closed. Indeed, by the closed graph theorem, see, e.g., [AB06, Theorem 17.11], being
closed and being upper hemicontinuous are equivalent properties for R. By definition,
R is closed if for each µn → µ ∈ Pp(D) and for each convergent sequence Pn → P
with Pn ∈ R(µn), then P ∈ R(µ). According to Definition 2.1.1, we have to show that
P ◦ X−10 = χ and that Mµ,φ, defined as in (2.6) on the canonical filtered probability
space (Ωˆ, Fˆ , Fˆt∈[0,T ], P ), is a P -martingale for all φ ∈ C∞0 (R).
The first condition is satisfied since convergence in probability implies convergence
in distribution and therefore X0
d
= limn→∞Xn0 , whose law is given by χ.
Regarding the second condition, let s, t ∈ [0, T ] be such that 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , and
let h be any continuous, Fˆs-measurable, bounded function. Since for all n Pn belongs
to R(µn), Mµn,φ is a Pn-martingale on (Ωˆ, Fˆ , Fˆt∈[0,T ]) by construction, and therefore
EPn [(Mµn,φt − Mµ
n,φ
s )h] = 0. Hence to prove that Mµ,φ is a P -martingale for all
φ ∈ C∞0 (R) it suffices to prove that the following limit
lim
n→∞E
Pn [(Mµn,φt −Mµ
n,φ
s )h] = E
P [(Mµ,φt −Mµ,φs )h] (2.19)
holds true for any h as before. By Taylor’s theorem, the operator Lφ is bounded on
C∞0 (R), since
‖Lφ(t, x, µ,Γ)‖∞ ≤
∥∥φ′(x)b(t, x, µ)∥∥∞ + ∥∥∥∥12σ2(t, x)φ′′(x)
∥∥∥∥
∞
+
∥∥∥∥∫
A
|φ′′(x+ ξβ(t, x, µ, α))|
2
β2(t, x, µ, α)ν(t) Γ(dα)
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ C(φ′, φ′′)
(
‖b‖∞ + ‖σ‖2∞ +
∫
A
‖β‖2∞ ‖ν‖∞ Γ(dα)
)
≤ C(c1, φ′, φ′′) = Cφ ,
where ξ is a suitable parameter belonging [0, 1]. This implies in turn that also Mµn,φ
can be bounded, uniformly on n as∥∥∥Mµn,φ∥∥∥
∞
≤ max
x∈R
|φ(x)|+ TCφ = C¯φ .
Furthermore, the global continuity of the functions b, σ, β and ν guarantees that also
the function Lφ is globally continuous for all test functions φ ∈ C∞0 (R), and , since,
according to Assumptions A and B, all such coefficients are bounded, and b and β are
Lipschitz continuous with respect to the variable µ uniformly in (t, x,Γ), then also Lφ
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is Lipschitz with respect to µ ∈ P(R). Indeed
|Lφ(t, x, µ,Γ)− Lφ(t, x, η,Γ)|
≤ |b(t, x, µ)− b(t, x, η)| ∣∣φ′(x)∣∣
+
∫
A
[
φ(x+ β(t, x, µ, α))− φ(x)− β(t, x, µ, α) ∣∣φ′(x)∣∣
− φ(x+ β(t, x, η, α)) + φ(x) + β(t, x, η, α) ∣∣φ′(x)∣∣ ]Γ(dα)ν(t)
≤ |b(t, x, µ)− b(t, x, η)| ∣∣φ′(x)∣∣
+
∫
A
[
c1 |φ(x+ β(t, x, µ, α))− φ(x+ β(t, x, η, α))|
+ c1 |β(t, x, µ, α)− β(t, x, η, α)|
∣∣φ′(x)∣∣ ]Γ(dα)
≤ |b(t, x, µ, α)− b(t, x, η, α)| ∣∣φ′(x)∣∣
+c1
∫
A
|β(t, x, µ, α)− β(t, x, η, α)|(∣∣φ′(x+ ξβ(t, x, µ, α))∣∣+ ∣∣φ′(x)∣∣)Γ(dα)
≤ Cφ′dW,p(µ, η) + 2c1Cφ′dW,p(µ, η) ≤ C(c1, Cφ′)dW,p(µ, η)
where ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore we can conclude that
(µ,X,Γ) 7→
∫
Lφ(t,Xt, µt,Γt) dt
is continuous. Indeed, the continuity with respect to (X,Γ) is provided by Lemma 2.2.4,
whereas the continuity with respect to µ is an application of Lemma 2.2.5 since by the
previous computation it follows that
|Lφ(t,Xt, µt,Γt)− Lφ(t,Xt, ηt,Γt)| ≤ CdW,p(µt, ηt) .
Therefore for each continuous, Fˆs-measurable, bounded function h
lim
n→∞E
Pn
[(∫
Lφ(s,Xns , µ
n
s , α)Γ
n
s (dα)ds
)
h
]
= EP
[(∫
Lφ(s,Xs, µs, α)Γs(dα)ds
)
h
]
and moreover, since Pn → P by construction and φ is bounded and continuous, Pnφ→
Pφ. Thus, we can conclude that for each continuous, Fˆs-measurable, bounded function
h
EP [(Mµ,φt −Mµ,φs )h] = limn→∞E
P [(Mµn,φt −Mµn,φs )h] = 0,
which implies that EP [Mµ,φt − Mµ,φs ] = 0, or, in other words, that Mµ,φ is a P -
martingale.
Therefore, satisfying Definition 2.1.1 we can conclude that P is an admissible law
with respect to µ, i.e. P ∈ R(µ) and thus R has closed graph as requested.
R is lower hemicontinuous. Let µ ∈ Pp(D) and µn be a sequence in the same space
converging to µ. Then, to show that R is lower hemicontinuous, we need to exhibit
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a sequence Pn ∈ R(µn) such that Pn → P in Pp(Ωˆ) for every P ∈ R(µ). Consider
any P ∈ R(µ), than Lemma 2.1.1 ensures that there exist a filtered probability space
(Ω′,F ′, {F ′t}t∈[0,T ], P ′), a F ′-Brownian motion W and a Poisson random measure N on
[0, T ]×A with intensity measure Γt(dα) ν(t) dt such that P ′ ◦ (Γ, X)−1 = P , where X is
the unique strong solution of the following SDE:
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt) dt+ σ(t,Xt) dWt +
∫
A
β(t,Xt−, µt−, α) N˜(dt, dα) (2.20)
subjected to an initial condition X0. The existence and uniqueness of strong solution of
equation (2.20) is once again guaranteed by Assumption A.
Then, for each n, let Xn be the process solving
dXnt = b(t,X
n
t , µ
n
t ) dt+ σ(t,X
n
t ) dWt +
∫
A
β(t,Xnt−, µ
n
t−, α), X
n
0 = X0 ,
and define Pn as Pn = P ◦ (Γ, Xn)−1. We want to show that R(µn) 3 Pn → P . To this
end, since convergence in Lp implies convergence in distribution, we will prove that
EP
′ [
(|Xn −X|∗t )p
]→ 0 . (2.21)
Let p¯ = max{2, p}. Then, for a suitable positive constant C > 0 we have
|Xnt −Xt|p¯ ≤ C
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
|b(s,Xns , µns )− b(s,Xs, µs)| ds
∣∣∣∣p¯ + C ∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
|σ(s,Xns )− σ(s,Xs)| dWs
∣∣∣∣p¯
+ C
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
∫
A
∣∣β(s,Xns−, µns−, α)− β(s,Xs−, µs−, α)∣∣ N˜(ds, dα)∣∣∣∣p¯ .
(2.22)
Being b Lipschitz continuous in x and µ due to Ass. (A.4), it holds
EP
′
[∫ t
0
|b(s,Xns , µns )− b(s,Xs, µs)|p¯ ds
]
≤ C(c1, p¯, t)
(∫ t
0
EP
′ [
(|Xn −X|∗s)p¯
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
dp¯W,p(µ
n
s , µs)ds
)
.
Regarding the stochastic integrals in (2.22), we can apply Jensen and Burkholder-Davis-
Gundy inequalities to obtain
EP
′
[∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∫ u
0
|σ(s,Xns )− σ(s,Xs)| dWs
∣∣∣∣p¯∣∣∣∣∗
t
]
≤ kEP ′
[∫ t
0
c1 |Xns −Xs|2 ds
]
≤ C(c1, p¯)
∫ t
0
EP
′ [
(|Xn −X|∗s)2
]
ds.
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and
EP
′
[(∣∣∣∣∫ ·
0
∫
A
∣∣β(t,Xnt−, µnt−, α)− β(t,Xt−, µt−, α)∣∣ N˜ (dt, dα)∣∣∣∣∗
t
)p¯]
≤ C(p¯)E
[∫ t
0
∫
A
∣∣β(s,Xns−, µns−, α)− β(s,Xs−, µs−, α)∣∣p¯ ν(s)Γs(dα)]
≤ C(p¯, c1)
(∫ t
0
EP
′ [
(|Xn −X|∗s)p¯
]
ds+
∫ t
0
dp¯W,p(µ
n
s , µs)
p¯ds
)
,
where we used also the boundedness assumption over ν and the Lipschitz continuity of
σ and β. Notice that the integral
∫ t
0 d
p¯
W,p(µ
n
s , µs)ds in the estimates above converges
to zero as n → ∞ due to Lemma 2.2.5. Therefore, combining the previous results and
applying the Gronwall’s inequality, the validity of equation (2.21) follows.
At this point we have found a sequence such that Pn → P in Pp(Ωˆ), and to conclude,
we have to show that, for each n, Pn is an element of R(µn). Pn satisfies condition (1) in
Definition 2.1.1 by construction, and condition (3), by applying Itoˆ’s formula to φ(Xn),
for each φ ∈ C∞0 (R).
A crucial hypothesis to apply Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem is the closed graph
property for the correspondence E . Berge’s Theorem states that
Theorem 2.2.3 (Berge Maximum Theorem). Let ϕ : X  Y be a continuous corre-
spondence between topological spaces with nonempty compact values, and suppose that
φ : Grϕ→ R is continuous. Let the real-valued function m : X → R be defined by
m(x) = max
y∈ϕ(x)
φ(x, y)
and the correspondence η : X  Y by
η(x) = {y ∈ ϕ(x) : φ(x, y) = m(x)} .
Then, m is continuous and η has nonempty compact values. Furthermore, if Y is Haus-
dorff, then η is upper hemicontinuous.
Therefore, since we have already proved that R is a closed continuous correspondence
with relatively compact range, and thus with compact values, the continuity of the
expected cost J would ensure that alsoR∗ is a continuous correspondence with nonempty
values, and that E is upper hemicontinuous, which means that E has closed graph, see,
once again, [AB06, Theorem 17.11].
Lemma 2.2.2. The operator J
J : P (D)× Pp(Ωˆ)→ R ∪ {∞}
(µ, P ) 7→ J(µ, P ) = EP [Cµ] =
∫
Ωˆ
Cµ dP
is upper hemicontinuous under Assumption A. If Assumption B is also in force, then J
is continuous.
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Proof. The upper hemicontinuity is an easy consequence of Lemmas 2.2.4 and 2.2.5,
while the continuity follows from the compactness of A. More precisely, Lemma 2.2.4 is
used to prove the hemicontinuity of Cµ(X,Γ) in (X,Γ), while the one in µ is granted by
Lemma 2.2.5.
We are now ready to prove the existence of a relaxed MFG solution for the relaxed
mean field game G∞.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.1. The existence of a relaxed MFG solution for G∞ is proved by
showing that the correspondence E defined in equation (2.13) admits a fixed point. To
apply the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem, we need to consider a restriction
of E to a suitably nonempty, compact, convex domain. Therefore we look for a convex
compact subset D ⊂ Pp(D) containing E(D), and then we consider the restriction of E
on D, which will be denoted by ED.
To construct such a domain D, define Q as the set of the probability measures P in
Pp(Ωˆ) such that:
(i) X0 ∼ χ;
(ii) EP
[
(|X|∗T )p
] ≤ C, where C = C(T, c1, χ) denotes the constant appearing in equa-
tion (2.28) of Lemma 2.2.3, which depends upon P only through the initial distri-
bution χ;
(iii) X is adapted to a filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] and satisfies
EP
[(
X(t+u)∧T −Xt
)p |Ft] ≤ C¯δ (2.23)
for t ∈ [0, T ] and u ∈ [0, δ], with C¯ defined in equation (2.18), independently of P .
Convexity of Q follows by construction: consider P˜ = aP1 + (1− a)P2 for a ∈ [0, 1]
where P1, P2 ∈ Q with corresponding filtration F1 and F2 as in condition (iii) above.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are easily satisfied by P˜ since the initial distribution χ is the
same for all the probabilities and the constant C depends on them only through χ.
Condition (iii) for P˜ also holds with the same constant C¯ as in equation (2.23) and the
filtration F˜ = F1 ∧ F2. Clearly, being Q convex, also Q is convex.
Furthermore, Q is relatively compact in Pp(Ω[A]). Observe that Q is tight since it
satisfies the sufficient criterion for tightness given in [Whi07, Lemma 3.11]. Indeed since
the constant C¯ in (2.23) is independent of P , it suffices to choose (in the notation of
[Whi07]) Z(δ) = C¯δ, and the tightness follows. Therefore Q is relatively compact, and
hence its closure Q for the p-Wasserstein metric is compact in Pp(Ω[A]).
We can now define D as
D = { η ∈ Pp(D) : there exists P ∈ Q such that η = P ◦X−1 }
= { η = P ◦X−1 : P ∈ Q} ⊂ Pp(D).
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Since Q is compact and convex and P 7→ P ◦X−1 is a continuous function, linear with
respect to convex combinations, also D turns out to be a convex, compact set.
In order to prove that the range of ED is contained inD we show thatR(µ) ⊂ P(Q) for
each µ ∈ Pp(D), so that E(µ) ⊂ D for all measures µ and therefore ED(Pp(D)) ⊂ D. Let
P ∈ R(µ), then it satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) by construction, see Definition 2.1.1 and
Lemma 2.2.3. The validity of condition (iii) can be proved arguing as in Proposition 2.2.1.
Indeed, using the same notation therein, we have that for each u ∈ [0, δ]
EP
[(
X(t+u)∧T −Xt
)2 | Ft] ≤ C¯u ≤ C¯δ ,
giving the same bound as in (2.23) with constant C¯, which does not depend on P . Since
R(µ) is nonempty, as shown in Remark 2.1.1, then also Q and therefore D are nonempty
sets.
The last condition to apply the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem is to show that E
is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with non-empty convex values. As pointed
out above, since Lemma 2.2.2 implies the joint continuity of function J , as defined in
(2.10), and Lemma 2.2.1 assures that R is continuous and has nonempty compact val-
ues, the Berge Maximum Theorem provides that the correspondence R∗ is indeed upper
hemicontinuous with nonempty compact values. By continuity and linearity with respect
to convex combinations of Pp(Ωˆ) 3 P 7→ P ◦ X−1 ∈ Pp(D) also E is an upper hemi-
continuous correspondence with nonempty compact values. Moreover, by Remark 2.1.1,
R(µ) is a convex set for each µ ∈ P(D), and hence by linearity with respect to convex
combinations and continuity of P 7→ J(µ, P ) and of P 7→ P ◦X−1, also R∗(µ) and E(µ)
are convex sets.
Since all the hypotheses of the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem are
satisfied, we can conclude that there exists a fixed point for the correspondence ED, and
therefore for E , meaning that there exists a relaxed MFG solution for the relaxed game
G∞, given in Section 2.1.3.
2.2.2 The unbounded case
In the previous Section 2.2.1, the existence of a MFG solution when b, σ and β are
bounded and the action space A is compact is proven. Then, the next goal is to prove
the same result under weaker hypotheses, namely when the coefficient functions b, σ and
β have linear growth and the action space A is not necessarily compact. Namely,
Theorem 2.2.4. Under Assumption A, there exists a relaxed MFG solution.
As in [Lac15a, Section 5], the basic idea is to work with a bounded approximation of
the coefficient functions, their truncated version, and then, by a convergence argument,
to show that the limit of the mean field game solutions found in the truncated setting
is indeed a solution for the unbounded case.
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Notation. For any n ≥ 1, let (bn, σn, βn) be the truncated version of the coefficients
(b, σ, β), i.e. bn = min{b, n} and analogously for σn and βn. Moreover, we denote An the
intersection of A with the interval centered at the origin with length 2rn = 2
√
n/2c1,
where we recall that c1 is the constant appearing in Ass. (A.4) granting Lipschitz con-
tinuity as well as growth conditions on the coefficients of the state variable. Since A is
closed by assumption, there exists n0 such that for all n ≥ n0 the set An is nonempty
and compact, hence the truncated data set (bn, σn, βn, f, g, An) satisfies Assumptions A
and B with the same constants ci (i = 1, 2, 3) independent of n.
Let V[An] be the set of measures satisfying the same requirements as the measures
belonging to V, as in Section 2.1.3, but with An replacing A, and then let Ω[An] be
the product space V[An]×D, endowed with the corresponding product σ-field. Due to
Theorem 2.2.1 in the previous section, for all n ≥ 1 there exists a relaxed MFG solution
corresponding to the data set (bn, σn, βn, f, g, An), which can be viewed as a probability
measure on Ωˆ = Ω[A] since P(Ω[An]) can be naturally embedded in P(Ω[A]) due to the
inclusion An ⊂ A.
Let Ln be the operator defined as L in equation (2.5) with the truncated data
(bn, σn, βn) replacing (b, σ, β). Now, for any n, we can define the set of admissible
laws Rn(µ) as the set of all measures P ∈ P(Ωˆ) such that
1. P (Γ([0, T ]×Acn) = 0) = 1;
2. P ◦X−10 = χ;
3. for all functions φ ∈ C∞0 (R), the process
Mµ,φ,nt := φ(Xt)−
∫ t
0
Lnφ(s,Xs−, µs−,Γs)ds, t ∈ [0, T ],
is a P -martingale.
Likewise, we also define R∗n(µ) = arg maxP∈Rn(µ) J(µ, P ). Due to the embedding of
P(Ω[An]) in P(Ωˆ), we can identify Rn(µ) and R∗n(µ) with the set of admissible laws
and optimal laws of the MFG with data (bn, σn, βn, f, g, An), respectively. Finally, any
relaxed MFG solution for the n-truncated data can be viewed as a probability Pn ∈
R∗n(µn) with µn ∈ Pp(D) satisfying the mean-field condition µn = Pn ◦X−1.
We are now ready to give the proof of Theorem 2.2.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.4. This proof follows closely [Lac15a, Section 5], hence we give
more details only on those parts which are jump-specific whereas sketching the main
arguments. As previously said, the basic idea is to show that the limit of the MFG
solutions found in the truncated setting, whose existence is granted by Theorem 2.2.1,
is indeed a solution for the unbounded case.
Let (Pn)n≥1 be a sequence of relaxed MFG solutions for the corresponding game
with data (bn, σn, βn, f, g, An). Proposition 2.2.1 ensures that this sequence (Pn)n≥1 is
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relatively compact in Pp(Ωˆ). Firstly we prove that any P ∈ Pp(Ωˆ) limit of a convergent
subsequence (Pnk)k≥1 of (Pn)n≥1 is an admissible law for µ, i.e. P ∈ R(µ), where
µ = P ◦X−1. By construction one has µ = limk µnk = limk Pnk ◦X−1 = P ◦X−1, and
then, in order to prove that P ∈ R(µ), we need to show that Mµ,φ is a P -martingale
for all φ ∈ C∞0 (R). For all t ∈ [0, T ], consider
Mµn,φ,nt (Γ, X)−Mµ
n,φ
t (Γ, X) =
∫ t
0
(bn(s,Xs, µ
n
s )− b(s,Xs, µns ))φ′(Xs)
+
1
2
(
σ2n(s,Xs)− σ2(s,Xs)
)
φ′′(Xs)
+
(∫
A
[φ(Xs + βn(s,Xs, µ
n
s , α))
− φ(Xs + β(s,Xs, µns , α))
− βn(s,Xs, µns , α)φ′(Xs)
+ β(s,Xs, µ
n
s , α)φ
′(Xs)
]
dα
)
ν(s)ds.
Exploiting the linear growth of the involved functions and arguing as in [Lac15a, Lemma
5.2], we obtain the following bounds. Regarding the term containg b, one has∫ t
0
(bn(s,Xs, µ
n
s )− b(s,Xs, µns ))φ′(Xs)ds ≤ 2
∥∥φ′∥∥∞ c1tZ11{2c1Z1>n}
where
Z1 = 1 + |X|∗T +
(
sup
n≥1
∫
D
(|z|∗T )pµn(dz)
)1/p
, (2.24)
and analogously∫ t
0
(
σ2n(s,Xs)− σ2(s,Xs)
)
φ′′(Xs)ds ≤ 2
∥∥φ′′∥∥∞ c1tZ11{2c1Z1>n} .
Lastly, regarding the term coming from the jump part, we have the following estimates∣∣φ(Xs + βn(s,Xs, µns , α))− φ(Xs + β(s,Xs, µns , α))− (βn − β)(s,Xs, µns , α)φ′(Xs)∣∣
≤ |φ(Xs + βn(s,Xs, µns , α))− φ(Xs + β(s,Xs, µns , α))|
+
∣∣(βn(s,Xs, µns , α)− β(s,Xs, µns , α))φ′(Xs)∣∣
≤ C (2 + |βn(s,Xs, µns , α)− β(s,Xs, µns , α)|) 1{|β(s,Xs,µns ,α)|>n},
for some constant C ≥ ‖φ‖∞ + ‖φ′‖∞. Then, due to Ass. (A.4) and by definition of Z1
2.2 Existence of a relaxed MFG solution 31
in (2.24), taking n ≥ 2c1 yields that Pn-a.s.∫ t
0
∫
A
C (2 + |βn(s,Xs, µns , α)− β(s,Xs, µns , α)|) 1{|β(s,Xs,µns ,α)|>n}Γs(dα)ds
≤ 2C
∫ t
0
∫
A
(1 + c1(Z1 + |α|)) 1{c1(Z1+|α|)>n}Γs(dα)ds
≤ 2Cc˜1
∫ t
0
∫
A
(1 + Z1 + |α|)) 1{2c1Z1>n}Γs(dα)ds
≤ 2Cc˜1
(
t(1 + Z1) +
∫ t
0
|Γs|ds
)
1{2c1Z1>n},
where we set c˜1 = c1 ∨ 1. Therefore, combining the bounds above we obtain that for all
t ∈ [0, T ] and Pn-a.s.∣∣∣Mµn,φ,nt (Γ, X)−Mµn,φt (Γ, X)∣∣∣ ≤ 6Cc˜1(t(1 + Z1) + ∫ t
0
|Γs|ds
)
1{2c1Z1>n}
for some constant C ≥ ‖φ‖∞ + ‖φ′‖∞ + ‖φ′′‖∞. Since, arguing as in [Lac15a, Lemma
5.1], one has
sup
n
EPn
[∫ T
0
|Γt|p′dt
]
<∞, sup
n
EPn
[
(|X|∗T )p
′]
= sup
n
‖µn‖p′T <∞ (2.25)
a standard application of Fatou’s lemma implies that
EP
[∫ T
0
|Γt|p′dt
]
<∞. (2.26)
Then, the estimates above implies the convergence
EPn
[∣∣∣Mµn,φ,nt (Γ, X)−Mµn,φt (Γ, X)∣∣∣]→ 0, n→∞.
Finally using the continuity of Mµ,φt (Γ, X) in (µ,Γ, X), granted by Lemma 2.2.4 and
Lemma 2.2.5, the previous convergence result implies that
EP
[(
Mµ,φt (Γ, X)−Mµ,φt (Γ, X)
)
h
]
= lim
n→∞E
Pn
[(
Mµn,φ,nt (Γ, X)−Mµ
n,φ,n
t (Γ, X)
)
h
]
= 0
for any continuous, bounded and Fˆs-measurable function h, which in turn implies that
Mµ,φ is a P-martingale, and therefore P ∈ R(µ) as requested.
Lastly, to conclude the proof, we need to show that the limit point P is optimal, i.e.
P ∈ R∗(µ). First of all, let P ′ be any element of R(µ) with J(µ, P ′) < ∞. Then, one
can show that there exists a sequence of probabilities P ′n ∈ Rn(µn) such that
Jnk(µ
nk , P ′nk)→ J(µ, P ′), k →∞, (2.27)
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where Jn denotes the objective corresponding to the truncated data. Indeed, this can
be shown as in the proof of [Lac15a, Lemma 5.3] by using Burkholder-Davis-Gundy
inequalities and Ass. (A.4) to estimate the jump part. Therefore, since Pn is optimal for
each n we have
Jn(µ
n, P ′n) ≥ Jn(µn, Pn),
so that thanks to (2.27) and to the fact that J is lower hemicontinuous (see Lemma
2.2.2) we obtain
J(µ, P ) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
Jnk(µ
nk , Pnk) ≤ lim
k→∞
Jnk(µ
nk , P ′nk) = J(µ, P
′).
The optimality of P follows since P ′ is arbitrary.
Then, the proof is completed since we have exhibited an admissible law P satisfying
the mean-field condition which is optimal. Hence P is a relaxed MFG solution.
2.2.3 Technical results
In the following, |Y |∗t is used as a shortcut for sups∈[0,t] |Ys|. Then, we study the
moments of the controlled state process X, given as a solution to the SDE (2.8).
Lemma 2.2.3. Let p¯ ∈ [p, p′]. Under Assumption A, there exists a constant C =
C(T, c1, χ, p¯) such that for any µ ∈ Pp(D) and P ∈ R(µ)
EP
[
(|X|∗T )p¯
]
≤ C
(
1 + ‖µ‖p¯T + EP
∫ T
0
|Γt|p¯ dt
)
. (2.28)
As a consequence, P ∈ Pp(Ωˆ). Furthermore, if µ = P ◦X−1, we have
‖µ‖p¯T = EP
[
(|X|∗T )p¯
]
≤ C
(
1 + EP
[∫ T
0
|Γt|p¯dt
])
.
Proof. In what follows, the value of the constant C may change from line to line, however
we will indicate what it depends on.
Consider a given measure µ ∈ Pp(D) and any related admissible law P ∈ R(µ). By
Lemma 2.1.1,
|Xt|p¯ ≤ Cp¯ |X0|p¯ + Cp¯
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
b(s,Xs, µs) ds
∣∣∣∣p¯ + Cp¯ ∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs)dBs
∣∣∣∣p¯
+ Cp¯
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
∫
A
β(s,Xs−, µs−, α)N˜(ds, dα)
∣∣∣∣p¯ . (2.29)
Assume that p¯ ≥ 2. Then, by Jensen’s inequality and boundedness of function b, see
Ass. (A.4), for all t ∈ [0, T ],∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
b(s,Xs, µs) ds
∣∣∣∣p¯ ≤ Ct,p¯ ∫ t
0
sup
u∈[0,s]
|b(u,Xu, µu)|p¯ ds
≤ Ct,p¯
∫ t
0
sup
0≤u≤s
cp¯1
(
1 + (|X|∗s)p¯ + ‖µ‖p¯s
)
ds .
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Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, see e.g. [Pro90, Theorem 48, Ch. IV.4], ensures
that there exists a positive constant Cp¯, not depending on X , such that the expected
supremum of the Itoˆ integral in (2.29) can be bounded as follows
E
[(∣∣∣∣∫ u
0
σ(s,Xs) dBs
∣∣∣∣∗
t
)p¯]
≤ Cp¯ E
[(∫ t
0
∣∣σ2(s,Xs)∣∣ ds) p¯2]
≤ Ct,p¯ E
[∫ t
0
c
p¯
2
1 (1 + |X|∗s)
p¯
2
]
,
where the last inequality is due to the growth condition of the function σ, see Ass. (A.4).
Lastly, we have to take into account the integral It =
∫
[0,t]×A β(s,Xs−, µs−, α)N˜(ds, dα)
appearing in (2.29). Using again the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, it follows that
E
[(∣∣∣∣∫ ·
0
∫
A
β(s,Xs−, µs−, α)N˜(ds, dα)
∣∣∣∣)p¯]
≤ Cp¯E
(∫ t
0
∫
A
sup
u∈[0,s]
|β(u,Xu−, µu−, α)|2 ν(s) Γs(dα) ds
) p¯
2

and since β has linear growth in (x, µ, α) uniformly in t, see Ass. (A.4), and ν is bounded,
see Ass. (A.2), it is found that
EP
[
(|I|∗t )p¯
]
≤ CE
∫ t
0
∫
A
c
p¯
2
+1
1
(
1 + |X|∗s +
(∫
D
(|z|∗s)pµ(dz)
) 1
p
+ |α|
) p¯
2
Γs(dα) ds
 .
Observe that, if p¯ ∈ [1, 2), the conclusion still holds since |y|p¯/2 ≤ 1 + |y|p¯ and then
arguing as before.
Combining all the previous estimates, we get that there exists a positive constant
C = C(t, c1, χ, p¯) such that
EP
[
(|X|∗t )p¯
]
≤ CEP
[
1 + |X0|p¯ +
∫ t
0
(
1 + ‖µ‖p¯s + |Γs|p¯
)
ds
]
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Hence the estimates (2.28) follows from an application of Gronwall’s lemma. As a
consequence, when µ = P ◦X−1, we have
‖µ‖p¯t = EP [(|X|∗t )p¯] ≤ CEP
[
|X0|p¯ +
∫ t
0
(1 + 2 ‖µ‖p¯s + |Γs|p¯)ds
]
,
so that another application of Gronwall’s lemma gives the second estimate.
For completeness, we provide some continuity results. Lemma 2.2.4 is an extension
of [Lac15a, Corollary A.5], where the space of continuous functions is replaced with the
Skorokhod space D([0, T ], E) of all ca`dla`g functions taking values in some metric space
(E, ρ).
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Lemma 2.2.4. Let (E, ρ) be a complete separable metric space. Let φ : [0, T ]×E×A→ R
be a jointly measurable function in all its variables and jointly continuous in (x, α) ∈
E × A for each t ∈ [0, T ]. Assume that for some constant c > 0 and some x0 ∈ E one
of the following two properties is satisfied
1. φ(t, x, α) ≤ c(1 + ρp(x, x0) + |α|p), for all (t, x, α) ∈ [0, T ]× E ×A;
2. |φ(t, x, α)| ≤ c(1 + ρp(x, x0) + |α|p), for all (t, x, α) ∈ [0, T ]× E ×A.
Hence, if (1) (resp. (2)) is fulfilled, the following function
D([0, T ];E)× V 3 (x, q) 7→
∫ T
0
∫
A
φ(t, x(t), α)q(dt, dα) (2.30)
is upper hemicontinuous (resp. continuous).
Proof. We prove first that the function
D([0, T ];E)× V 3 (x, q) 7→ η(dt, dα, de) := 1
T
q(dt, dα)δx(t)(de) ∈ Pp([0, T ]× E ×A)
(2.31)
is jointly continuous. Using [Lac15a, Prop. A.1] it suffices to show that when (xn, qn)→
(x, q) in D([0, T ];E) × V[A] as n → ∞, we have ∫ φdηn → ∫ φdη for all continuous
functions φ : [0, T ] × E × A → R such that |φ(t, x, α)| ≤ c(1 + ρp(x, x0) + |α|p), for all
(t, x, α) ∈ [0, T ]×E ×A. We use the notation ηn for the measure associated to (xn, qn)
as in (2.31). Since D([0, T ];E)× V is equipped with the product topology, it suffices to
prove separately the continuity in x and q. Both are consequences of an application of
dominated convergence theorem. We consider the continuity in x, the one in q can be
easily showed using similar arguments. Let xn → x in D([0, T ];E), hence xn(t) → x(t)
for all t ∈ [0, T ] where the limit function x is continuous (see [EK09, Proposition 5.2]),
hence for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] with respect to the Lebesgue measure and hence for q(dt, A) as
well. Therefore, since φ is jointly continuous, we have φ(t, xn(t), α) → φ(t, x(t), α) for
a.e. (t, α) ∈ [0, T ]× A with respect to the measure q(dt, dα). Moreover, notice that for
some (hence for all) x0 ∈ E there exists a constant C > 0, that might change from line
to line, such that
|φ(t, xn(t), α)| ≤ C(1 + ρp(x0, xn(t)) + |α|p)
≤ C (1 + ρp(x0, x(t)) + ρp(x(t), xn(t)) + |α|p) .
Moreover by [EK09, Proposition 5.3] there exists a sequence of time changes τn(t), i.e.
strictly increasing continuous functions mapping [0, T ] onto [0, T ], such that
lim
n→∞ supt∈[0,T ]
ρ(xn(t), x(τn(t))) = 0.
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Hence for all ε > 0 we can choose n large enough so that for all t ∈ [0, T ]
|φ(t, xn(t), α)| ≤ C (1 + ρp(x0, x(t)) + ρp(x(t), x(τn(t))) + ρp(x(τn(t)), xn(t)) + |α|p)
≤ C
(
1 + sup
s∈[0,T ]
ρp(x0, x(s)) + sup
s∈[0,T ]
ρp(x(s), x(τn(s))) + ε+ |α|p
)
≤ C
(
1 + 3 sup
s∈[0,T ]
ρp(x0, x(s)) + ε+ |α|p
)
.
Therefore, since sups∈[0,T ] ρp(x0, x(s)) is bounded, uniformly in n, we can apply domi-
nated convergence and conclude that∫
φ(t, xn(t), α)q(dt, dα)→
∫
φ(t, x(t), α)q(dt, dα), n→∞.
Similarly we have the continuity with respect to q, which gives the announced joint con-
tinuity of the function η in (2.31). Finally, the upper hemicontinuity (resp. continuity)
of the function in equation (2.30) is obtained by applying [Lac15a, Corollary A.4] (resp.
[Lac15a, Lemma A.3]).
Lemma 2.2.5. Let {µn} ⊆ Pp(D) a convergent sequence to µ ∈ Pp(D). Then, for any
q ≥ 1 ∫ T
0
dW,p(µ
n
t , µt)
q dt→ 0, n→∞.
Proof. Since convergence with respect to dW,p implies also weak convergence, Skorokhod’s
representation theorem ensures that there exist D-valued random variables Xn and X,
defined on a common probability space (Ω,F , P ) such that
µn = P ◦ (Xn)−1 and µ = P ◦X−1 ,
with
dJ1(X
n, X)→ 0, P a.s.
By triangular inequality
|Xnt −Xt|p ≤ 2p(dJ1(Xn, 0)p + dJ1(X, 0)p)
and
dJ1(X
n, 0)p + dJ1(X, 0)
p → 2dJ1(X, 0)p , n→∞,
where dJ1(X, 0)
p = (|X|∗T )p ∈ L1(P ), which does not depend on t. Then, since con-
vergence Xn → X in J1 implies convergence a.e t ∈ [0, T ], by applying a slightly more
general version of dominated convergence (e.g. [Kal06, Theorem 1.21]), we have
E [|Xnt −Xt|p]→ 0 a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] .
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Then, by applying dominated convergence once again in view of
EP [dJ1(Xn, 0)p + dJ1(X, 0)p]→ 2
∫
D
dJ1(x, 0)
pµ(dx) <∞ ,
it is found that ∫ T
0
(E [|Xnt −Xt|p])q dt→ 0 , n→∞.
2.3 Existence of a relaxed Markovian MFG solution
In the previous section, Theorem 2.2.4 ensures that, under suitable assumptions,
there exists a relaxed MFG solution for the relaxed game G∞. The following step is
to prove that for any admissible law P ∈ R(µ) it is possible to define a Markovian
control P ∗ ∈ R(µ) with a lower cost than P . This would imply that G∞ admits also a
Markovian MFG solution. To this end some further assumptions on the function β is
required. Namely,
Theorem 2.3.1. Assume that Assumption A holds true and that β satisfies for all
(t, x, µ, α) ∈ [0, T ]× R× Pp(R)×A
|β(t, x, µ, α)| ≤ c(1 + ψ(α)), (2.32)
for some continuous function ψ : A → (0,∞) and constant c > 0. Then there exists a
relaxed Markovian MFG solution to the relaxed game G∞.
Proof. Let P ∈ R(µ) be a relaxed MFG solution for G∞, whose existence under As-
sumption A is guaranteed by Theorem 2.2.4. To show the existence of a Markovian
MFG solution we build a (possibly different) probability measure P ∗ ∈ R(µ), for the
same measure flow µ ∈ P(D), satisfying the following three properties:
Property MP. (MP.1) J(µ, P ∗) ≤ J(µ, P );
(MP.2) P ∗ ◦X−1t = P ◦X−1t for all t ∈ [0, T ];
(MP.3) P ∗(Γ(dt, dα) = Γˆ(t,Xt−)(dα)dt) = 1 for a measurable function Γˆ : [0, T ]× R→
V.
Being P optimal, i.e. P ∈ R∗(µ), J(µ, P ) is the minimum of the expected cost J(µ, ·)
related to the flow measure µ, and therefore condition (MP.1) implies that also P ∗
attains its minimum, meaning that also P ∗ is an optimal admissible law, i.e. P ∗ ∈ R∗(µ).
The second property (MP.2) ensures that P ∗ satisfies the MFG consistency condition
µ = P ∗ ◦X−1, and thus along with the previous one guarantees that also P ∗ is a relaxed
MFG solution for G∞. Condition (MP.3) is indeed the Markovian property for P ∗.
The assumption (2.32) assures that the operator L defined in (2.5) satisfies assump-
tions (i)-(vi) in [KS98, pp. 611-612]. In [KS98], the authors establish that under these
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conditions for any solution to the controlled martingale problem for the generator L
there exists another solution having a Markov control which has the same state and con-
trol distribution as the initially given one. Therefore, since by Definition 2.1.1 P ∈ R(µ)
means that P is a solution to the martingale problem for L, then [KS98, Corollary
4.9] guarantees the existence of a process Z, defined on some filtered probability space
(Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,T ], Q) and a measurable function Γˆ : [0, T ]× R→ V such that
Mµ,φt (Γˆ, Z) = φ(Z)−
∫ t
0
Lφ(s, Zs−, µs−, Γˆ(s, Zs−)) ds
is a F˜t-adapted Q-martingale for all φ ∈ C∞0 (R), and for all t ∈ [0, T ] it holds that
Q ◦ (Zt, Γˆ(t, Zt))−1 = P ◦ (Xt,EP [Γt|Xt])−1 . (2.33)
Define P ∗ = Q ◦ (Γˆ(t, Zt)dt, Z)−1. By construction, P ∗ belongs to R(µ) and it
satisfies conditions (MP.2) and (MP.3). Moreover it holds that
J(µ, P ∗) = EQ
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, Zt, µt, α)Γˆ(t, Zt)(dα)dt+ g(ZT , µT )
]
(a)
= EP
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µt, α)EP [Γt(dα)|Xt]dt+ g(XT , µT )
]
(b)
= EP
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µt, α)Γt(dα)dt+ g(XT , µT )
]
= J(µ, P )
Equality (a) follows from the equivalent distribution of the processes involved, i.e.
Q ◦ Z−1t = P ◦ X−1t and Q ◦ Γˆ(t, Zt)−1 = P ◦ EP [Γt|Xt]−1 for any time t ∈ [0, T ],
see equation (2.33), whereas equality (b) is just the tower property of conditional expec-
tations. Therefore P ∗ satisfies also condition (MP.1) and the proof is complete.
Theorem 2.2.4 and Theorem 2.3.1 guarantee the existence of a relaxed MFG solution
and of a Markovian relaxed MFG solution, respectively, for the relaxed MFG G∞ under
suitable assumptions, namely Assumption A. Assume that, in addition to Assumption A,
it is verified that
Assumption C. For all (t, x, µ) ∈ [0, T ]× R× P(R), the set
K(t, x, µ) = {(β(t, x, µ, α), z) : α ∈ A, z ≤ f(t, x, µ, α)} ⊂ R× R
is convex.
Then it is possible to prove the existence also of a strict (strict Markovian, respectively)
relaxed MFG by applying the same arguments as in the [Lac15a, Theorem 3.7]. More
details on the jump-specific parts can be found in [BCDP17a].
Chapter 3
Existence of an ε-Nash
equilibrium for the game Gn
In this chapter we exploit the existence of a MFG solution for the game G∞, ad-
dressed in Chapter 2, to build ε-Nash equilibria for the corresponding prelimit games Gn.
Denoting by γ(t, x) a Markovian MFG solution for the limiting game G∞, an εn-Nash
equilibrium for the game Gn is obtained when each player i follows the same strategy γ
but computed with respect his own state γ(t,Xi,nt− ), and this sequence approximates a
(true) Nash equilibrium as n→∞, meaning that the sequence εn vanishes as n→∞.
In Section 3.1 we briefly recall how the gamesGn are defined, introducing the notation
and the main assumptions used throughout the whole chapter, whereas in Section 3.2
we prove the existence of an εn-Nash equilibrium to any Gn, with εn → 0 as n→∞.
The original contributions of this chapter may be found in [BCDP17b]. The approx-
imation scheme is inspired by [CF17].
3.1 Notation and Assumptions
As introduced more in details in Chapter 1, we recall the definition of the mean-
field interaction game with n-player Gn and the infinite-player version G∞ under study.
Differently by the setting introduced in the previous chapters, here we assume that
β(t, x, µ, γ) = β(µ, γ) to simplify the computation in what follows.
The mean-field interaction game Gn. Each player i = 1, . . . , n solves the optimiza-
tion problem
inf
γ∈A
{
J i,n(γ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xi,nt (γ), µ
n
t (γ), γ
i
t) dt+ g(X
i,n
T (γ), µ
n
T (γ))
]}
, (3.1)
s.t.
{
dXi,nt (γ) = b(t,X
i,n
t , µ
n
t ) dt+ σ(t,X
i,n
t ) dW
i
t + β(µ
n
t−, γit) dN˜ it ,
Xi,n0 = ξ
i ∼ χ , (3.2)
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where the n Brownian motions, the n Poisson processes with the same intensity
function ν(t) and the initial conditions ξi are mutually independent. γ
i represents
the strategy of player i which is required to belong to the set of the admissible pro-
cesses A, that is the set of the A-valued predictable processes. Then, an admissible
strategy profile γ for the game Gn is any n-tuple of admissible controls γ
i ∈ A for
all i, i.e. (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ An. Furthermore, µn stands for the empirical distribution
of the state Xn = (X1,n, . . . , Xn,n), meaning that at any time t ∈ [0, T ]
µnt (γ) =
n∑
i=1
1
n
δ
Xi,nt (γ)
. (3.3)
We sometimes write Xi,n(γ), µn(γ) and J i,n(γ) to stress that the state, and thus
the empirical distribution of the system and the expected cost of the game Gn of
each player i depend not only on his own control γi but also on the decision rule
of the other participants.
The mean field game G∞. A process γˆ ∈ A is a MFG solution to G∞ if
γˆ = arg min
γ∈A
{
J(γ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Yt(γ), µˆt, γt) dt+ g(YT (γ), µˆT )
]}
(3.4)
s.t.
{
dYt(γ) = b(t, Yt, µˆt) dt+ σ(t, Yt) dWt + β(µˆt−, γt) dN˜t
Y0 = ξ ∼ χ
(3.5)
and, at the same time, γˆ satisfies the MFG consistency condition
µˆt = L(Yt(γˆ)) (3.6)
at any time t ∈ [0, T ]. Furthermore, as stated in Definition 2.1.2, a mean-field
solution γˆ of G∞ is said to be Markovian if γˆt = γˆ(t, Yt−) for a measurable function
γˆ : [0, T ]× R→ R.
For the games to be well-defined and to find an approximate Nash equilibrium for
the n-player game Gn we have to require some integrability of the initial conditions of
the state processes as well as some regularity on the functions
b : [0, T ]× R× P2(R)→ R , σ : [0, T ]× R→ R , β : P2(R)×A→ R , ν : [0, T ]→ R+,
f : [0, T ]× R× P2(R)×A→ R , g : R× P2(R)→ R .
Assumption D. (D.1) The initial distribution χ belongs to Pq(R) for some q > 2,
q 6= 4.
(D.2) A is a compact subset of R. supa∈A |a| will be denoted by αM <∞.
(D.3) The intensity function ν is bounded, i.e. there exists a positive constant Mν
satisfying ‖ν‖∞ ≤Mν .
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(D.4) b is a Lipschitz function both in x and µ, σ is Lipschitz in x, and β is Lipschitz in
µ and γ. Namely, there exist positive constants Lb, Lσ and Lβ such that for all
x, y ∈ R, µ, η ∈ P2(R), γ, λ ∈ A and t ∈ [0, T ] ,
|b(t, x, µ)− b(t, y, η)| ≤ Lb |x− y|+ Lb dW,2(µ, η) ,
|σ(t, x)− σ(t, y)| ≤ Lσ |x− y| ,
|β(µ, γ)− β(η, λ)| ≤ Lβ dW,2(µ, η) + Lβ |γ − λ| .
Moreover, b, σ and β are bounded, i.e. there exists a positive constantM satisfying
‖b‖∞ + ‖σ‖∞ + ‖β‖∞ ≤M1 .
Without loss of generality, we can assume Lb = Lσ = Lβ = L and Mν = M1 = M .
(D.5) f and g are Lipschitz functions in both x and µ, i.e. there exist two positive
constants Lf , Lg such that for all x, y ∈ R, µ, η ∈ P2(R) and t ∈ [0, T ]
|f(t, x, µ)− f(t, y, η)| ≤ Lf |x− y|+ Lf dW,2(µ, η) ,
|g(x, µ)− g(y, η)| ≤ Lg |x− y|+ Lg dW,2(µ, η) .
From now on, we shortly write dW for the squared Wasserstein distance dW,2, as defined
in (2.4), and P(R) for P2(R).
Remark 3.1.1. The technical assumption q 6= 4 is required to guarantee the applicability
of [FG15, Theorem 1] to obtain the rate of convergence.
Remark 3.1.2. Ass. (D.1)-(D.4) will be used to construct approximate equilibria for the
n-player game Gn under some further hypotheses on the existence and the regularity of
a Markovian solution to the MFG G∞. Sufficient conditions ensuring the existence of
these Markovian MFG solutions are discussed in previous Chapter 2.
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All the results of this section are proved under the following standing assumption on
the limiting mean-field game G∞:
Assumption E. Assume that there exists a Markovian MFG solution γˆt = γˆ(t, Yt−) for
the game G∞, for some measurable function γˆ : [0, T ]×R→ A. Moreover, the function
γˆ(t, x) is Lipschitz continuous in the state variable x, i.e.
|γˆ(t, x)− γˆ(t, y)| ≤ Cγˆ |x− y| ∀x, y ∈ R ,∀t ∈ [0, T ], (3.7)
for some suitable constant Cγˆ > 0.
Without loss of generality we can assume that Cγˆ = L as in Assumption D.
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Consider the game Gn in the event that each agent i plays strategy γˆ = γˆ(t, Xˆ
i,n
t− ), i.e.
each player follows the optimal (relative to game G∞) strategy function (t, x) 7→ γˆ(t, x)
evaluated at the left-limit of his own state process Xˆi,nt− . In this case the state dynamics
is the n-tuple Xˆn = (Xˆ1,n, . . . , Xˆn,n), defined as solution of the following system{
dXˆi,nt = b(t, Xˆ
i,n
t , µ
n
t ) dt+ σ(t, Xˆ
i,n
t ) dW
i
t + β(µ
n
t−, γˆ(t, Xˆ
i,n
t− )) dN˜ it ,
Xˆi,n0 = ξ
i ,
(3.8)
where µn is the empirical measure of Xˆn. Assumption D ensures that there exists a
unique strong solution to the previous SDEs. Moreover, for each player the strategy
γˆ(t, Xˆi,nt− ) is admissible, i.e (γˆ(t, Xˆ
i,n
t− ))t∈[0,T ] ∈ A, being γˆ a (Borel)-measurable function
by construction and Xi,nt− a predictable process as solution of the stochastic differential
equation (3.8).
Then, the strategy profile (γˆ(t, Xˆ1,nt− ), . . . , γˆ(t, Xˆ
n,n
t− )) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for
the corresponding game Gn which approximates a (true) Nash equilibrium as n → ∞.
Namely,
Theorem 3.2.1. Let Assumptions D and E be fulfilled. If Xˆn is the solution of the
system (3.8), the n-tuple (γˆ(t, Xˆ1,nt− ), . . . , γˆ(t, Xˆ
n,n
t− )) is an εn-Nash equilibrium for the
n-player game Gn, with εn = O
(
n−α/2
)→ 0 as n→∞, where α = min{12 , q−22 }.
As previously noted, all the players taking part in the game Gn are symmetric in
their behaviour. For this reason in the following we will prove Theorem 3.2.1 considering
without loss of generality deviations of player 1 only. Indeed the same arguments would
apply to every other player in the game.
In the proof of Theorem 3.2.1, we will focus on two different scenarios: the case when
all the players choose to play according to the optimal recipe suggested by G∞, i.e. they
all play γˆ(t, Xˆi,nt− ) as explained above, and the case when player 1 deviates by choosing
any different strategy η ∈ A, i.e.
(η, γˆXˆ
n
−1 ) = (ηt, γˆ(t, Xˆ
2,n
t− ), . . . , γˆ(t, Xˆ
n,n
t− ))t∈[0,T ] .
Notation. From now on, the strategy profile (γˆ(t, Xˆ1,nt− ), . . . , γˆ(t, Xˆ
n,n
t− )), t ∈ [0, T ], will
be shortly denoted by γˆXˆ
n
whereas strategy (η, γˆXˆ
n
−1 ) by ηγˆ . The corresponding state
processes, that are the solutions of equation (3.2) under γˆXˆ
n
and ηγˆ , will be denoted by
Xˆ and X˜, respectively.
Remark 3.2.1. Concerning Remark 1.1.3, observe that in the following the deviating
player is allowed to choose any admissible open-loop strategy η ∈ A, whereas the (feed-
back) strategies of the other players are given by γˆi = γˆ(t, Xˆi,nt ), i.e. they are computed
considering the state of the system as described in equation (3.8) and therefore under-
stood as the related open-loop controls. Therefore, in order to prove Theorem 3.2.1 we
will show that
J i,n(γˆ) ≤ J i,n((η, γˆXˆn−i )) + εn
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for each i ∈ 1, . . . , n and η ∈ A, and εn as requested.
In the following we will also make use of the auxiliary processes Y i,n, with i =
1, . . . , n, and Y˜ 1,n, given as solutions of
dY i,nt (γˆ) = b(t, Y
i,n
t , µˆt) dt+ σ(t, Y
i,n
t ) dW
i
t + β(µˆt−, γˆ(t, Y
i,n
t− )) dN˜
i
t , Y
i,n
0 = ξ
i (3.9)
and of
dY˜ 1,nt (η) = b(t, Y˜
1,n
t , µˆt) dt+ σ(t, Y˜
1,n
t ) dW
1
t + β(µˆt−, ηt) dN˜
1
t , Y˜
1,n
0 = ξ
1 , (3.10)
respectively. Here µˆt represents the distribution law of the state process (optimally)
controlled by γˆ in the limiting game G∞ , i.e. Y (γˆ), solution to the SDE (3.5) under
γˆ(t, Yt), and therefore µˆ = L(Yt(γˆ)).
Remark 3.2.2. For each i = 1, . . . , n, the process Y i,n is defined as the dynamics of a
representative player in G∞, given in equation (3.5), when the optimal strategy function
γˆ, given in Assumption E, is chosen as control process. Then, by definition, Y i,n satisfies
the MFG consistency condition (3.6), meaning that Y i,n is distributed accordingly to µˆ,
i.e.
L(Y i,nt ) = µˆt , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] . (3.11)
Remark 3.2.3. The definition of processes Y i,n and Y˜ 1,n differs from the one of Xˆi,n and
X˜1,n due to the different measure flow considered in the stochastic differential equations.
Indeed in (3.2), the dynamics of Xˆi,n and X˜1,n are computed taking into account the
associated empirical distribution of the system Xˆn and X˜n, respectively, as defined in
equation (3.3), while the dynamics of Y i,n and Y˜ 1,n in (3.9) and (3.10) are computed
with respect to µˆ. In particular, this implies that Y i,n and Y˜ 1,n do no longer depend
on the other players’ choices (we will say that they do not depend on n for short) and
therefore their dynamics are easier to study.
3.2.1 L2-estimates for the state processes and the empirical mean pro-
cess in Gn
The following lemma provides an estimate for the second moment of the processes
Xi,n, defined as in equation (3.2).
Lemma 3.2.1. Assume that Assumption D holds. Then, for each admissible strategy
profile γ ∈ An the related controlled processes Xi,n(γ) for i = 1, . . . , n, solving the related
SDEs (3.2), satisfy
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xi,nt |2
]
≤ Cˆ(χ, T,M) , (3.12)
where the constant Cˆ is independent of n and γ.
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Proof. The proof follows the same steps as that of Lemma 2.2.3. By the equation (3.2),∣∣∣Xi,nt ∣∣∣2 ≤ 4 |ξi|2 + 4 ∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
b(s,Xi,ns , µ
n
s ) ds
∣∣∣∣2
+ 4
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
σ(s,Xi,ns ) dW
i
s
∣∣∣∣2 + 4 ∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
β(µns−, γ
i
s) dN˜
i
s
∣∣∣∣2 .
Applying Jensen’s and Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s inequalities, it follows that for a con-
stant C (which may change from line to line)
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣Xi,nt ∣∣∣2
]
≤ CE
[
|ξi|2
]
+ CtE
[∫ t
0
sup
u∈[0,s]
∣∣b(s,Xi,ns , µns )∣∣2 ds
]
+ CE
[∫ t
0
σ(s,Xi,ns )
2 ds
]
+ CE
[∫ t
0
β2(µns , γ
i
s)ν(s) ds
]
≤ C(χ) + C ‖b‖2∞ t2 + C ‖σ‖2∞ t+ C ‖β‖2∞ ‖ν‖∞ t
≤ Cˆ(χ, T,M),
where we have used Ass. (D.1), (D.2) and (D.4) for the second inequality.
An analogous result can be proved for the empirical distribution µn of the system
Xn, given in equation (3.3).
Lemma 3.2.2. Assume that Assumption D holds. Then, for any admissible strategy γ ∈
An, the empirical distribution µn = µn(γ) of the system Xn, solution of the SDE (3.2),
satisfies
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
d2W (µ
n
t , δ0)
]
≤ Cˆ(χ, T,M) (3.13)
for a constant Cˆ independent of n and γ.
Proof. The constant Cˆ appearing in Lemma 3.2.1 provides the required bound, since
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
d2W (µ
n
t , δ0)
]
≤ E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣Xi,nt ∣∣∣2
]
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣Xi,nt ∣∣∣2
]
≤ Cˆ .
Arguing as in the previous Lemmas, or as in Lemma 2.2.3, but exploiting the stronger
hypothesis on the initial distribution χ ∈ Pq(R) with q > 2, we can prove that each
solution Y to the SDE (3.5) satisfies
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Yt|q
]
≤ Cˆ2(χ, T,M) .
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Furthermore, considering its distribution law at time t ∈ [0, T ], that is µˆt, the previous
estimate guarantees that∫
R
|y|q µˆt(dy) < Cˆ2 <∞ for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.14)
3.2.2 Approximation results
Let Y n = (Y 1,n, . . . , Y n,n) be the system defined as in equation (3.9) and µY,n its
empirical measure, namely
µY,nt =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ
Y i,nt
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
As first step we show that this measure µY,n converges to µˆ with respect to the squared
Wasserstein distance as n → ∞. Being Y i,nt independent and identically distributed
random variables with distribution µˆt, see Remark 3.2.2, [FG15, Theorem 1] ensures
that
E
[
d2W (µˆt, µˆ
Y,n
t )
]
≤ C(q)M
2
q
q (µˆ)
(
1
n
1
2
+
1
n
q−2
q
)
where C is a positive constant depending on q, and Mq is defined as
Mq(µ) =
∫
R
|x|q µ(dx) .
Since by previous considerations Mq(µˆ) is finite, see equation (3.14),
dW (µˆt, µ
Y,n
t )
2 = O
(
n−α
)
(3.15)
where α = min
{
1
2 ,
q−2
q
}
, and being q > 2, this implies that
lim
n→∞E
[
d2W (µˆt, µ
Y,n
t )
]
= 0 (3.16)
uniformly in time.
Now, we want to show that the process Y i,n(γˆ) approximates Xˆi,n as n grows to
infinity, in a sense that will be specified later. In both the systems Xˆn and Y n, all
the n players choose the same strategy, or more precisely the same strategy form, i.e.
γˆ(t, Xˆi,nt− ) and γˆ(t, Y
i,n
t− ), respectively, but the dynamics in Xˆn depend on the actual
empirical distribution of this system, while the evolution of the state processes Y i,n are
computed with respect to the measure flow µˆ.
Proposition 3.2.1. Let Xˆi,n and Y i,n be defined as in equation (3.8) and (3.9), respec-
tively, and µn the empirical distribution of the system Xˆn. Then we have
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
d2W (µ
n
t , µˆt)
]
= O
(
n−α
)
, (3.17)
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2] = O (n−α) . (3.18)
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Proof. For each t ∈ [0, T ]
∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2 ≤ 3(∫ t
0
b(s, Xˆi,ns , µ
n
s )− b(s, Y i,ns , µˆs) ds
)2
+ 3
(∫ t
0
σ(s, Xˆi,ns )− σ(s, Y i,ns ) dW is
)2
+ 3
(∫ t
0
β(µns−, γˆ(s, Xˆ
i,n
s−))− β(µˆs−, γˆ(s, Y i,ns− ))dN˜ is
)2
.
Then,
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ 3tE [∫ t
0
∣∣∣b(s, Xˆi,ns , µns )− b(s, Y i,ns , µˆs)∣∣∣2 ds]
+ 3E
[∫ t
0
∣∣∣σ(s, Xˆi,ns )− σ(s, Y i,ns )∣∣∣2 ds]
+ 3E
[∫ t
0
(
β(µns−, γˆ(s, Xˆ
i,n
s−))− β(µˆs−, γˆ(s, Y i,ns− ))
)2
ν(s)ds
]
,
where we used again Jensen’s and Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s inequalities. Using the
Lipschitz continuity of functions b, σ and β, given by Ass. (D.4), and of γˆ(·, x), as ex-
plained in equation (3.7), as well as the finiteness of E[supt∈[0,T ] dW (µnt , δ0)2], as in (3.13),
we obtain
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ 6tL2 ∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2] + E [d2W (µns , µˆs)] ds
+ 3L2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2] ds
+ 6L2 ‖ν‖∞
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [d2W (µns , µˆs)] ds
≤ C˜(T, L,M)
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [d2W (µns , µˆs)] ds
(3.19)
for a suitable constant C˜. Moreover, by the previous inequality (3.19), we get
E
[
d2W (µ
n
t , µ
Y,n
t )
]
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ C˜
∫ t
0
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [d2W (µns , µˆs)] ds .
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Then, it holds that
E
[
d2W (µ
n
t , µˆt)
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ 2E
[
d2W (µ
n
t , µ
Y,n
t )
]
+ 2E
[
d2W (µ
Y,n
t , µˆt)
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ 2E
[
d2W (µ
Y,n
t , µˆt)
]
+ 3C˜
(∫ t
0
E
[
d2W (µ
n
s , µˆs)
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2] ds
)
.
(3.20)
Therefore, by equation (3.16), we have
E
[
d2W (µ
n
t , µˆt)
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ O (n−α)+ 2C˜ (∫ t
0
E
[
d2W (µ
n
s , µˆs)
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2] ds
)
and an application of the Gronwall’s inequality implies the desired results, i.e. equa-
tions (3.17) and (3.18).
In the previous estimates, we have considered the case when all the n players are
choosing the same strategic plan, γˆ(t, x). We now investigate what happen to the players’
dynamics when one of them, namely player 1, deviates from the strategy profile γˆXˆ
n
by
playing any other admissible strategy η ∈ A. In this case the strategy profile adopted
in the game Gn becomes η
γˆ and the dynamics of each player in Gn are given by X˜
i,n.
The following proposition shows that the empirical distributions of the two systems Xˆ
and X˜ converge with respect to dW as the number of players grows to infinity and that
the dynamics of the deviating player X˜1,n can be approximated by Y˜ 1,n, which does not
depend on n as pointed out in Remark 3.2.3.
Proposition 3.2.2. Let Xˆ and X˜ be the solutions of the system (3.2) when the strategy
profile is given by γˆXˆ
n
and by ηγˆ, respectively. We denote by µn and µ˜n the empirical
measure of the two systems. Then,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
d2W (µ
n
t , µ˜
n
t )
]
= O
(
n−1
)
.
Moreover, considering Y˜ 1,n, as defined in equation (3.10), it holds that
sup
t∈[0,T ], η∈A
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣2] = O (n−α) . (3.21)
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Proof. Firstly, we compare the dynamics of player 1 in the two different settings. Letting
Cˆ be the constant appearing in Lemma 3.2.1, that is independent of n, Ass. (D.4) implies
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ1,nt − X˜1,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ 6tL2 ∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ1,ns − X˜1,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [d2W (µns , µ˜ns )] ds
+ 3L2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ1,ns − X˜1,ns ∣∣∣2] ds
+ 3E
[∫ t
0
(
LdW (µ
n
s , µ˜
n
s ) + L
∣∣∣γˆ(s, Xˆ1,ns )− η∣∣∣)2 ν(s)ds]
≤ 12L2Cˆ(2t2 + t+ 2 ‖ν‖∞ t) + 12L2α2M ‖ν‖∞ t
≤ 12L2Cˆ(2T 2 + T + 2MT ) + 12L2α2MMT = C1
where C1 is again independent of n, and furthermore, by construction, does not depend
on η either.
On the other hand, the other players for i = 2, . . . , n play the strategy γˆ(t, ·) in
both cases, even if computed with respect to the different states, and then to estimate
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − X˜i,nt ∣∣∣2] we can argue as in (3.19).
Finally, following the same idea as to obtain (3.20) but taking into account the
different role of player 1, we have that
E
[
d2W (µ
n
t , µ˜
n
t )
] ≤ 1
n
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ1,nt − X˜1,nt ∣∣∣2]+ 1n
n∑
i=2
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − X˜i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ C1
n
+
C˜
n
n∑
i=2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,ns − X˜i,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [d2W (µns , µ˜ns )] ds
and therefore
E
[
d2W (µ
n
t , µ˜
n
t )
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=2
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − X˜i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ C1
n
+
2C˜
n
n∑
i=2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,ns − X˜i,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [d2W (µns , µ˜ns )] ds .
Applying again Gronwall’s lemma, it is found that
E
[
d2W (µ
n
t , µ˜
n
t )
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=2
E
[∣∣∣Xˆi,nt − X˜i,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ 1nK1(Cˆ, C1) , (3.22)
with K1 independent of n, t and η since Cˆ and C1 are so. Therefore,
sup
t∈[0,T ] ,η∈A
E
[
d2W (µ
n
t , µ˜
n
t )
]
= O
(
n−1
)
.
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This, together with (3.17), implies also that
sup
t∈[0,T ] ,η∈A
E
[
d2W (µˆt, µ˜
n
t )
]
= O
(
n−α
)
. (3.23)
Lastly, considering Y˜ 1,n as defined in equation (3.10) and arguing as in the proof of
Proposition 3.2.1, we have
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ 3(2t+ 1)L2 ∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣X˜i,ns − Y˜ i,ns ∣∣∣2] ds
+ 3(2t+ ‖ν‖∞)L2
∫ t
0
E
[
d2W (µ˜
n
s , µˆs)
]
ds
≤ K˜(T, L,M)
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,ns − Y˜ 1,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [d2W (µ˜ns , µˆs)] ds
so that by the previous convergence result (3.23)
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ K˜(T, L,M)∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,ns − Y˜ 1,ns ∣∣∣2] ds+ TK˜(T, L,M)O (n−α) .
Hence Gronwall’s lemma implies
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ K¯(T, L,M)O (n−α) (3.24)
for a suitable constant K¯ independent of n, t and η, and therefore
sup
t∈[0,T ], η∈A
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣2] = O (n−α) .
Remark 3.2.4. It is crucial here and in what follows that the two constants K1 and K¯
appearing in the estimates (3.22) and (3.24) do not depend on how player 1 deviates
from the strategy profile γˆXˆ
n
.
In order to prove Theorem 3.2.1, we will make use of the following two operators:
J˜n : An → R and J˜ : A → R, defined by
J˜n(γ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X1,nt (γ), µˆt, γ
1
t ) dt+ g(X
1,n
T (γ), µˆT )
]
(3.25)
and
J˜(η) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Y 1,nt , µˆt, ηt) dt+ g(Y
1,n
T , µˆT )
]
(3.26)
respectively, where X1,n(γ) and Y 1,n(η) are given as in (3.2) and (3.10). It is worth
observing that since both Y 1,n and µˆ do not depend on the number of players in the
game, then also J˜ does not depend on n. Furthermore, since Y 1,n follows the dynamics
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of a representative player in the mean-field game G∞, J˜ is exactly the expected cost
of the strategy η in G∞ with respect to the measure flow µˆ, as given in equation (3.4).
Therefore, since γˆ(t, Y 1,nt ) is by construction one of the minimising strategies, i.e. γˆ ∈
arg minγ∈A J(γ), we have that
J˜((γˆ(t, Y 1,nt− ))t∈[0,T ]) ≤ J˜(η) , (3.27)
for any admissible strategy η ∈ A.
As first step, we show that the value of player 1 in the game Gn when he deviates from
the candidate approximate Nash equilibrium γˆXˆ
n
to any different admissible strategy
η ∈ A, that is J1,n(ηγˆ) given in equation (3.1), can be approximated (when n is large)
with J˜n(η
γˆ), that is the expected cost computed under the same strategy profile ηγˆ , but
evaluated with respect to the measure µˆ.
Proposition 3.2.3. Let (t, x) 7→ γˆ(t, x) be as in Assumption E. Consider the strategy
profile
γˆXˆ
n
t = (γˆ(t, Xˆ
1,n
t− ), . . . , γˆ(t, Xˆ
n,n
t− )), t ∈ [0, T ],
and let η be an admissible strategy in A. Then
sup
η∈A
∣∣∣J1,n(ηγˆ)− J˜n(ηγˆ)∣∣∣ = O (n−α2 ) . (3.28)
Proof. By definition (3.25)-(3.26) and Ass. (D.5), the distance between the two operators
J1,n and J˜n can be bounded as follows:∣∣∣J1,n(ηγˆ)− J˜n(ηγˆ)∣∣∣ ≤ E [∫ T
0
∣∣∣f(t, X˜1,nt , µ˜nt , ηt)− f(t, X˜1,nt , µˆt, ηt)∣∣∣ dt]
+ E
[∣∣∣g(X˜1,nT , µ˜nT )− g(X˜1,nT , µˆT )∣∣∣]
≤ L
∫ T
0
E [dW (µ˜nt , µˆt)] dt+ LE [dW (µ˜nT , µˆT )] .
Then, previous results in Proposition 3.2.1 and in Proposition 3.2.2 imply that
E [dW (µ˜nt , µˆt)] ≤
(
E
[
dW (µ˜
n
t , µˆt)
2
]) 1
2 = O
(
n−
α
2
)
,
and by Lemma 3.2.2 and the dominate convergence theorem, the limit in equation (3.28)
is obtained.
As second step, we approximate J˜n(η
γˆ) with J˜(η), that is the expected cost for
playing η in the MFG G∞.
Proposition 3.2.4. Let (t, x) 7→ γˆ(t, x) represent the Markovian structure of a mean-
field game solution of the game G∞, γˆXˆ
n
t = (γˆ(t, Xˆ
1,n
t− ), . . . , γˆ(t, Xˆ
n,n
t− )), for t ∈ [0, T ],
and let η ∈ A be any admissible strategy. It holds that
sup
η∈A
∣∣∣J˜n(ηγˆ)− J˜(η)∣∣∣ = O (n−α2 ) . (3.29)
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Proof. Arguing as in Proposition 3.2.3, we have that∣∣∣J˜n(ηγˆ)− J˜(η)∣∣∣ ≤ E [∫ T
0
∣∣∣f(t, X˜1,nt , µˆt, ηt)− f(t, Y˜ 1,nt , µˆt, ηt)∣∣∣ dt]
+ E
[∣∣∣g(X˜1,nT , µˆT )− g(Y˜ 1,nT , µˆT )∣∣∣]
≤ L
∫ T
0
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣] dt+ LE [∣∣∣X˜1,nT − Y˜ 1,nT ∣∣∣] .
Since by Proposition 3.2.2, E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt (ηγˆ)− Y˜ 1,nt (η)∣∣∣] = O (n−α2 ), then
sup
η∈A
∣∣∣J˜n(ηγˆ)− J˜(η)∣∣∣ = O (n−α2 ) , (3.30)
as claimed.
Thanks to all the previous approximation results, we are ready to prove Theo-
rem 3.2.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.1. Given any admissible strategy η ∈ A, let
ε1,n = 4 sup
η∈A
∣∣∣J1,n(ηγˆ)− J˜n(ηγˆ)∣∣∣ , ε2,n = 4 sup
η∈A
∣∣∣J˜n(ηγˆ)− J˜(η)∣∣∣ and εn = ε1,n + ε2,n.
Then
J1,n(ηγˆ) ≥ −εn
2
+ J˜(η) ≥ −εn
2
+ J˜(γˆ) ≥ −εn + J1,n(γˆ),
meaning that the deviating player saves at most εn. More in detail, the first and the
third inequalities are guaranteed by Proposition 3.2.3 and Proposition 3.2.4 respectively,
whereas the second inequality is justified in equation (3.27). The symmetry of Gn
guarantees that (γˆ(t,X1,nt− ), . . . , γˆ(t,X
n,n
t− )), for t ∈ [0, T ], is an ε-Nash equilibrium of
this game. See Definition 1.1.2.
The rate convergence, i.e. εn = O
(
n−
α
2
)
, is also granted by the previous approxi-
mations in Propositions 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.
Chapter 4
An illiquid interbank market
model
We illustrate the relevance of the class of mean field games introduced in the previous
Chapter 1 by means of an illiquid interbank market model. Inspired by the systemic risk
model proposed by Carmona and co-authors in [CFS15], we consider n banks interacting
in an illiquid interbank lending market. Each bank controls its level of reserves to meet
its financial obligations and its reserve requirements. However, being this market illiquid,
the banks can access it only at some exogenously given instants, modeled as jump times
of a Poisson process. The intensity ν of these Poisson processes, which does not depend
on the specific bank, can be viewed as a health indicator of the whole system: the lower
the intensity, hence the lower the probability of controlling the reserves, the higher the
illiquidity of the system.
In Section 4.1, the mathematical structure of this game is introduced and an open-
loop Nash equilibrium is computed explicitly, whereas in Section 4.2 the resulting limiting
MFG is investigated. Furthermore, we perform some numerical experiments showing the
role of illiquidity in driving the evolution over time of the optimal controls and the related
state variables. These results are summarised in Section 4.3.
The original results are collected in [BCDP17a].
4.1 The n-bank case
Consider n banks, the players of this game, which lend to and borrow from a central
bank in an interbank lending market. This is the market where banks can ask or extend
loans to one another and therefore it is their primary source to manage liquidity. Deter-
mining an appropriate level for its reserves is a crucial task for any financial institutions
since after the financial crisis of 2008, they are required to store an adequate amount of
liquid assets, like cash, to manage possible market stress by international regulations,
like Basel III or Solvency II. But at the same time, also holding more cash than needed
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is costly due to its low return.
We model illiquidity phenomenon by not allowing the banks to control their reserves
continuously over time. On the contrary, each bank can adjust its reserve level by
borrowing or lending money only at some exogenous random instants modeled as jump
times of a Poisson process.
Let n be a strictly positive natural number, representing the number of banks in-
tervening in the interbank market under study, and let Xi = (Xit)t∈[0,T ] denote the
monetary log-reserves of each bank i, for i = 1, . . . n, over the finite time interval [0, T ],
with 0 < T <∞. The evolution of these processes is given by
dXit =
a
n
n∑
j=1
(Xjt −Xit) dt+ σ dW it + γit−dP it , i = 1, . . . , n, (4.1)
subjected to an initial condition Xi0 = ξi for all i = 1, . . . , n. Here (W
1, . . . ,Wn) is an
n-dimensional Brownian motion and (P 1, . . . , Pn) is an n-dimensional Poisson process,
each component with a constant intensity ν > 0. ξi are i.i.d. random variables such that
E[ξi] = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Furthermore, initial conditions, Brownian motions W i and
Poisson processes P i are all mutually independent.
Each bank can control its reserves by means of the control γi, which multiplies
the corresponding Poisson Process P i. This implies that the institution i actively, or
deliberately, modifies its state only at the jump times of P i.
Through the parameter ν, that is the intensity of each independent Poisson process
P i, we represent the market liquidity, like it is an health indicator of the whole system.
For instance, when ν is low, the system becomes very illiquid, meaning that each bank
can intervene in the market, and therefore adjust its reserve level, more rarely. Observe
that while the banks can borrow or lend money at different times, since the processes P i
are mutually independent, ν does not depend on the particular bank i, since it measures
the depth of the market and not a specific characteristic of each bank.
In the following, let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and γ = (γ1, . . . , γn). We denote by X¯t the
empirical mean of the monetary log-reserves X at time t, that is
X¯t =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xit . (4.2)
Therefore, the dynamics given in the previous SDE (4.1) can be rewritten in the mean
field form as
dXit = [a(X¯t −Xit) + νγit ]dt+ σ dW it + γit−dP˜ it , i = 1, . . . , n ,
which clearly show that the dynamics of the monetary reserves are coupled together
through their drifts by means of the average state of the system. Differentiating the
formula (4.2), the dynamics of the average state X¯t follows
dX¯t =
1
n
n∑
k=1
dXkt =
ν
n
n∑
k=1
γkt dt+
σ
n
n∑
k=1
dW kt +
1
n
n∑
k=1
γkt− dP˜
k
t . (4.3)
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Any bank i controls its level of reserves through the control process γi in order to
minimise the cost functional J i, defined by
J i(γ) = J i(γ1, . . . , γn) = E
[ ∫ T
0
νf i(Xt, γ
i
t) dt+ g
i(XT )
]
.
This cost J i depends directly on the strategy chosen by player i, and indirectly also on
the choices of the opponents, since X does. The running cost f i : Rn × R→ R and the
terminal cost gi : Rn → R are the following quadratic functions
f i(x, γi) =
1
2
(γi)2 − θγi(x¯− xi) + ε
2
(x¯− xi)2 , (4.4)
gi(x) =
c
2
(x¯− xi)2 , (4.5)
where x¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 x
i. Note that both the cost functions of player i depend on the other
players’ strategies only through the mean of the states x¯, i.e. f i(x, γi) = f(x¯, xi, γi)
and gi(x) = g(x¯, xi) and that these cost functions are the same for each player, even if
computed with respect to the own strategy/state.
As mention before, if, on the one hand, banks need to maintain a certain level of
reserves due to regulators, on the other hand, holding too much cash is costly. Then we
assume that banks try to keep their reserve level away from critical values, both from
above and from below, by using as a benchmark the average value of reserves in the
system. With this reason in mind, both the cost functions penalize departures from the
average x¯. Then, the parameter θ > 0 is to control the incentive to borrowing or lending:
each bank i wants to increase its reserves (i.e. borrow: γit > 0) if its state X
i
t is smaller
than the empirical mean X¯t and decrease them (i.e. lend: γ
i
t < 0) if X
i
t is greater than
X¯t. Also the parameters ε and c are strictly grater than 0, so that the quadratic term
(x¯− xi)2 in both costs punishes deviations from the average. Moreover we assume that
θ2 ≤ ε ,
which guarantees the convexity of f i(x, γ) in (x, γ).
Remark 4.1.1. Differently from what we have studied in the previous chapters, both the
dynamics and the cost functions depend on the empirical state distribution only through
its first moment, that is the empirical mean of the system.
4.1.1 The open-loop problem
We look for a Nash equilibrium among all admissible open-loop strategies γt =
{γit , i = 1, . . . , n}. A game is open-loop if no player obtains any dynamic informa-
tion during the decision process. Therefore an open-loop strategy is any adapted and
ca`dla`g process η = (ηt)t∈[0,T ] with values in a fixed action set A ⊂ R satisfying the
integrability condition E
[ ∫ T
0 |ηt|2 dt
]
< ∞. We denote the set of all these admissible
open-loop controls by A and we will consider as control space A the whole real line R.
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Since due to the formulation of the model the game under study is symmetric, we
can focus on a representative player, say player i, implying that the following holds for
each player i = 1, . . . , n.
Let γˆ = (γˆi, . . . , γˆn) be an admissible strategy profile. To prove that it is a Nash
equilibrium for this game, we need to show that, when all the opponents j, with j 6= i,
are following γˆj , γˆi is a best response for player i, meaning that γˆi is a minimising
control. We will solve the optimization problem faced by player i via the Pontryagin’s
maximum principle, developed in the stochastic framework in [ØS05]. The Hamiltonian
related to the minimisation problem of bank i is the function
H i(t, x, γ, yi, qi, ri) : [0, T ]× Rn ×An × Rn × Rn×n × Rn×n → R
defined by
H i(t, x, γ, yi, qi, ri) = νf i(x, γ) + (a(x¯− x) + νγ) · yi + σtr(qi) + γ · diag(ri)
= ν
(
(γi)2
2
− θ(x¯− xi)γi + ε
2
(x¯− xi)2
)
+
n∑
k=1
[
a(x¯− xk) + νγk
]
yi,k
+ σ
n∑
k=1
qi,k,k +
n∑
k=1
γkri,k,k.
(4.6)
The processes Y it = {Y i,kt : k = 1, . . . , n}, Qit = {Qi,k,jt : k, j = 1, . . . , n} and Rit =
{Ri,k,jt : k, j = 1, . . . , n} appearing in the definition of the Hamiltonian H i are the so
called adjoint processes, which are defined as the solutions of the following BSDEs with
jumps (see, e.g., [Del13, Theorem 3.1.1]){
dY i,kt = −∂H
i(t,Xt,γt,Y it ,Q
i
t,R
i
t)
∂xk
dt+
∑n
j=1Q
i,k,j
t dW
j
t +
∑n
j=1R
i,k,j
t− dP˜
j
t
Y i,kT =
∂gi
∂xk
(XT ) ,
(4.7)
for k = 1, . . . , n.
To compute an optimal strategy, we will exploit the following Theorem.
Theorem 4.1.1. Let γˆ = (γˆ1, . . . , γˆn) be an admissible strategy profile, γˆ ∈ An, and
Xˆ = X γˆ the corresponding controlled state. Suppose that there exists a solution (yˆi, qˆi, rˆi)
of the corresponding adjoint SDE (4.7) such that
E
∫ T
0
qˆit(qˆ
i
t)
> +
n∑
j,k=1
∣∣∣rˆi,j,kt ∣∣∣2 dt
 <∞ . (4.8)
Moreover, suppose that for all t ∈ [0, T ]
H i(t, Xˆt, γˆt, yˆ
i
t, qˆ
i
t, rˆ
i
t) = inf
α∈A
H i(t, Xˆt, γˆ
1
t , . . . , γˆ
i−1
t , α, γˆ
i+1
t , . . . , γˆ
n
t , yˆ
i
t, qˆ
i
t, rˆ
i
t)
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and that
Hˆ i(x) = min
α∈A
H i(t, x, yˆ1t , . . . , γˆ
i−1
t , α, γˆ
i+1
t , . . . , γˆ
n
t , yˆ
i, qˆi, rˆi)
is a well-defined convex function, for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, γˆi is optimal, meaning that it
minimises J i.
Proof. See Theorem 3.4 in [ØS05]
The previous theorem suggests to consider as candidate for the optimal control γˆi the
process which minimise the Hamiltonian H i with respect to all possible control values,
that is
γˆi = θ(x¯− xi)− yi,i − 1
ν
ri,i,i . (4.9)
Observe that the convexity of f i in (x, γ) provides convexity also for H i and Hˆ i in (x, γ)
and x, respectively. Then, the following step is to explicitly solve the BSDEs given in
equation (4.7).
Note that the drift term in the definition of process Y i as adjoint process, that is
equation (4.7), is given by
−∂H
i(t, x, γ, yi, qi, ri)
∂xk
= νθ
(
1
n
− δi,k
)
γit − νε
(
1
n
− δi,k
)
(x¯− xi)− a
n
n∑
j=1
(yi,j − yi,k) .
Due to its linearity with respect to
(
1
n − δi,k
)
(x¯−xi), it is natural to consider as ansatz
for Y i,kt a linear process in the same difference, i.e.
Y i,kt =
(
1
n
− δi,k
)
(X¯t −Xit)φt, (4.10)
where δi,j is the Kronecker delta and φ is a deterministic scalar function of class C
1([0, T ]).
To guarantee the final condition of process Y i,k as requested in (4.7), that is
Y i,kT = c
(
1
n
− δi,k
)(
X¯T −XiT
) ∂gi
∂xk
(XT ) ,
we require that φ satisfies the terminal condition φT = c. By applying Itoˆ’s Lemma to
the ansatz (4.10) and exploiting the SDEs (4.1) and (4.3), it is found that Y i,k solves
the following SDE:
dY i,kt =
(
1
n
− δi,k
)
d(X¯t −Xit)φt +
(
1
n
− δi,k
)
(X¯t −Xit)φ˙t dt
=
(
1
n
− δi,k
)[
νφt(γ¯t − γit) + (φ˙t − aφt)(X¯t −Xit)
]
dt
+
(
1
n
− δi,k
)
φtσ
n
n∑
j=1
(
dW jt − dW it
)
(4.11)
+
(
1
n
− δi,k
)
φt
n
n∑
j=1
(
γjt− dP˜
j
t − γit− dP˜ it
)
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where γ¯t =
1
n
∑n
k=1 γ
k
t denotes the average value of all control processes at time t.
Comparing (4.7) and (4.11) under the ansatz (4.10) yields
Qi,k,jt = σ
(
1
n
− δi,k
)(
1
n
− δi,j
)
φt, (4.12)
Ri,k,jt =
(
1
n
− δi,k
)(
1
n
− δi,j
)
φtγ
j
t , (4.13)
for all indeces k, j = 1, . . . , n. Being φ a bounded function and γj ∈ A for all j, these
processes satisfy the desired regularity condition (4.8).
Moreover, by (4.10) and (4.13), it follows that the optimal process γˆi given in (4.9)
solves
γˆit = θ(X¯t −Xit)−
(
1
n
− 1
)
φt(X¯t −Xit)−
1
ν
(
1
n
− 1
)2
φtγˆ
i
t ,
and therefore the optimal best response γˆi turns out to be
γˆit =
θ +
(
1− 1n
)
φt
1 + 1ν
(
1− 1n
)2
φt
(X¯t −Xit) . (4.14)
Then, at any time t ∈ [0, T ], the optimal strategy of player i is proportional to the
distance between his state position and the average state with rate
ψt =
θ +
(
1− 1n
)
φt
1 + 1ν
(
1− 1n
)2
φt
. (4.15)
Furthermore, it should be noted that even if in principle we were looking for an open-loop
optimal strategy, it turned out to have a closed-loop structure, since γˆit = γˆ
i(t,Xt).
To complete the description of the optimal open-loop strategy γˆi, we need to provide
a characterisation of the function φ appearing in the definition of the adjoint process
Y i,k, given in equation (4.10). From the definition of the Hamiltonian H i, equation (4.6),
the ansatz (4.10) and the related implications, the SDE (4.7) becomes
dY i,kt =
(
1
n
− δi,k
)
[νθψt − νε+ aφt] (X¯t −Xit) dt+
n∑
j=1
(
Qi,k,jt dW
j
t +R
i,j,k
t− dP˜
j
t
)
.
(4.16)
Since both equations (4.11) and (4.16) hold simultaneously, we have that the following
equality must hold
φ˙− aφ− νψtφ = νθψt − νε+ aφt
and in turn this implies that φt need to solve the ODE(
1 +
1
ν
(
1− 1
n
)2
φt
)
φ˙t =
[
ν +
2a
ν
(
1− 1
n
)](
1− 1
n
)
φ2t
+
[
νθ
(
2− 1
n
)
− ε
(
1− 1
n
)2
+ 2a
]
φt + ν(θ
2 − ε) , (4.17)
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with terminal condition φT = c.
Remark 4.1.2. Observe that a solution φ to the ODE (4.17) exists and it can be computed
at least in implicit form.
φ solves the following final value Cauchy problem{
φ˙(t) = F (φ(t)) ,
φ(T ) = c > 0 ,
where F is given by
F (u) =
Au2 +Bu+ C
1 + ku
,
and k, A, B and C are fixed constants depending on the model parameters, namely
k =
1
ν
(
1− 1
n
)2
,
A =
(
ν +
2a
ν
(
1− 1
n
))(
1− 1
n
)
> 0 ,
B = νθ
(
2− 1
n
)
− ε
(
1− 1
n
)2
+ 2a ,
C = ν(θ2 − ε) < 0 .
The parameter k is strictly positive as soon as ν > 0 and n ≥ 2, which we can safely
assume to rule out trivialities. Performing the time reversal τ = T − t we can consider
the equivalent Cauchy problem {
φ˙(τ) = −F (φ(τ))
φ(0) = c > 0 ,
(4.18)
which is uniquely solvable in the domain Dk = [0, T ]×
(− 1k ,∞). Indeed, since −F and
−F˙ are continuous functions in this domain Dk, standard results assures the existence
of a unique C1 solutions to problem (4.18) for any initial condition c > − 1k .
4.2 The limiting game
We continue the study of this model by computing the solution of the MFG obtained
from the game introduced in Section 4.1 when the number of players grows to infinity.
In particular, we will study the convergence of the n-player Nash equilibria towards
the related MFG solution. Clearly, this is a theoretical argument since the financial
interpretation of the model gets lost, being the participants of a lending market finite
and rather few.
Firstly, we introduce the corresponding limiting game as explained in Chapter 1.
Let m : [0, T ] → R be a given ca`dla`g function, m ∈ D, representing a candidate for the
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evolution of the expected average state of the system, that is E[X¯t(n)], when n → ∞.
In this limit case, a representative player aims at minimising the expected cost
J(γ) = E
[∫ T
0
ν
(
γ2t
2
− θγt(m(t)−Xt) + ε
2
(m(t)−Xt)2
)
dt+
c
2
(m(T )−XT )2
]
among all the admissible strategies γ ∈ A, subject to the dynamics
dXt = [a(m(t)−Xt) + νγt] dt+ σ dWt + γt− dP˜t, X0 = ξ. (4.19)
As before, A represents the set of the ca`dla`g and adapted processes with values in
A and such that E
[∫ T
0 |γt|2 dt
]
< ∞, W and P denote a standard Brownian motion
and a Poisson process with constant intensity ν > 0, respectively, and ξ is the initial
condition of the state process. W , P and ξ are assumed to be independent. In view of
Definition 1.2.1, a MFG solution is any admissible strategy γˆ ∈ A which minimises the
objective function J , i.e.
γˆ = arg inf
γ∈A
J(γ) ,
and at the same time satisfies the MFG consistency condition (1.8), that in this case
reduces to
E[X γˆt ] = mt ∀t ∈ [0, T ] .
As for the game with a finite number of players, the problem is solved via the Pon-
tryagin maximum principle. In this case, the Hamiltonian turns out to be
H(t, x, γ, y, q, r) = ν
(
γ2
2
−θγ(m(t)−x) + ε
2
(m(t)−x)2
)
+ [a(m(t)−x) +νγ]y+σq+γr
where (y, q, r) are the adjoint processes, defined as the triple (Y,Q,R) solving{
dYt = −∂H(t,Xt,Yt,Qt,Rt,γt)∂x dt+Qt dWt +Rt− dP˜t ,
YT = c(XT −m(T )) .
(4.20)
Note that this time, contrary to what happen in the n-player game, the optimization
problem is one-dimensional and therefore Y , Q and R are real-valued stochastic pro-
cesses. Then, the Hamiltonian H(t, x, ·, y, q, r) attains its minimum when
γˆ = θ(m(t)− x)− y − 1
ν
r .
In this case the dynamics of the related control state X = X γˆ is given by
dXt = [(a+ νθ)(m(t)−Xt)− νYt −Rt] dt+ σ dWt + [θ(m(t−)−Xt−)
−Yt− − 1
ν
Rt−)] dP˜t
X0 = ξ ,
(4.21)
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whereas the triple (Y,Q,R) solves{
dYt =
[
(a+ νθ)Yt + θRt + ν(ε− θ2)(m(t)−Xt)
]
dt+Qt dWt +Rt− dP˜t ,
YT = c(XT −m(T )) .
(4.22)
The two stochastic differential equations (4.21)-(4.22) are linear in X and Y , and there-
fore we can firstly solve for their expected value, i.e. E[Xt] and E[Yt]. In fact, by taking
expectation in both sides of equation (4.21) and using the martingale property of the
integrals with respect to Brownian motion and compensated Poisson process, it is found
that E[Xt] solves
dE[Xt] = [(a+ νθ)(m(t)− E[Xt])− νE[Yt] + E[Rt]] dt.
Since a MFG solution γˆ is required to guarantee the consistency condition E[X γˆt ] = mt,
to find a solution it must be the case that m evolves according to
dm(t) = −νE[Yt] + E[Rt] dt . (4.23)
Now, in order to solve the BSDE (4.22) and therefore to find explicitly the adjoint
processes, we make the usual ansatzes, namely
Yt = −φt(m(t)−Xt) , Qt = σφt , Rt = θ + φt
1 + 1νφt
φt(m(t)−Xt) , (4.24)
for some deterministic function φ of class C1([0, T ]) with final value φT = c. As before,
this final condition over φ assures that YT = c(XT −m(T )) as requested. Observe that,
defined as in equation (4.24), the adjoint processes Y , R and Q are the limit of the
processes consider in the n-bank case given in equations (4.10), (4.12) and (4.13), when
n tends to infinity.
Due to the fact that both processes Q and R are proportional to the difference
m(t)− E[Xt] and that m(t) = E[Xt] for all t ∈ [0, T ] when a MFG solution is chosen as
control process, it follows that in the optimal case E[Qt] = E[Rt] = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
By plugging the ansatzes in the BSDE (4.22), it is found that the process Y solves
dYt =
(
−(a+ νθ)φt + θ θ + φt
1 + 1νφt
φt + ν(ε− θ2)
)
(m(t)−Xt)dt+ σφt dWt
+
θ + φt
1 + 1νφt
φt(m(t−)−Xt−) dP˜t
(4.25)
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and, at the same time, by differentiating its definition, we have that
dYt =
(
−φ˙t(m(t)−Xt) + φt ((a+ νθ)(m(t)−Xt)− νYt −Rt + νE[Yt] + E[Rt])
)
dt
+ σφt dWt +
θ + φt
1 + 1νφt
φt(m(t−)−Xt−) dP˜t
=
(
−φ˙t + φt
(
a+ νθ + νφt − θ + φt
1 + 1νφt
φt
))
(m(t)−Xt) dt+ σφt dWt
+
θ + φt
1 + 1νφt
φt(m(t−)−Xt−) dP˜t,
where once again we used the identity m(t) = E[Xt] and its implications, namely E[Yt] =
E[Rt] = 0 and equation (4.23).
Therefore (Y,Q,R) as defined in equation (4.24) is the solution to the BSDE (4.22)
as soon as φt solves the following Cauchy problem{(
1 + 1νφt
)
φ˙t =
(
ν + 2aν
)
φ2t + (2(a+ νθ)− ε)φt − ν(ε− θ2) ,
φ(T ) = c ,
(4.26)
and then the optimal control strategy turns out to be
γˆt =
θ + φt
1 + 1νφt
(E[Xt]−Xt) .
Observe that this can also be obtained as limit for n → ∞ of the Nash equilibrium
computed before in the n-player game (see equations (4.14) and (4.17)). Figure 4.1
displays the behaviour of φ, solution of the ODE (4.17), for different values of players’
number n. As n increases, the graph of φ = φ(n) quickly converges to the solution we
found in the game with an infinite number of players, given in equation (4.26).
4.3 Simulations
We conclude this chapter by performing some numerical analysis on the n-player
game introduced in the Section 4.1. In particular, we examine the dependence of the
open-loop Nash equilibrium on the intensity of the Poisson processes, ν.
First, in Figure 4.2, we consider a general possible scenario of the model. Figure 4.2a
shows the dynamic of each bank, with the one of player 1 marked in bold, and the
evolution of the average level of the reserves in red, whereas Figure 4.2b shows the
corresponding optimal strategy for player 1. This optimal strategy is such that at each
jump time in his own dynamic, that is when bank 1 can adjust its reserves by borrowing
or lending money, the corresponding state process moves closer to the average level X¯.
This is clearly expected due to the form of the cost functions, being such an average a
benchmark for each bank. Then, since both the cost functions penalize each deviation
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Figure 4.1: Plots of φ, solution of the ODE (4.17) for different values of n. Model’s
parameter: T = 2, a = 1, θ = 1, ε = 10, ν = 0.7, c = 0
of the players’ state from the average state X¯, each player try to replicate X¯ for its own
reserve level. Therefore, as it can be seen in the figures, when the reserve level of bank
1 is below the average value X¯, the optimal strategy is positive, meaning that bank 1
wishes to raise its reserves up, and on the contrary when X1 is above X¯, the optimal
strategy is negative, meaning that bank 1 wants to decrease its reserves.
It could be noted that, even if after a jump, the state of player 1 moves closer
to the benchmark X¯t, these two values do not (always) match exactly. This depends
on two reasons. First, reaching X¯ can be too costly due to the quadratic cost of the
control in the running cost function. Second, the choice of each bank, say bank 1, at
time t− depends on the difference between its reserve X1t− and the average reserves X¯t−
computed immediately before the jump time t. But at the same time, X¯ might have a
jump at the same time t, as a consequence of the jump in the reserves of bank 1. So
even if X1t = X¯t−, it may occur that X1t 6= X¯t.
Now, we focus on the variation of the equilibrium strategy due to changes in the
intensity ν of the Poisson processes, representing the liquidity parameter of the inter-
bank market. It is more convenient for the analysis to consider the function ψ : [0, T ]→
R, as defined in equation (4.15), so that the open-loop optimal strategy can be expressed
as γˆit = ψt(X¯t −Xit), for t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence, whenever one of the Poisson processes, say
P i, jumps, bank i would modify its reserves by an amount γˆit which is proportional to
the difference X¯t−−Xit− just before the jump, with a proportionality factor ψt. Routine
4.3 Simulations 62
Time
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
M
on
et
ar
y 
re
se
rv
es
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Average state process
State process
(a) Monetary reserves
Time
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
O
pt
im
al
 s
tra
te
gy
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
(b) Optimal strategy
Figure 4.2: Possible scenario. Model’s parameters: n = 10, T = 2, a = 1, σ = 0.8,
X0 = 0, θ = 1, ε = 10, c = 0, ν = 0.7.
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computation shows that ψ solves the following ODE(
1− 1
ν
(
1− 1
n
)
θ
)2
ψ˙t =
[
ν +
2a
ν
(
1− 1
n
)](
1− 1
ν
(
1− 1
n
)
ψt
)
(ψt − θ)2
+
[
νθ
(
2− 1
n
)
− ε
(
1− 1
n
)2
+ 2a
](
1− 1
ν
(
1− 1
n
)
ψt
)2
(ψt − θ)
+
[(
1− 1
n
)
ν(θ2 − ε)
](
1− 1
ν
(
1− 1
n
)
ψt
)3
,
with final value ψT =
θ +
(
1− 1n
)
c
1 + 1ν
(
1− 1n
)2
c
, which is increasing in ν.
All our numerical experiments revealed that such a monotonicity behaviour propa-
gates to the whole time interval, i.e. the proportionality factor ψt is increasing in the
intensity ν for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Here, in figures 4.3 and 4.4, we show only the behaviour
of ψ as function of time t ∈ [0, T ] with T = 2, n ∈ {10, 100}, c ∈ {0, 1}, and more
importantly for different values of ν. Moreover, observe that (see Fig 4.4) the final value
ψT depends on the parameter ν whenever c is different than zero.
In the Nash equilibrium we have found, when ν is small, hence the interbank market
is very illiquid in the sense that banks will have (in expectation) very few possibilities to
change their reserves, the reserves will change very little proportionally to (X¯t−−Xit−).
On the other hand, when ν is large, so that in expectation banks will have many occasions
to lend/borrow money from the central bank, changes in their reserves will be very big
proportionally to (X¯t− − Xit−). Therefore, focusing on the first case, we notice that
instead of compensating the lack of liquidity (ν small), banks seem to amplify it by
borrowing and lending very little.
Another interesting feature one can notice from the figures is that when ν is small,
the proportionality factor ψt is increasing in time. When the market is very illiquid,
there are very few possibility for the banks to change their reserves during the time
period, so that when the maturity T is approaching, the banks knowing that they are
running out of time to move their reserves closer to the average reserve X¯, amplify their
efforts, whence an increasing ψt. An analogue interpretation can be provided for the
opposite situation of a time-decreasing ψt when ν is large.
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of ψ for different values of ν. Model’s parameters: T = 2, a = 1,
θ = 1, ε = 10, c = 0.
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of ψ for different values of ν. Model’s parameters: T = 2, a = 1,
θ = 1, ε = 10, c = 1.
Part II
An optimal control approach to
stochastic volatility models
Chapter 5
Stochastic optimal control theory
The objective of this chapter is to collect some useful results on stochastic optimal
control theory, needed in Chapter 6. Stochastic control theory concerns controlled dy-
namical systems when subjected to random perturbations. In the following we consider
diffusion models, meaning that the state of the system evolves over time according to
an Itoˆ’s stochastic differential equation, which depends on a controlled input chosen to
achieve the best possible outcome.
Here the presentation is restricted to the key results, but a more general and detailed
study of these topics can be found in [Pha09; FR12; Tou12; YZ99] which are the main
references for this chapter.
5.1 Stochastic optimal control problems
Let t0 and T be two fixed times in the interval (0,∞) such that t0 < T and let
(Ω,F , {Ft}t∈[t0,T ], P ) be a filtered probability space. Consider a dynamical system whose
random state X = X(ω) ∈ Rn evolves according to the stochastic differential equation
dXt = b(t,Xt, u(t)) dt+ σ(t,Xt, u(t))dWt , t ∈ [t0, T ] , (5.1)
subjected to an initial condition Xt0 = x, where Wt stands for a d-dimensional Brownian
motion. The dynamic t 7→ Xt depends on the controlled input u, where the value u(t)
represents the control applied in the system at time t, chosen with respect to the available
information.
The drift function b : [t0, T ] × Rn × U → Rn and the diffusion function σ : [t0, T ] ×
Rn×U → Rn×d are assumed to be continuous and Lipschitz continuous with respect to
the state variable x, that is for all x, y ∈ Rn, t ∈ [t0, T ] and v ∈ U , it holds that
|b(t, x, v)− b(t, y, v)|+ |σ(t, x, v)− σ(t, y, v)| ≤ C |x− y|
for a suitable positive constant C.
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To be admissible, a control u = {u(t) : t0 ≤ t ≤ T} is required to be an Ft-adapted
process, taking values in a given set of U ⊂ Rk, and such that
E
[∫ T
t0
|b(t, 0, u(t))|2 + |σ(t, 0, u(t))|2 dt
]
<∞ .
In the following, the set of all admissible control processes will be denoted by U(t0, x).
Furthermore, an admissible control u ∈ U(t, x) is called feedback (or Markov) control if
it is adapted to the natural filtration generated by the state process and can be written
as us = ν(s,X
t,x
s ) for a measurable function ν : [t, T ]× Rn → U .
Given the previous assumptions regarding the drift and the diffusion function, u being
in U ensures that there exists a unique strong solution to the stochastic differential
equation (5.1) for each initial data (t, x) ∈ [t0, T ] × Rn. Given an admissible control
process u ∈ U(t, x), the unique solution of equation (5.1) starting at time t from value x
will be denoted with Xt,x,u = {Xt,x,us }s∈[t,T ], or simply with Xt,x = {Xt,xs }s∈[t,T ] if there
is no ambiguity.
The performance of any control process is measured by a given cost criterion J , and
the objective is to minimise it. Considering a finite horizon problem, given an initial
data (t, x) ∈ [t0, T ]× Rn, the functional J is defined as
J(t, x; ·) : U → R
u→ J(t, x;u) = E
[∫ T
t
f(s,Xt,x,us , u(s)) ds+ g(T,X
t,x,u(T ))
]
,
where f and g are two measurable functions. We refer to J(t, x;u) as the expected cost
associated to the control u. In order to be J well defined, U(t, x) is restricted to the
admissible processes providing E
[ ∫ T
t |f(s,Xt,x,us , u(s))| ds
]
<∞ and g is required to be
is lower-bounded or of sub-quadratic growth.
Therefore, given an initial data (t, x) ∈ [t0, T ] × Rn for the state process X, the
stochastic control problem (P) considered here is to find (if it exists) an admissible
control process u∗ attaining the minimum of J(t, x; ·) over all the admissible control
processes U(t, x):
(P) Search u∗ ∈ U(t, x) such that J(t, x;u∗) = minu∈U(t,x) J(t, x;u).
5.2 The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
Let V (t, x) be the value function associated to the minimisation problem (P), that
is the infimum value of the objective function J given as a function of the initial data
(t, x). Then, for all (t, x) ∈ [t0, T ]× Rn, V (t, x) is defined as
V (t, x) = inf
u∈U(t,x)
J(t, x;u) . (5.2)
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Thus, a control u∗ is optimal for problem (P) if u∗ ∈ U(t, x) and V (t, x) equals the
expected cost corresponding to u∗, that is V (t, x) = J(t, x;u∗).
The bahaviour of the value function V (t, x) is studied in the dynamic programming
principle (DPP), a fundamental result in stochastic control theory. The DPP states that
Theorem 5.2.1 (Dynamic programming principle). Let Tt,T be a family of finite stop-
ping times with value in [t, T ]. Then,
V (t, x) = inf
u∈U
sup
θ∈Tt,T
E
[∫ θ
t
f(s,Xt,xs , u(s)) ds+ V (θ,X
t,x(θ))
]
= inf
u∈U
inf
θ∈Tt,T
E
[∫ θ
t
f(s,Xt,xs , u(s)) ds+ V (θ,X
t,x(θ))
]
.
(5.3)
The DPP asserts that the optimization problem (P), which takes under consideration
the whole time interval [t, T ], can be split into two (or more) minimisation problems:
Let θ ∈ [t, T ]. First, look for an admissible control process u∗ which is optimal
over the (possibly) shorter time window [θ, T ] when the state process X starts
at time θ from value Xt,xθ , meaning that
V (θ,Xt,xθ ) = J(θ,X
t,x
θ ;u
∗) .
Secondly, search for an admissible control process u ∈ U(t, x) which attains
the minimum of the expectation
E
[∫ θ
t
f(s,Xt,xs , u(s)) ds+ V (θ,X
t,x
θ )
]
.
Naively, this is an analogous minimisation problem to (P) on the time interval
[t, θ] when the terminal cost is given by V (θ,Xt,xθ ). This counts the infimum
expected cost on the remaining time [θ, T ] when the initial state is Xt,x,uθ .
From the DPP, also the local behaviour of the value function V can be derived, and
it is described in the so called dynamic programming equation, better known as the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We shortly, and heuristically, recall how the
HJB equation can be essentialy obtained by the DPP.
Let h > 0 and consider the optimization problem (P) over the time window [t, t+h] ⊂
[t0, T ]. Considering the constant control process ν(s) = ν for all s ∈ [t, t+h], with ν ∈ U ,
and the corresponding state process Xt,x,ν , it holds that
V (t, x) ≤ E
[∫ t+h
t
f(s,Xt,x,νs , ν) ds+ V (t+ h,X
t,x,ν
t+h )
]
, (5.4)
being the value function V , by definition, the infimum over all the admissible processes
of the expected value in the RHS of the previous inequality. If V is a smooth enough
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function, let say V ∈ C1,2([t0, T ]× Rn), applying Itoˆ’s Lemma to the stochastic process
V (s,Xt,x,νs ) with s ∈ [t, t+ h], it follows that
V (t+ h,Xt,xt+h) = V (t, x) +
∫ t+h
t
(
∂V
∂t
+ LνV
)
(s,Xt,xs ) ds+Qt . (5.5)
Here Qt =
∫ t+h
t σ(s,X
t,x,ν
s , ν) · DxV (s,Xt,x,νs ) dWs is a (local) martingale, whereas the
linear second order operator Lν associated to the controlled process Xν , where ν is the
constant control process ν(s) ≡ ν, is defined by
LνV = b(t, x, ν) ·DxV + 1
2
tr
[
a(t, x, ν) ·D2xV
]
.
Moreover Dx and D
2
x stand respectively for the gradient and the Hessian operator with
respect to x, the trace operator tr[·], which is defined on the set of symmetric, positive
semidefinite m×m matrices Sm, is given by
tr[M ] =
m∑
i=1
Mii , for all M ∈ Sm ,
and a(t, x, u) = σ(t, x, u)σ′(t, x, u). Substituting equation (5.5) into the inequality (5.4)
implies
E
[∫ t+h
t
(
∂V
∂t
+ LνV
)
(s,Xt,x,νs ) + f(s,X
t,x,ν
s , ν) ds
]
≥ 0
and letting h→ 0, the mean value Theorem ensures that(
∂V
∂t
+ LνV
)
(t, x) + f(t, x, ν) ≥ 0 . (5.6)
Here we strongly use the continuity of the value function V and of its derivatives ∂tV ,
DxV and D
2
xV . Since equation (5.6) holds for each constant admissible control ν ∈ U ,
that is for each ν ∈ U , then
∂V
∂t
(t, x) + inf
ν∈U
{LνV (t, x) + f(t, x, ν)} ≥ 0 . (5.7)
At the same time, by definition, an optimal control process u∗ satisfies
V (t, x) = E
[∫ t+h
t
f(s,Xt,x,u
∗
s , u
∗(s)) ds+ V (t+ h,Xt,x,u
∗
t+h )
]
and, arguing as before, this time it is found that
∂V
∂t
(t, x) + Lu∗(t)V (t, x) + f(t, x, u∗(t)) = 0 .
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Combining the two equations (5.6) and (5.7), the value function V (t, x) is required to
satisfy the following partial differential equation
∂V
∂t
(t, x) + inf
ν∈U
{LνV (t, x) + f(t, x, ν)} = 0 , (5.8)
called the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated to the optimization problem (P).
Furthermore, considering the final horizon T , the definition of the value function implies
that its natural terminal condition is
V (T, x) = g(x) , ∀x ∈ Rn .
Usually, the HJB equation (5.8) is shortly written as{
−∂V∂s (s, x)−H(s, x,DxV (s, x), D2xV (s, x)) = 0 , ∀(s, x) ∈ [t, T )× Rn ,
V (T, x) = g(x) , ∀x ∈ Rn (5.9)
where, for (t, x, p,M) ∈ [t0, T ] × Rn × Rn × Sn, the Hamiltonian function H is defined
by
H(t, x, p,M) = inf
u∈U
[
b(t, x, u) · p+ 1
2
tr [a(t, x, u)M ] + f(t, x, u)
]
. (5.10)
5.2.1 The verification Theorem
Therefore, if the value function V exists smooth enough, it solves the HJB equa-
tion (5.9). Then, the following natural and crucial question is if also the converse holds
true, that is when, or under which conditions, a solution to the HJB equation coincides
with the value function of the corresponding optimization problem. An answer to this
query is provided by the Verification Theorem.
Theorem 5.2.2 (Verification Theorem). Let v be a function in C1,2([t0, T ) × Rn) ∩
C0([t0, T ]× Rn) satisfying for a suitable constant C the quadratic growth condition
|v(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|2) , for all (t, x) ∈ [t0, T )× Rn.
Assume that v is a classical solution to the HJB equation{
−∂v∂s (s, x)− infu∈U
[
b(t, x, u) ·Dxv + 12tr [a(t, x, u)D2xv] + f(t, x, u)
]
= 0 ,
V (T, x) = g(x) ,
for all (s, x) ∈ [t, T )× Rn. Then, v ≤ V on [0, T ]× Rn.
Assume further that there exists a process u∗ = u∗(t, x) ∈ U for a measurable function
u∗ : [0, T ]×Rn → U , which along with the related controlled state X∗ = Xt,x,u∗ satisfies
inf
u∈U
[
b(t,X∗t , u) ·Dxv +
1
2
tr[a(t,X∗t , u)D
2
xv] + f(t,X
∗
t , u)
]
= b(t,X∗t , u
∗) ·Dxv + 1
2
tr(a(t,X∗t , u
∗)D2xv) + f(t,X
∗
t , u
∗) .
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Then, v coincides with the value function V , v(t, x) = V (t, x), and therefore u∗ = u∗(t, x)
is an optimal feedback control process.
Remark 5.2.1. Here, we have assume for simplicity that the SDE (5.1) admits a unique
strong solution. However, the optimization problem (P) can be solves analogously if
the state equation admits a unique weak solution. Indeed, in this case, the optimization
problem can be analogously solved by re-defining the control as the 5-tupla (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜ , w, u)
where
(i) (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜ ) is a complete probability space;
(ii) w = (wt)t∈[t0,T ] is a Brownian motion defined on the previous probability space,
whose natural filtration augmented by the P˜ -null sets is denoted by (F˜wt )t∈[t0,T ];
(iii) u is a F˜wt -adapted process such that the SDE (5.1) admits a unique solution, for
any initial data.
See [YZ99] for further details.
5.2.2 Weak generalized solutions
In the previous, we consider a smooth enough value function V to ensure that it is a
classical solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (5.9). When this is not the
case, to still apply this methodology a weak formulation of solution is required. For this
purpose, Crandall and Lions introduced in [CL83] the concept of viscosity solution, which
properly suits for a large class of control problems since the value function V is indeed
the unique viscosity solution of equation (5.9) under weaker assumptions regarding its
regularity relative to the classical setting.
Another possibility is to describe the value functions as a weak generalized solution
to the HJB equation, see [FS06, Chapter IV.10]. In this case Vx ∈ L1loc([t0, T ] × R) is
said to be a generalized partial derivative of V with respect to variable x if∫
[t0,T ]×R
Vxψ dxdt = −
∫
[t0,T ]×R
V ψx dxdt ,
and analogously the generalized partial derivative of Vt and Vxx are given, if they exists,
as the L1loc([t0, T ]× R) functions such that∫
[t0,T ]×R
Vtψ dxdt = −
∫
[t0,T ]×R
V ψt dxdt ,∫
[t0,T ]×R
Vxxψ dxdt =
∫
[t0,T ]×R
V ψxx dxdt .
Then the value function V is proved to be a generalized subsolution to the HJB equa-
tion (5.9).
This is the concept of weak solution we will use in the following chapter. See Defini-
tion 6.3.1 for further details.
Chapter 6
Optimality in a controlled Heston
model
This chapter studies a stochastic optimization problem where the evolution of the
state process is modeled as in the Heston model, but with a further multiplicative control
input in the volatility of the state. The basics of the stochastic volatility models, with
particular attention on the Heston model, are presented in Section 6.1. Section 6.2
formally introduces the stochastic optimal control problem under investigation, whereas
in Section 6.3 the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated to this optimal control
problem is introduced and the existence of solutions is discussed. Lastly, in Section 6.4
we construct optimal feedback controls for a class of problems which approximates the
original one.
The results of this chapter are collected in [BBDP17a].
6.1 The Heston model
Stochastic volatility models (SVMs) are widely used in a large number of different
financial settings, as in the risk sector, in the interest rate policy or in insurance problems.
In fact, SVMs allow for a careful analysis of relevant time series as they appear in the real
financial world. Daily return data series show two peculiarities among different types
of assets in different markets and in different periods, namely the volatility clustering
phenomenon and the fat-tailed and highly peaked distribution relative to the normal
distribution. Volatility clustering refers to the fact that large changes in prices tend to
be followed by large changes, regardless of their sign, whereas small changes tend to be
followed by small changes, see [Man97]. This means that, over a significant time window,
it can be observed the presence of both high volatility periods and low volatility ones,
separately, rather than a constant average level of volatility persisting over time.
The two above-mentioned peculiarities can be captured by the so called SVMs, a
class of models characterised by the fact that the volatility of the state is a stochastic
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process itself.
One of the most popular SVMs is the Heston model, which we shortly introduce here
recalling its main properties. The Heston model, named after his inventor, was firstly
introduced in [Hes93] to price European bond and currency options, aiming at generalize
and overcome (some of) the biases of the Black and Scholes model, starting with the
assumption of normal distributed returns. In this case, the asset price moves according
to the diffusive dynamics
dSt
St
= µdt+
√
νtdW1(t) , (6.1)
subjected to an initial condition S0 = s, where the volatility νt is modeled by a stochastic
process satisfying
d
√
νt = −β√νt dt+ δdW2(t) ,
with ν0 ≥ 0. Then, the volatility of the price is no longer a deterministic function of S,
but it is itself randomly distributed. Here, W1 and W2 are two Brownian motions which
may be possibly correlated, and in the following their correlation will be denoted by ρ.
By applying Itoˆ’s Lemma, it follows that ν solves the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck SDE
dνt = 2β
(
δ2
2β
− νt
)
dt+ 2δ
√
νt dW2(t) . (6.2)
As a matter of fact, the Heston model generalizes the Black and Scholes one, since if
δ is identically zero, then ν becomes a deterministic function of time and the latter
model is recovered. Furthermore, a crucial advantage of the Heston model is that there
exists a closed-form option pricing formula for a European call written on an asset whose
dynamics is given by (6.1)-(6.2).
Different choices for modeling the volatility ν allow for a multitude of models that
properly represent different financial data, see, e.g, [BNS02; CIJR05; HW87; Sco87;
Wig87].
Beside the fact that the volatility of returns of the underlying asset S varies stochas-
tically over time, the key difference between the Heston and the Black and Scholes model
is the correlation between the volatility of the price, ν, and the price itself, S. The nat-
ural consequence of this correlation has an impact in the skewness of the asset return
distribution. Indeed a positive correlation ρ > 0 provides a higher variance when the
asset price rises and therefore it leads to a fat right-tailed distribution. Moreover, the
mean reversion of the volatility ν can explain the clustering effect: even in periods of
high volatility, ν is expected to eventually return to normal values.
In the following of this chapter we study an optimization problem where the state
dynamics is modeled by an Heston model when a multiplicative control component is
added into its volatility term. Details on the mathematical setting will be specified
in Section 6.2. The aim is to take under consideration the possible exogenous role of
an external actor. Consider, as an example, a market sector where a relevant number
of banks are exposed simultaneously. Then, to preserve stability, a Central Bank may
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intend to prevent abrupt changes in this market by actively intervening. Recently, a
similar measure has been implemented by the European Central Bank with the so called
quantitative easing monetary policy. Buying a predetermined amount of financial assets
emitted mainly from (national) commercial banks, the ECB managed to rise the price of
(some) interested financial assets, lower their yield and increase the money supply and
therefore it provides a radical reduction of the volatility as a final result.
6.2 The controlled Heston model
Let T ∈ (0,∞) be a fixed time horizon and let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) be a filtered
probability space. Let X = (X1, X2) ∈ R2 be a stochastic process defined by
dX1 = µX1 dt+X1
√
uX2 dW1 , t ∈ (0, T ) ,
dX2 = k(θ −X2) dt+ σ
√
X2 dW2 , t ∈ (0, T ) ,
X1(0) = X
0
1 , X2(0) = X
0
2 ,
(6.3)
where the initial conditions X01 , X
0
2 are both positive. Here W1 and W2 are two Ft-
adapted Brownian motions, whereas µ, κ, σ and θ are fixed positive parameters. This
system (6.3) extends the classical Heston model introduced in the previous section in
equations (6.1)-(6.2) by adding a control u in the volatility term of the stochastic process
X1.
Let U denote the real interval [a, b], with 0 < a < b < ∞. Then, an admissible
control process u is any Ft-adapted stochastic process u : [0, T ] → R, taking values in
U . The class of all these stochastic processes will be denoted by U . The effectiveness of
any control u ∈ U is measured by the cost criterion J defined by
J(X01 , X
0
2 ;u) = E
[∫ T
0
X21 (t)f(X1(t), u(t)) dt+ g(X1(T ))
]
. (6.4)
whose form is mainly inspired by [FP11]. The function f : R × U → R is required to
satisfy the following hypotheses.
(i) f is a continuous function on R × U . Moreover, for each x ∈ R, u 7→ f(x, u) is
convex and inf{f(x, u);u ∈ [a, b]} = 0.
Then, the stochastic optimal control problem (P) we consider here is:
(P) Minimise J(X01 , X
0
2 ;u) over the set of all admissible control processes u ∈ U .
A first problem regards the well-posedness of the state system (6.3), that is the
existence of a solution X to this system for any admissible process u ∈ U . It is clear
that by its definition a solution X2, if exists, should be found in the class of non negative
processes on [0, T ]. However since the diffusion term in the SDE of X2 x 7→ σ
√
x is not
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Lipschitz, it is not clear if such a solution exists for any initial data X02 ≥ 0. The following
theorem states suitable conditions on the model parameters to ensure the existence of a
weak solution X = (X1, X2) to the system (6.3).
Theorem 6.2.1. Assume that
kθ ≥ 1
2
σ2 . (6.5)
Then, there is at least one weak solution X = (X1, X2) for the system (6.3) belonging to
(L2(Ω;C([0, T ])))2 such that X is non negative almost surely, i.e.
X1(t) ≥ 0 , X2(t) ≥ 0 , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] , P-a.s. (6.6)
Moreover
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
|X1(t)|2 + |X2(t)|2
)]
≤ C¯
(∣∣X01 ∣∣2 + ∣∣X02 ∣∣2)+ CT (6.7)
for suitable positive constants C¯ and C.
Proof. As first step, to show the positiveness of X2, we approximate the second equation
in (6.3) by a different SDE, namely
dXε2 = k(θ −Xε2) dt+ σ
Xε2√|Xε2 |+ ε dW2 , t ∈ (0, T ) ,
Xε2(0) = X
2
0 ,
(6.8)
where ε is an arbitrary positive constant. Since for each fixed ε > 0 the map x 7→ x√|x|+ε
is Lipschitz continuous, standard results, see, e.g. [Pha09, Theorem 1.3.15], ensures that
the SDE (6.8) has a unique strong solution Xε2 ∈ L2(Ω;C([0, T ])). After proving that
the solution process Xε2(t) is non negative for all t ∈ [0, T ], we will show that also X2 is
non negative by approximation results.
Assume that the assumption (6.5) holds, then the solution to (6.8) satisfies
Xε2(t) ≥ 0 , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] , P-a.s. (6.9)
Indeed, consider the function ϕ : R → R+ defined by ϕ(x) = 12(x−)2, where x− is the
negative part of x, namely x− = max { 0,−x }, and its essential derivatives
ϕ′(x) = −x− , ϕ′′(x) = H(−x), ∀x ∈ R ,
where H is the Heaviside function, i.e. H(x) = 1(0,∞)(x). Applying the Itoˆ’s Lemma,
or better, a generalization for convex function of the Itoˆ’s Lemma, see [KS12, theorem
6.22], to ϕ(Xε2(t)) and exploiting the equality x
−x = −(x−)2 , it follows that
1
2
d
∣∣(Xε2)−(t)∣∣2 = −k ∣∣(Xε2)−(t)∣∣2 dt− kθ(Xε2)−(t) dt+ σ (Xε2(t)−)2√|Xε2(t)|+ ε dW2(t)
+
σ2
2
((Xε2)
−(t))2
(Xε2)
−(t) + ε
H(−Xε2(t)) dt .
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Since (Xε2)
− is non negative by definition and x
2
x+ε ≤ x for all x ≥ 0 and ε > 0, the
previous SDE implies that
1
2
E
[∣∣(Xε2)−(t)∣∣2 + k ∫ t
0
∣∣(Xε2)−(s)∣∣2 ds] ≤ E [∫ t
0
(
σ2
2
− kθ
)
(Xε2)
−(t) ds
]
≤ 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ], where the last inequality is an immediate result of condition (6.5).
Therefore, (Xε2)
−(t) = 0 on (0, T )× Ω which implies (6.9) as claimed.
As second step, we associate to each equation (6.8), the SDE{
dXε1 = µX
ε
1 dt+X
ε
1
√
uXε2 dW1 , t ∈ (0, T ) ,
Xε1(0) = X
0
1 ,
(6.10)
for the corresponding value of ε, and we study its solvability. Given a fixed ε > 0, let
Xε2 be the strong, non negative solution to equation (6.8), then X
ε
1 can be represented
as
Xε1(t) = exp
(∫ t
0
√
u(s)Xε2(s)dW1(s)
)
yε(t) .
Under this representation, by Itoˆ’s formula, Xε1 solves the following SDE
dXε1(t) = exp
(∫ t
0
√
u(s)Xε2(s)dW1(s)
)
dyε(t)
+
√
u(t)Xε2(t) exp
(∫ t
0
√
u(s)Xε2(s)dW1(s)
)
yε(t) dW1(t)
+
1
2
u(t)Xε2(t) exp
(∫ t
0
√
u(s)Xε2(s)dW1(s)
)
yε(t)dt
= exp
(∫ t
0
√
u(s)Xε2(s)dW1(s)
)
dyε(t) +
1
2
u(t)Xε2(t)X
ε
1dt
+
√
u(t)Xε2(t)X
ε
1 dW1(t)
which coincides with (6.10) when yε solves the random differential equation
dyε
dt
=
(
µ− 1
2
uXε2
)
yε , t ∈ (0, T )
y(0) = X01 ,
which has a unique Ft-adapted solution yε, namely
yε(t) = X
0
1 exp
(∫ t
0
(
µ− 1
2
u(s)Xε2(s)
)
ds
)
.
Therefore,
Xε1(t) = X
0
1 exp
(∫ t
0
(
µ− 1
2
u(s)Xε2(s)
)
ds+
∫ t
0
√
u(s)Xε2(s)dW1(s)
)
(6.11)
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together with Xε2 , is a strong solution to the system (6.8)-(6.10). The uniqueness of such
a solution is immediate by construction. Moreover, by its definition in equation (6.11),
also Xε1 ≥ 0 for each ε > 0, as claimed.
Regarding the bound given in equation (6.7), it follows by Itoˆ’s formula that
1
2
|Xε2(t)|2 =
1
2
∣∣X02 ∣∣2 + ∫ t
0
k(θ −Xε2(s))Xε2(s) ds+
σ2
2
∫ t
0
|Xε2(s)|2
Xε2(s) + ε
ds
+
∫ t
0
σ |Xε2(s)|2√
Xε2(s) + ε
dW2(s) .
Applying Burkholder-Davis-Gundy Theorem (see e.g. [DPZ14]) to the martingale
It =
∫ t
0
σ(Xε2(s))
2√
Xε2(s) + ε
dW2(s) ,
it is found
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
It
]
≤ c1E
(∫ T
0
σ2(Xε2(s))
4
Xε2(s) + ε
ds
) 1
2

≤ E
( sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xε2(t)|2
∫ T
0
c21σ
2Xε2(s) ds
) 1
2

≤ 1
4
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xε2(t)|2
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
c21σ
2Xε2(s) ds
]
≤ 1
4
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xε2(t)|2
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
c21
(
1 + σ2 |Xε2(s)|2
)
ds
]
≤ 1
4
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xε2(t)|2
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
c21
(
1 + σ2 sup
u∈[0,s]
|Xε2(u)|2
)
ds
]
.
Moreover,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ t
0
k(θ −Xε2(s))Xε2(s) +
σ2
2
(Xε2(s))
2
Xε2(s) + ε
ds ≤
∫ T
0
c¯(1 + |Xε2(s)|2) ds
≤ c¯ T +
∫ T
0
c¯ sup
u∈[0,s]
|Xε2(u)|2 ds ,
where c¯ = max
{
k(θ + 1), σ
2
2
}
. Summing up the previous estimates,
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xε2(t)|2
]
≤ c¯1 + c¯2
∫ T
0
E
[
sup
u∈[0,s]
|Xε2(s)|2
]
ds
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and applying Gronwall’s Lemma it follows that for each ε > 0
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xε2(t)|2
]
≤ C1
(
1 +
∣∣X02 ∣∣2) ,
for a suitable constant C1. This is the desired bound (6.7) for the process X
ε
2 . Further-
more, thanks to Jensen’s inequality and Itoˆ isometry, the SDE (6.8) provides that
E [Xε2(t)−Xε2(s)]2 = E
(∫ t
s
k(θ −Xε2(r)) dr + σ
Xε2(r)√|Xε2(r)|+ ε dW2(r)
)2
≤ 2T E
[∫ t
s
k2(θ −Xε2(r))2 dr
]
+ 2σ2E
[∫ t
s
|Xε2(r)|2
Xε2(r) + ε
dr
]
for all s ≤ t belonging to [0, T ]. Then, arguing as before, for suitable constants C and
C2
E
[
|Xε2(t)−Xε2(s)|2
]
≤ C E
[∫ t
s
(1 + |Xε2(r)|2) dr
]
≤ C2(t− s) ∀s ≤ t ∈ [0, T ] .
The previous consideration can be analogously repeated for process Xε1 , solution to
the SDE (6.10), obtaining that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xε1(t)|2
]
≤ C3
(
1 +
∣∣X01 ∣∣2) ,
E
[
|Xε1(t)−Xε1(s)|2
]
≤ C4(t− s) ∀s, t ∈ [0, T ] .
Hence, combining the previous estimation, it is found that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xε(t)|2
]
≤ C5
(
1 +
∣∣X01 ∣∣2 + ∣∣X02 ∣∣2) , (6.12)
E
[
|Xε(t)−Xε(s)|2
]
≤ C6(t− s) ∀s, t ∈ [0, T ] , (6.13)
for any Xε = (Xε1 , X
ε
2).
Let νε = L(Xε), that is νε(Γ) = P(Xε ∈ Γ) for each Borel set Γ ⊂ (C([0, T ];R))2.
Then, the sequence {νε}ε>0 is tight in C([0, T ];R2). To prove its tightness, we need to
exhibit for each δ > 0 a compact set Γ ⊂ (C([0, T ];R2)) such that νε(Γc) ≤ δ for all
ε > 0. Consider the set Γr,γ defined as
Γr,γ =
{
y ∈ C ([0, T ];R2) : |y(t)| ≤ r , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] ,
|y(t)− y(s)| ≤ γ |t− s| 12 ,∀t, s ∈ [0, T ]
}
,
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which is compact in C([0, T ];R2) in view of the Ascoli-Arzela theorem. Then, due to
the bounds given in equations (6.12)-(6.13) and the well known inequality
ρP(|Y | ≥ ρ) ≤ E |Y | , ∀ρ > 0 ,
it follows that there exist two constants r and γ independent of ε such that νε(Γ
c
r,γ) ≤ δ
as claimed.
Therefore, being {νε}ε tight and thus relatively compact, by the Skorohod’s theorem
there exists a probability space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) and random variables X˜, X˜ε such that L(X˜ε) =
L(Xε) and satisfying
X˜ε → X˜ in C([0, T ];R2), P˜-a.e. ω ∈ Ω˜.
Then we may pass to limit in (6.8)-(6.10) and observe that X˜ = (X˜1, X˜2) satisfies
system (6.15) in the space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) for a new pair W˜ = (W˜1, W˜2) of Wiener processes
in this space, see [BBT16]. This completes the proof of existence of a weak solution.
Clearly the bounds given in equations (6.6) and (6.7) hold also for this solution
X˜ = (X˜1, X˜2)
6.3 The dynamic programming equation
The following step in order to compute an optimal control for problem (P) is to study
the solvability of the corresponding HJB equation.
Let V : [0, T ]×R×R→ R be the optimal value function associated to problem (P),
see equations (5.2) and (6.4), that is
V (t, x, y) = inf
u∈U
{
E
[∫ T
t
X21 (s)f(X1(s), u(s)) ds+ g(X1(T ))
]}
(6.14)
subject to the controlled system
dX1(s) = µX1(s) ds+X1
√
u(s)X2(s) dW1(s) , s ∈ (t, T ) ,
dX2(s) = k(θ −X2(s)) ds+ σ
√
X2(s) dW2(s) , s ∈ (t, T ) ,
X1(t) = x , X2(t) = y .
(6.15)
We shall assume that the initial value of the system is positive, namely x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0,
and that conditions (6.5) holds, so that Theorem 6.2.1 ensures the existence of a weak
solution X = (X1, X2) to the SDEs (6.15) such that X1(s) and X2(s) are non negative
processes for all s ∈ [t, T ], P-a.s. The HJB equation associated with problem (P), as
defined in (5.8), becomes
−ϕt(t, x, y)− inf
u∈U
{
µxϕx(t, x, y) + k(θ − y)ϕy(t, x, y) + 1
2
σ2yϕyy(t, x, y)
+
1
2
x2uyϕxx(t, x, y) + x
2f(x, u)
}
= 0 , t ∈ [0, T ], x, y ∈ R
ϕ(T, x, y) = g(x) , ∀x, y ∈ R ,
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which can be rewritten as
ϕt(t, x, y) + µxϕx(t, x, y) + k(θ − y)ϕy(t, x, y) + 1
2
σ2yϕyy(t, x, y)
+x2G(x, y, ϕxx(t, x, y)) = 0 , t ∈ [0, T ], x, y ∈ R ,
ϕ(T, x, y) = g(x) , ∀x, y ∈ R ,
(6.16)
where G : R× R× R→ R is given by
G(x, y, z) = min
u∈[a,b]
{
1
2
uyz + f(x, u)
}
, ∀x, y, z ∈ R . (6.17)
For all t ∈ [0, T ] and x, y ∈ R, let p be defined as
p(t, x, y) = ϕx(t, x, y) . (6.18)
Then, differentiating with respect to x equation (6.16), it is found that, if ϕ is solution
to the previous partial differential equation (6.16), p solves
pt(t, x, y) + µ(xp(t, x, y))x + k(θ − y)py(t, x, y) + 1
2
σ2ypyy(t, x, y)
+(x2G(x, y, px(t, x, y)))x = 0 , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], x, y ∈ R ,
p(T, x, y) = gx(x) , ∀x, y ∈ R ,
(6.19)
with natural boundary conditions at x = ±∞ and y = ±∞. Therefore, the HJB
equation (6.16) can be reduced to a second order nonlinear parabolic equation. Of
course, the two equations (6.16) and (6.19) are not equivalent since in general the former
has not a strong smooth solution ϕ, and thus p may be not well-defined. However, if the
PDE (6.19) is well posed we can recover a solution ϕ to (6.16) by the solution to (6.19)
as better explained in the following.
Taking into account that by (6.6) the state X2 is in the positive half plane {y ≥ 0},
we see that the flow t 7→ (X1(t), X2(t)) leaves invariant the domain
Q0 = { (x, y) ∈ R2; 0 ≤ y <∞}
and so equation (6.19) can be treated on this narrow domain. For simplicity we shall
restrict the domain Q0 to
Q = {x ∈ R, ρ < y < M } = R× (ρ,M)
where M is sufficient large, but finite, and ρ is arbitrarily small but strictly positive.
In other words, we shall consider the equation (6.19) on the domain (0, T ) × Q with
boundary value condition on ∂Q given by
p(t, x, ρ) = 0 and p(t, x,M) = 0 ∀x ∈ R , t ∈ [0, T ] . (6.20)
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The domain Q is not invariant for the stochastic flow t → (X1(t), X2(t)), but we infer
that, for M large enough and ρ extremely small, this is a convenient approximation for
problem (6.19) on Q0.
We set H = L2(Q) with the standard norm ‖·‖H and define the space V as
V = { z ∈ H ∩H1loc(Q) ; xzx, zy ∈ L2(Q) ; z(x, ρ) = z(x,M) = 0 , ∀x ∈ R } (6.21)
where derivatives zx, zy are taken in sense of distributions on Q. This space V is an
Hilbert space with the norm
‖z‖V =
(∫
Q
z2 + x2z2x + z
2
y dxdy
) 1
2
, ∀z ∈ V
such that V ⊂ H algebraically and topologically. Moreover we denote by V ? the dual
space of V having H as pivot space and by ‖·‖V ? the dual norm of V ?. Then,
Definition 6.3.1. A function p defined on [0, T ]×Q is called weak solution to problem
(6.19)-(6.20) if the following conditions hold
p ∈ C([0, T ];H) ∩ L2([0, T ];V ) , dp
dt
∈ L2([0, T ];V ?) ,
d
dt
∫
Q
p(t, x, y)ψ(x, y) dx dy +
∫
Q
(µ(xp(t, x, y))x + k(θ − y)py(t, x, y))ψ(x, y) dx dy
− σ
2
2
∫
Q
py(t, x, y)(yψ(x, y))y dx dy
−
∫
Q
x2G(x, y, px(t, x, y))ψx(x, y) dx dy = 0 ∀ψ ∈ V , a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] ,
p(T, x, y) = gx(x) , ∀(x, y) ∈ Q .
Considering the relation between ϕ and p, given by equation (6.18) and the previous
Definition 6.3.1, we say that
Definition 6.3.2. A function ϕ is a weak solution to (6.16) on [0, T ]×Q if
ϕ ∈ L2([0, T ];L2loc(R× R)), ϕx ∈ C([0, T ];H) ∩ L2([0, T ];V ) ,
dϕx
dt
∈ L2([0, T ];V ?) ,
d
dt
∫
Q
ϕx(t, x, y)ψ(x, y) dx dy +
∫
Q
(µ(xϕx(t, x, y))x + k(θ − y)ϕxy(t, x, y))ψ(x, y) dx dy
− σ
2
2
∫
Q
ϕxy(t, x, y)(yψ(x, y))y dx dy
−
∫
Q
x2G(x, y, ϕxx(t, x, y))ψx(x, y) dx dy = 0 ∀ψ ∈ V , a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] ,
ϕ(T, x, y) = g(x) , ∀(x, y) ∈ Q ,
ϕx(t, x, ρ) = ϕx(t, x,M) = 0 ∀x ∈ R , t ∈ [0, T ] .
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Clearly, if p is a weak solution to (6.19)-(6.20) then by equation (6.18) the function
ϕ(t, x, y) =
∫ x
−∞
p(t, ξ, y) dξ , (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× R× [0,M ]
is a weak solution to (6.16). Conversely, when ϕ is a weak solution to (6.16) then p, as
defined in equation (6.18) is a weak solution to (6.19). It should be said that ϕ is unique
up to an additive function ϕ˜ = ϕ˜(t, y).
Under some conditions on the regularity of gx, the existence of a weak solution to
problem (6.19)-(6.20) is ensured. In particular,
Theorem 6.3.1. Let gx ∈ L2(R). Then, there is a unique weak solution p to problem
(6.19)-(6.20).
Proof. Let A,
A : V → V ?
z → Az ,
be the nonlinear operator defined by
(Az, ψ) = −
∫
Q
(µ(xz)x + k(θ − y)zy)ψ(x, y) dx dy + σ
2
2
∫
Q
zy(yψ(x, y))y dx dy
+
∫
Q
x2G(x, y, zx)ψx(x, y) dx dy , t ∈ [0, T ] , z, ψ ∈ V .
(6.22)
Here V ? is the dual space of V , whereas (v?, v) denotes the value of a functional v? ∈ V ?
at point v ∈ V . Then, problem (6.19)-(6.20) can be shortly rewritten as the backward
infinite dimensional Cauchy problem{
d
dtp(t)−Ap(t) = 0 , a.e. t ∈ (0, T ) ,
p(T ) = gx .
(6.23)
In order to apply standard results on the existence of solutions for the Cauchy problem
(6.23) we need to show that the operator A satisfies the three following properties.
(I) There exists α1 ≥ 0 such that
(Az −Az¯, z − z¯) ≥ −α1 ‖z − z¯‖2H , ∀z, z¯ ∈ V . (6.24)
(II) There exists α2 > 0 such that
‖Az‖V ? ≤ α2 ‖z‖V , ∀z ∈ V. (6.25)
(III) There exist α3 > 0 and α4 ≥ 0 such that
(Az, z) ≥ α3 ‖z‖2V − α4 ‖z‖2H , ∀z ∈ V . (6.26)
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Property (I).
Let z and z¯ be two elements in V . We want to provide a lower bound for (Az −
Az¯, z − z¯) = (Az, z − z¯)− (Az¯, z − z¯). We consider the three integrals appearing in the
definition of the operator A, equation (6.22), separately.
First consider
−
∫
Q
(µ ((xz)x − (xz¯)x) + k(θ − y)(zy − z¯y)) (z − z¯) dxdy .
The integral
−
∫
Q
kθ(zy − z¯y)(z − z¯) dxdy = −kθ
2
∫
Q
(
(z − z¯)2)
y
dxdy
= −kθ
2
∫
R
(z(x, ·)− z¯(x, ·))2|Mρ dx = 0
in view of the boundary conditions (6.21). For the same reason, by integration by parts∫
Q
ky(zy − z¯y)(z − z¯) dxdy = k
2
∫
Q
y
(
(z − z¯)2)
y
dxdy
= −k
2
∫
Q
(z − z¯)2 dxdy = −k
2
‖z − z¯‖2H
and
−
∫
Q
µ (x(z − z¯))x dxdy = −µ
∫
Q
(z − z¯)2 dxdy − µ
∫
Q
x(z − z¯)(z − z¯)x dxdy
= −µ
2
‖z − z¯‖2H ,
where the previous equalities hold in the sense of distributions.
Moreover, the second component satisfies
σ2
2
∫
Q
zy(y(z − z¯))y − z¯y(y(z − z¯))y dxdy = σ
2
2
∫
Q
(zy − z¯y)(y(z − z¯))y dxdy
=
σ2
2
∫
Q
1
2
(
(z − z¯)2)
y
+ y ((z − z¯)y)2 dxdy ≥ 0
since for all (x, y) ∈ Q, ∫Q y ((z − z¯)y)2 dxdy ≥ 0 due to the fact that y > 0 in Q, and,
as before,
∫
Q
1
2
(
(z − z¯)2)
y
dxdy = 0.
Lastly, recalling its definition in equation (6.17) that is
G(x, y, z) = − sup
u∈[a,b]
{
−1
2
uyz − f(x, u)
}
,
the function G can be equivalently written as
G(x, y, z) = −f˜?
(
x,−1
2
yz
)
∀(x, y) ∈ Q, z ∈ R , (6.27)
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where f˜?(x, v) is the convex conjugate of function v
f˜−→ f(x, v)+I[a,b](v), that is f˜?(x, q) =
supv { qv − f˜(x, v); v ∈ [a, b] }. Here I[a,b] represents the characteristic function of the
interval U = [a, b], i.e.
I[a,b](v) :=
{
0 if v ∈ [a, b],
+∞ if v ∈]−∞, a[∪ ]b,+∞[.
Given a convex, lower semicontinuous function h : R →] −∞,+∞], the subdifferential
∂h(v) of h at v is the set
∂h(v) = { η ∈ R : η(v − v¯) ≥ h(v)− h(v¯) ∀v¯ ∈ R } ,
which we will simply denote as hv(v). Since ∂ [h(αv)] = α∂h(αv) for all α, v ∈ R, it
follows that the subdifferential of function z 7→ G(x, y, z), i.e. Gz, satisfies
Gz(x, y, z) =
1
2
yf˜?v
(
x,−1
2
yz
)
, ∀(x, y) ∈ Q, z ∈ R , (6.28)
Moreover, if h? is the conjugate of h, then its subdifferential is the inverse of ∂h in the
sense of multivalued mappings, i.e. ∂h?(q) = (∂h)−1(q), ∀q ∈ R. See [Roc15] for further
details. Then, for all v ∈ R we have
f˜?v (x, v) =
(
f˜u(x, ·)
)−1
(v)
=
(
fu(x, ·) + ∂I[a,b](·)
)−1
(v)
=
(
fu(x, ·) +N[a,b](·)
)−1
(v) ,
(6.29)
where N[a,b](v) ⊂ 2R is the normal cone to [a, b] in v, that is
N[a,b](v) =

R− if v = a,
0 if a < v < b,
R+ if v = b,
and therefore, for all x, v ∈ R
f˜?v (x, v) ∈ [a, b] . (6.30)
Since y ∈ [ρ,M ] and a > 0, Gz(x, y, z) ≥ 12aρ > 0 whenever (x, y) ∈ Q, meaning that
the function z → G(x, y, z) is monotonically increasing. This provides∫
Q
x2G(x, y, zx)(z − z¯x)− x2G(x, y, z¯x)(zx − z¯x) dxdy =
=
∫
Q
x2 (G(x, y, zx)−G(x, y, z¯x)) (zx − z¯x) dxdy ≥ 0 .
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Summing up all the previous estimates, it is found
(Az −Az¯, z − z¯) ≥ −k + µ
2
‖z − z¯‖2H ,
that is the desired bound given in equation (6.24).
Property (II).
Let z ∈ V . By definition of the dual norm ‖·‖V ? ,
‖Az‖V ∗ = sup {|(Az, ψ)| : ‖ψ‖V = 1} .
Then, considering any ψ ∈ V , Ho¨lder’s inequality implies∫
Q
x2G(x, y, zx)ψx(x, y) dx dy ≤
(∫
Q
x2ψ2x dx dy
) 1
2
(∫
Q
x2G(x, y, z)2 dx dy
) 1
2
≤ ‖ψ‖V
(∫
Q
|xG(x, y, x)|2 dx dy
) 1
2
.
Hypothesis (i) over the function f implies that G(x, y, 0) = infu f(x, u) = 0 for all
x ∈ R. Therefore, |G(x, y, v)| = |vGz(x, y, ξv)| for a suitable ξv ∈ [0, v], and the previous
estimates (6.28) and (6.30) guarantee that
|G(x, y, v)| ≤ 1
2
Mb |v| ,
for all (x, y) ∈ Q and v ∈ R. Hence for all z, ψ ∈ V∣∣∣∣∫
Q
x2G(x, y, zx)ψx(x, y) dx dy
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12Mb ‖ψ‖V
(∫
Q
x2 |zx|2 dx dy
) 1
2
≤ 1
2
Mb ‖ψ‖V ‖z‖V .
Similarly, we have that for all z, ψ ∈ V∣∣∣∣∫
Q
zy(yψ)y dx dy
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫
Q
|zy(ψ + yψy)| dx dy
≤
(∫
Q
z2y dx dy
) 1
2
[(∫
Q
ψ2 dxdy
) 1
2
+
(∫
Q
y2ψ2y dx dy
) 1
2
]
≤ (1 +M) ‖ψ‖V ‖z‖V
and∣∣∣∣∫
Q
(µ(xz)x + k(θ − y)zy)ψ dx dy
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (∫
Q
ψ2 dx dy
) 1
2
[√
2µ
(∫
Q
z2 + x2z2x dx dy
) 1
2
+kθ¯
(∫
Q
z2y dx dy
) 1
2
]
≤ (
√
2µ+ kθ¯) ‖ψ‖V ‖z‖V ,
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where θ¯ = max{θ, |θ −M |}. Therefore, combining the previous considerations, for all z
and ψ ∈ V
|(Az, ψ)| ≤ C ‖ψ‖V ‖z‖V
where C =
(
1
2Mb+
σ2
2 (M + 1) +
√
2µ+ kθ¯
)
, that is Property (II) given in equation (6.25).
Property (III).
As before, by previous considerations on G, i.e. equations (6.28)-(6.30), Gz(x, y, z) ≥
1
2ay >
1
2aρ on Q× R. Therefore,∫
Q
x2G(x, y, zx)zx dx dy =
∫
Q
x2Gz(x, y, ξz)z
2
x dx dy
for some ξz and thus∫
Q
x2G(x, y, zx)zx dx dy ≥ 1
2
aρ
∫
Q
x2z2x dx dy . (6.31)
Moreover, by integration by parts∫
Q
zy(yz)y dx dy =
∫
Q
(
y|zy|2 + 1
2
(z2)y
)
dx dy
≥ ρ
∫
Q
|zy|2 dx dy
and
−
∫
Q
(µ(xz)x + k(θ − y)zy) z dx dy = −
∫
Q
µ
2
x(z2)x + µz
2 +
k
2
(θ − y)(z2)y dx dy
= −µ+ k
2
‖z‖2H .
Together with (6.31) the latter implies
(Az, z) ≥ 1
2
aρ
(∫
Q
x2z2x dxdy
)
+ ρ
(∫
Q
z2y dxdy
)
−
(
µ+ k
2
)
‖z‖2H
≥ α3
(∫
Q
z2 + x2z2x + z
2
y dxdy
)
−
(
α3 +
µ+ k
2
)
‖z‖2H ,
where α3 = min
{
1
2aρ, ρ
}
> 0, that is the bound (6.26) required by Property (III).
Then we infer, see e.g. [Bar10, Theorem 4.10], that the Cauchy problem (6.23) has a
unique solution p as in Definition 6.3.1 and this completes the proof of the theorem.
6.3.1 Semigroup approach
An alternative methodology to study the Cauchy Problem given in equation (6.23)
is the semigroup approach.
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Let q : [0, T ] → H be the function defined by q(t) = p(T − t). Then, the previous
problem (6.23) can be rewritten as the forward Cauchy problem{
dq
dt +Aq = 0 , t ∈ (0, T ) ,
q(0) = gx ,
(6.32)
where A is the same operator introduced before in equation (6.22).
Let AH be the restriction of the operator A over the functions q ∈ V such that
Aq ∈ H, namely D(AH) = {q ∈ V : Aq ∈ H} ⊂ H and
AH : D(AH)→ H
q → AHq = Aq .
AH is quasi-m-accretive in H × H, meaning that there exists a real parameter η0 ∈ R
such that
(AHq −AH q¯, q − q¯) ≥ −η0 ‖q − q¯‖2H , ∀q, q¯ ∈ D(AH) .
Indeed, AH still satisfies Property (I), given in (6.24), and therefore by choosing η0 > α1
the previous inequality follows straightforwardly. Moreover Property (III), given in
equation (6.26), implies that
((ηI +AH)q, q) = (AHq, q) + η ‖q‖2H ≥ α3 ‖q‖2V + (η − α4) ‖q‖2H > (η − α4) ‖q‖2H
since α3 > 0, and therefore, if η ≥ α4, ηI + AH is coercive. Here I denotes the identity
operator. Therefore, via Minty-Browder theory, see e.g. [Bar10, Theorem 2.2], it follows
that ηI +AH : D(AH)→ H is surjective for all η > η0 = max{α0, α3}, meaning that its
range R(ηI +AH) coincides with the space H, i.e.
R(ηI +AH) = H , ∀η > η0 .
The existence theorem for the Cauchy problem associated with non-linear quasi-
m-accretive operators in Hilbert spaces [Bar10, Theorem 4.5] ensures that when gx ∈
D(AH) Problem (6.32) admits a unique strong solution
q ∈W 1,∞([0, T ];H) =
{
q ∈ L∞([0, T ], H); dq
dt
∈ L∞([0, T ], H)
}
,
that is
q ∈ L2([0, T ], V ) , Aq(t) ∈ L∞([0, T ];H) ,
d+
dt
q(t) +AH(q(t)) = 0 , t ∈ [0, T [ ,
q(0) = gx .
And this means,
Corollary 6.3.1. Let gx ∈ L2(R). Then equation (6.19)-(6.20) has a unique solution
in the sense of Definition 6.3.1.
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Moreover, this unique solution q is given by the Crandall-Liggett exponential formula,
that is
q(t) = lim
n→∞
(
1 +
t
n
A
)−n
q0 , (6.33)
where the limit is uniformly in t over [0, T ]. See, e.g., [Bar10, Theorem 4.3]. Let q0 = gx
and qh be an h-approximate solution to the previous Cauchy problem given by the
following finite difference scheme:
qh(t) = q
i
h ∈ R if t ∈ [ih, (i+ 1)h)
where {
q0h = q0 ,
qi+1h + hAq
i+1
h = q
i
h , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N =
[
T
h
]− 1 .
Then, the Crandall-Liggett formula (6.33) means that q is given as the limit of these
approximate solution qh, i.e.
q(t) = lim
h→0
qh(t) ∀t ∈ [0, T ] .
This scheme may be useful to numerically compute an approximation of the solution to
equation (6.19). Moreover, this reveals that under regular assumptions over the terminal
function g, the solution p of equation (6.19) is locally in H2(Q).
Then, coming back to the equation (6.16),
Corollary 6.3.2. Let gx ∈ L2(R). Then, equation (6.16) has a weak solution in the
sense of Definition 6.3.2. This solution is unique up to an additive function ϕ˜ ≡ ϕ˜(t, y).
Remark 6.3.1. The main advantage of Theorem 6.3.1 and respectively of Corollary 6.3.2
is the regularity properties of a weak solution ϕ.
6.4 A sub-optimal feedback control
In the previous Section 6.3, we have found suitable conditions to ensure the existence
of a weak solution to the HJB equation (6.16) related to the optimization problem (P).
Such a solution may be exploited to construct an optimal control in feedback form.
Indeed, Theorem 5.2.2 suggests that the feedback controller u? defined by
u?(t) = φ(t,X1(t), X2(t)) t ∈ (0, T ) ,
where
φ(t, x, y) = arg min
u∈[a,b]
{
1
2
uypx(t, x, y) + f(x, u)
}
, ∀(x, y) ∈ Q
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and p is a weak solution to equation (6.19)-(6.20), may be optimal in problem (P) for
(X1, X2) ∈ (0, T ) × Q. In order to conclude, one should consider the regularity of the
system under this candidate optimal control.
Let gx ∈ L2(R), then Corollary 6.3.1 ensures that the exists a unique weak solution
p, as in Definition 6.3.1, to the PDE (6.19). Then, in view of equations (6.27) and (6.29),
the map φ is defined by
φ(t, x, y) =
(
fu(x, ·) +N[a,b]
)−1(−1
2
ypx(t, x, y)
)
, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] , (x, y) ∈ Q (6.34)
where fu(x, ·) is the subdifferential of function u 7→ f(x, u). Function φ is well defined
since [LSU88, Theorem 6.1] provides a bound for px, as solution of a quasilinear parabolic
equation. Thus, the corresponding closed loop system (6.3) becomes
dX1 = µX1 dt+X1
√
φ(t,X1, X2)X2 dW1 , t ∈ (0, T ) ,
dX2 = k(θ −X2) dt+ σ
√
X2 dW2 , t ∈ (0, T ) ,
X1(0) = X
0
1 , X2(0) = X
0
2 .
(6.35)
The existence of a strong solution (X1, X2) to (6.35) would imply by standard com-
putations that the map u? = φ(t,X1, X2) is indeed an optimal feedback controller for
problem (P). However the existence of a strong solution for (6.35) is a delicate problem
and the best one can expect in this case is a martingale solution.
Assume in addition to the above hypotheses that
(ii) u 7→ fu(x, u) is strictly monotone, for all x ∈ R.
Then,
Theorem 6.4.1. Assume that (i),(ii) and (6.5) hold. Then there is a weak solution
(X1, X2) to stochastic system (6.35).
Proof. The proof follows similarly to the one of Theorem 6.2.1.
Consider the random map ψ : [0, T ]× R→ R given by
ψ(t, x) = x
√
φ(t, x,X2(t))X2(t) , t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ R .
By construction, the control φ(t, x, y) given in equation (6.34) belongs to the real interval
[a, b] for all (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]×Q, with a > 0, and X2(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], and thus ψ
is well defined. Moreover, ψ is upper bounded by
|ψ(t, x)| ≤ |x|
√
bX2(t) . (6.36)
By hypothesis (ii), fu is monotone, and therefore invertible. Moreover, the map(
fu(x, ·) +N[a,b]
)−1
is Lipschitz continuous on R in x, i.e. |φ(t, x, y)− φ(t, x¯, y)| ≤
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Lφ |x− x¯| for a suitable constant Lφ. Also px is Lipschitz in x on [0, T ] × QR, where
QR = (0, R)× (ρ,M), namely
|px(t, x, y)− px(t, x¯, y)| ≤ LR |x− x¯| , for |x|+ |x¯| ≤ R ,
for a suitable constant LR. The latter is a consequence of high order regularity of
solutions to quasilinear parabolic equation (see again [LSU88, Theorem 6.1]). Therefore,
it follows that for all R > 0, |x|+ |x¯| ≤ R, P-a.s.
|ψ(t, x)−ψ(t, x¯)| =
∣∣∣x√φ(t, x,X2(t))X2(t)− x¯√φ(t, x¯,X2(t))X2(t)∣∣∣
≤
√
X2(t)
(
|x− x¯|
√
φ(t, x,X2(t))+|x¯|
√
|φ(t, x,X2(t))−φ(t, x¯,X2(t))|
)
≤
√
bX2(t) |x− x¯|+ 1
2
RX2(t)
√
Lφ |px(t, x,X2(t))− px(t, x¯,X2(t))|
≤
√
bX2(t) |x− x¯|+ 1
2
RX2(t)
√
LφLR |x− x¯| .
(6.37)
Then, let 
dXε1 = µX
ε
1 dt+X
ε
1
√
φ(t,Xε1 , X
ε
2)X
ε
2 dW1 ,
dXε2 = k(θ −Xε2) dt+ σ X
ε
2√
|Xε2 |+ε
dW2 ,
Xε1(0) = X
0
1 , X
ε
2(0) = X
0
2 ,
(6.38)
approximate the original system (6.35). Arguing as in the proof of Theorem 6.2.1 it
follows by (6.36)-(6.37) that (6.38) has a unique solution (Xε1 , X
ε
2), X
ε
1 , X
ε
2 ≥ 0, P-a.s.,
for any ε > 0. Moreover, one obtains also in this case estimates (6.12)-(6.13) and so
by the Skorohod theorem it follows as above the existence of a weak solution (X˜1, X˜2)
satisfying system (6.35) in a probability space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜, W˜1, W˜2).
Remark 6.4.1. Roughly speaking Theorem 6.4.1 amounts to saying that there is a proba-
bility space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜, W˜1, W˜2) where the closed loop system (6.35) has a solution (X˜1, X˜2).
This means that the feedback controller u∗ is admissible in problem (P) though it is not
clear if it is optimal. However this is a suboptimal feedback controller. Indeed, if one
constructs in a similar way the feedback controller u∗ε = φε(Xε1 , Xε2) for problem (P),
but with state system (6.38), then u∗ε is optimal for the approximating optimal control
problem and it is convergent in law to a controller u∗ as found above.
We conclude this section considering two possible examples.
Example 1. Consider the simple case when f(x, u) = 0 for all x ∈ R and u ∈ U . Then
equation (6.19) reduces to
pt + µ(xp)x + k(θ − y)py + σ
2
2
ypyy + y
(
x2(aH(px) + bH(−px))
)
x
= 0 ,
x ∈ R , y ∈ (ρ,M) ,
p(T, x, y) = gx(x) , ∀x ∈ R.
(6.39)
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where H is the Heaviside function. Therefore, in this case the optimal feedback control
u?, given in equation (6.34), becomes
u?(t) =

a if px(t,X1(t), X2(t)) > 0,
∈ (a, b) if px(t,X1(t), X2(t)) = 0,
b if px(t,X1(t), X2(t)) < 0.
However, in this case Theorem 6.4.1 does not apply since hypothesis (ii) is not verified
by a constant function. Therefore, even if the parabolic equation (6.39) admits a weak
solution p in the sense of Definition 6.3.1, p is not sufficiently regular to assume the
existence of a solution to the closed loop system (6.39) even in the weak sense.
Nevertheless, observe that if for almost all ω ∈ Ω the set
Σ = { t : px(t,X?1 (t), X?2 (t)) = 0 }
is finite, then the control u? is a bang-bang controller with Σ as set of switch points.
This fact might be lead to a simplification of control problem (P) by replacing the set
U of admissible control process u : [0, T ]→ R by
U˜0 = {u : [0, T ]→ R ,Ft − adapted, u(t) =
N−1∑
i=0
viχ[ti,ti+1](t) } .
Here t0 = 0 < t1 < t2 < · · · < tN = T is a given partition of interval [0, T ] while
vi : Ω→ R are Fti-measurable functions.
Example 2. Now, let f : R× R→ R be
f(x, u) = f(u) =
1
2
(u− u0)2 ,
where u0 ∈ [a, b]. The function f satisfies hypotheses (i) and (ii), since f is continuous
and convex, minu f = 0 and fu = (u − u0) is strictly increasing. Then Theorem 6.4.1
ensures that there exists a candidate optimal feedback control u?(t) = φ(t,X1(t), X2(t)),
where φ is given by
φ(t, x, y) =
(
I(·)− u0 +N[a,b](·)
)−1(1
2
ypx(t, x, y)
)
, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] , (x, y) ∈ R ,
where p is the solution to (6.19)-(6.20). In this case u? reads as
u?(t) =

a if X2(t)px(t,X1(t), X2(t)) > 2(b− u0)
b if X2(t)px(t,X1(t), X2(t)) < 2(a− u0)
u0 − X2(t)2 px(t,X1(t), X2(t)) ∈ (a, b) otherwise.
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